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"... the evolution of science reflects a basic 
polarity in nature itself: differentiation and 
integration."
Koestler, 1972.
"... the evolution of ideas appear(s) as a succession 
of repeated differentiations, specializations and 
re-integrations on a higher level - a progression 
from primordial unity through variety to more complex 
patterns of unity-in-variety."
Koestler, 1968.
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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of empirical work relating to the 
first three years of childhood makes the psychological study 
of infancy very complex. Scientists have restricted the 
areas of these studies in order to postulate about specific 
aspects of the behavioural development of the child. This 
differentiation is valuable in its detailed contribution 
to scientific inquiry. Its complexity brings with it, 
however, a need for a superordinate self-theory within 
which to subsume the parts of the whole personality, to 
relate them in an organized and hierarchical way and to 
keep open an observation of the self's furthest develop­
mental parameters as a paradigm for individual psychology. 
The self construct, at the top of the hierarchical set of 
individual theoretical constructs, is the study undertaken 
here with particular attention to the self's special 
relation with the ego-processes in the first years of 
childhood.
The long human evolution of individuation has built 
up the genome, or programme for life, through links between 
the brain and germ plasm. As each individual organism is 
unique genetically and experientially, (containing the long 
evolution of the central nervous system), the organism uses 
its own germ plasm, linked to its own brain, in a unified 
or self-conscious and self-reflective way. The central 
nervous system relates the human being to biologically 
relevant aspects of the environment. It also devolves 
some tasks to a hierarchically lower unconscious integration
Ill
A continuity within self-experience is strengthened by 
dispositions within the memory system to recall behaviour 
through an ego-related storage system (Chapter VII).
But dispositions to behave unconsciously are also present 
and contain inbuilt tendencies of an archetypal nature 
(Chapter I). Inborn reactions are now being widely studied,
e.g. the newborn baby's expectation of being fed. This 
expectant knowledge is a priori, i.e. prior to all 
observational experience and thus both psychologically 
and genetically a priori. The need to explain such 
phenomena has led to new hypotheses regarding the self 
and its ego-system in the first year of life.
The ego process has needed reassessment in its relation 
to the self construct. In general, the ego has been 
described in too simplistic a way and in widely differing 
ways. The ego-process proposed here is an original revision 
and conjunction of elements within Jung's and Freud's 
formulations, using Fordham's extension of Jung's self­
theory and then extending these postulates of ego develop­
ment still further into a new ego-process theory. An 
original term, 'con-integrate', is introduced. Con-inte­
grates are a group of de-integrated ego aggregates which 
re-integrate in special systems of great significance 
within the ego processes.
It will be argued that a self theory is consistent 
with general experimental data (Chapters III, IV, VI and 
VII ) 7 that it is heuristically essential in analytical 
psychology (Chapter I), in the neo-Freudian contribution 
of Kohut (Chapter II) and to the theory of autism (Chapter III)
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In general, self theories are supported by physiological 
analogues of the self (Chapter IV) and centrally important 
to neo-Kantian humanism, Mischel's cognitive models and 
to several dynamic construct models (Chapter V ) . Rychlak 
(1976) has defined self as "... a construct enabling the 
theorist to conceptualize the contribution made to behaviour 
by an organism which brings meaningful premises to bear 
from a protopoint (a premise taken as a beginning or fixed 
point by the self)". The term 'self can be said to capture 
the impact of precedent meanings that partially determine 
ongoing behaviour (Chapter V ) . Self-premises can be varied 
or changing as the organism 'comes at' any one life 
situation. The multiplicity of premises possible to the 
self within a unit of time is an area psychology has yet 
to study thoroughly. Unconfirmed self-premises are 
repressed and return through dreams and in complexes where 
there is poor self-definition not under the individual's 
full self-control. The psychological uncomfortableness of 
a multiplicity of self-premises simultaneously present in 
the conscious and the unconscious gives cognitive, 
phenomenological, behaviourist and depth psychologists 
much to think about and to clarify theoretically. This 
study is an attempt to rectify this situation through a 
broadly based theoretical reappraisal of self theory and 
its implications for ego processes. A new theory of the 
ego is introduced.
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Introduction
The etymologies of most words standing for the concept 
of the self as used in everyday language are obscure or 
unknown. The base of Anglo-Saxon self is selbha (Pokorny 
1959) which contains within its root the symbolic union of 
separation and of belonging. Selbha is compounded of se 
meaning away, separated for, or by, itself and bho which 
refers to cohesive totality, e.g. Gothic sibia; Old High 
German sippe, kin, kinsfolk, totality of one's own people; 
English dialect sib, related by blood; Latin Sabini, members 
of the clan; Indo-European suebho, belonging to one's own 
people, free; hence Russian o-soba, person, and Old Eccle­
siastical Slavonic svoboda, freedom originally meant as the 
status of the members of the clan.
The other important root is poti, or self in the Indo- 
European languages. Thus Old Indian pati, lord or master; 
Greek posis, mighty; Old Latin potic sum, I can, potoir, I 
seize upon.
Two striking motifs emerge in the etymology of the self 
concept: one, that of belonging to a clan but associated with 
the notion of freedom and individuality: the other, that of 
omnipotence of the individual self.
For psychology, etymology cannot be more than a sign­
post for what ordinary persons mean when the self as an 
idea is mentioned. Psychology needs an overall conceptual 
definition from which it can argue and theorize. This 
would include a reassessment of the contribution from 
cognitive, behaviourist and psycho-dynamic schools bearing
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in mind recent relevant evidence from physiological studies 
and from theoretical physics. The most broadly based 
conception from which to extend elements of self theory is 
that postulated by C.G. Jung, the Swiss psychiatrist and 
analytical psychologist. Jung's theory and that of the 
Freudian school will be thoroughly evaluated and a new model 
of the self's ego-processes attempted which is grounded on 
theoretical ideas from both major schools of depth psychology. 
The critical and empirical influence of other historical 
contributions of self theory will be considered. More 
specifically, the empirical evidence of infant and child 
psychology will be considered in proposing evidence for a 
new self/ego theory.
C.G. Jung worked throughout his life in reformulating 
a description of a theoretical self-concept and in 1959 
stated one of its problems: "The concept of psychic wholeness 
necessarily implies an element of transcendence on account 
of the existence of unconscious components. Transcendence 
in this sense is not equivalent to a metaphysical postulate 
or hypostasis; it claims no more than to be a borderline 
concept" (Jung 1959b).
In general Jung (1928) contended that theories are the 
equivalent of primitive and myth-like elements from which 
they are derived. In 1946 he wrote: "Translated into the 
language of psychology the mythologem runs; ... the union 
of conscious mind or ego-personality with the unconscious 
personified as anima (an archetype) produces a new personality 
(the self) compounded of both". This conception maintains 
that theories are based on archetypal affects.
vil
The archetypes of the collective unconscious, as projected 
into consciousness, are thought to bring affects which 
influence the formulation of 'self' postulates. Jung 
derived the idea of the archetypes from the archetypal 
images represented, for example, by the gods in mythological 
systems. Archetypes generally were introduced to account 
for regularities observed in dreams and imagination.
Although Jung worked mainly with adults, Fordham (1976) 
observed that in studies of children evacuated from London 
during World War II the child's psyche was seen to be making 
a separate archetypal contribution, divorced from an 
intrusion of the parents' unconscious into the child's 
dream life. As well, the evacuated child's range of neurosis, 
behaviour disorder, psychosomatic diseases and psychoses 
suggested that more than the home, past or present, was 
responsible. Fordham has published his collection of 
children's archetypal dreams in The Life of Children (19 44) 
and developed this theme in Children as Individuals (1969) . 
Images such as the self can be easily observed in children's 
symbolic material and are widely reported by many therapeutic 
schools.
Fordham (1976) believes that the Jungian theory of 
archetypes brings body and psyche together because the 
archetypes are described as being unconscious states or 
entities having two poles: the one an expression of 
instinctual force and drives, the other expressed in the 
form of fantasies. The instinctual drives would be relatively 
few in number and fixed while the fantasy component "has wide 
and flexible applications". Therefore one is stating
V l l l
theoretically that a child has a predisposition for developing 
archaic ideas and feelings which are neither only introjects 
nor are they implanted. Suitable imagery enables the 
unconscious archetypal ideas to find expression in consciousness
Education presumably influences archetypal ideas and 
parents build on the child's archetypes when they mediate 
the culture patterns within which a developing organism is 
living. So there is both an outer (projective, introjective, 
identifying) and an inner (archetypal) influence which gives 
regularity to the affect associated to archetypal images.
This interaction between unconscious archetype and traditional 
environmental components causes a reinforcement between the 
two aspects.
It will be necessary in tracing back the archetypes 
to early infancy to show how they are reflected in early 
physical object-relationships. The infant is first concerned 
with what is transmitted to his body, the quality of that 
experience and what he can do with these objects. Melanie 
Klein (1932) and her collaborators, such as Susan Isaacs 
(1948) and Paula Heimann (1955), define unconscious fantasy 
in terms almost identical with Jung's definition of the 
archetypes.
In this study the author assumes a neo-Kantian position: 
this is that from birth, or shortly before, the mind brings 
meaning-framing 'premises' or categories of understanding to 
what Rychlak (1976) describes as a 'pro forma' or going 
towards a formal sense. These are precedent categories, 
conceptual and not necessarily primarily constituted as in 
the Lockean model of tabula rasa upon which a stimulus-
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response set is built up into a hierarchy of behavioural 
habits. The Kantian theoretical position and that of 
Jung when dealing with support of the idea of the self 
as a central archetype are very similar. Both Kant and 
Jung argued that we must bring things in mind down to 
empirical test. This allows, however, for a contribution 
from mind to the empirical result. A purely material and 
efficient-cause description, i.e. a mechanist explanation, 
is here rejected for a humanistic approach which comments 
from an introspective perspective and attempts to "see 
things the way the conceptualizing intellect sees them" 
(Rychlak 1976). Humanism contends that the individual self 
contributes to the flow of events and makes a difference. 
This contention is fundamental to this study of the self/ 
not-self polarity in the early development of childhood.
A new model of the ego processes will be presented as 
a framework for further research. This self/ego model 
introduced by the author postulates an original conception 
of 'integrates' which have a special dynamic relation to 
the ego processes.
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Chapter I. The contribution of Jung and the neo-Jungians 
1. The Jungian background
The history of depth psychology as it evolved from 
the psycho-analysis of S. Freud to the analytical psychology 
of C.G. Jung has shifted from the personal reductive 
emphasis of Freud's work to a more distant goal of research 
leading to a phylogeny of the mind in Jung's theory of the 
psyche. Freud essentially looked at man in terms of his 
personal history and found in the child-parent inter­
relationships the elements which determined the healthy 
and/or pathological development of the individual. This 
genetic and personalistic view led to an emphasis on child­
hood analysis. Jung, however, moved slightly away from a 
preoccupation with only the personal to look at a trans­
personal factor in the psyche - the archetypes of the 
collective unconscious - which in Jung's theory determine 
man's development, aided or abetted by the temporal as it 
creates conflicts with the 'read-out' of archetypal material 
through the stages of life development from birth to death.
If emphasis is laid purely on empirical and clinical 
factors in depth psychology it can suggest the scientist 
may be unconscious of his own theoretical preconceptions.
Jung was an empiricist but his theory of the psyche is 
constructed on both a grand and a rich scale. When empirical 
material is almost unmanageable due to its complexity as 
it is in the work about the psychology of early childhood, 
it pushes scientists to build theories that differentiate 
aspects or a part of the whole. But without a superordinate
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self-theory it will be difficult to keep open the furthest 
parameters within which scientific inquiry can properly 
move in the dynamic study of the first years of life.
à. The nature of archetypes
As the subject and object of cognition are of the same 
nature in the science of psychology, that is, both are 
interpreted by one and the same psyche in a psychological 
manner and then also studied psychologically, it can be 
said that any or all psychologies must share this difficulty 
Jung came to the conclusion that beyond causal relations 
and manifestations in time and space within consciousness 
and the personal unconscious, there must lie a transpsychic 
reality, or collective unconscious where a relativation of 
time and space occur. Physics has investigated the discon­
tinuities in subatomic processes and has also, within modern 
science, been confronted with the problem of the relativity 
of time and space.
Analytical psychology, formed on Jung's contribution 
and widely extended by others both before and since his 
death in 1961, is based principally on the study of the 
archetypes. Jungian psychology has an object to study and 
a method by which to study it. The object is the 'objective 
psyche' which Jung originally referred to as the collective 
unconscious. This part of the unconscious is held to differ 
fundamentally from more personal material which has been 
repressed into the 'personal unconscious' because of 
incompatibility in terms of its acceptability from the 
conscious standpoint. The personal unconscious is all that
Diagram 1, Diagram of the self.
1. The ego.
2. Consciousness.
3. The personal unconscious.
4. The collective unconscious.
(Adapted from Jacabi, 1962)
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Freud postulated in his model of the unconscious. (See 
Diagram 1 for the Jungian schema of the unconscious).
In the objective psyche or collective unconscious, there 
is a second kind of material, expressing primordial 
collective forms that influence the way conscious material 
is experienced and which have been compared by Jung to a 
crystal: "The form of these archetypes is perhaps comparable 
to the axial system of a crystal which predetermines ... 
the crystalline formation in the saturated solution, without 
itself possessing a material existence. This existence 
first manifests itself in the way of ions and then the 
molecules arrange themselves ... The axial system determines 
... merely the stereometric structure, not ... the concrete 
form of the individual crystal ... and just so the archetype 
possesses ... an invariable core of meaning that determines 
its manner of appearing always only in principle, never 
concretely" (Jung 1939).
Jung views this unconscious material as fundamentally 
objective in the sense that its image in consciousness can 
be studied. When aspects of the collective unconscious 
become conscious, they can be discussed as elements of the 
objective psyche. Jung sees the psyche as just as suitable 
an object for scientific study as is the world of outer 
material fact. The archetypes or universal patterns of 
perception are contrasted in definition with the term 
'archetypal images' which means symbolic manifestations 
and the pictorial expression of the archetypes. "These 
belong to the knowable realm of consciousness and occur as 
analogous motifs in myths, fairy tales, dreams, delusions, 
etc., at all times and in all parts of the world" (Jaffe 1971)
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In 1936 Jung presented an unpublished paper in London 
at Bedford College where he elaborated his view of the 
collective unconscious. The archetype per se is an unknow­
able factor in the collective unconscious which underlies 
archetypal images and contents and arranges them into typical 
images and groupings. Such a structuring element would be 
comparable to a 'pattern of behaviour' in biology that also 
underlies recurrently typical life situations such as birth, 
change, illness, love or death. The phenomena of the 
collective unconscious are, unlike repressed material, 
transpersonal7 unlike repressed contents which have once 
been conscious, they have never been conscious before but 
emerge as new to consciousness from the collective unconscious 
and are represented in images. "The hypothesis of a collec­
tive unconscious is just about as daring as the assumption 
that there are instincts" (Jung 1936). Instincts are like­
wise unconscious in functioning and transcend personal 
considerations.
The theory of the collective unconscious and its organs, 
the archetypes, is based on an assumption that the fundamental 
structure of the psyche is uniform. If we could eliminate 
the conscious, Jung believed there would be little or no 
difference between one human being and another (in the 
original unconscious psychical content). So Jung has 
postulated an unknown 'x', a psychoid archetype in nature, 
unconscious and having a hypothetical vital principle 
directing the behaviour of organisms out of which consciousness 
grows. When it appears consciously it is an archetypal image 
which is seen to be the mental representative of instinct 
and which transposes the instinct into a conscious experience.
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Mindful of the distinction between the personal and 
collective unconscious, Jung criticized Freud's discussion 
of Leonardo da Vinci's picture 'St. Anne with Mary and the 
Christ Child'. Freud's explanation of the picture was 
based on the fact that Leonardo had two women who served 
as mother to him. Jung in the paper entitled 'Dual Mother' 
in Symbols of Transformation (1956) asserted that the dual 
mother theme is widespread, having motifs of rebirth, the 
dual descent or twice born, in which the culture hero has 
a double birth, one human and one divine. Jung's examples 
in amplifying this idea include myths around Heracles, the 
Pharaohs and Jesus: the rebirth ritual was used in medical 
healing at the dawn of civilization, is found in mysticism, 
in infantile fantasy and is a central concept in mediaeval 
occult philosophy. Jung concluded, "it is absolutely out 
of the question that all the individuals who believe in the 
dual descent have in reality always had (or experienced) 
two mothers ..." (1956). Jung also argued, using a neurosis
where a patient appears to be deluded that he has two mothers, 
that the neurosis under review is not personal but a 
collective manifestation.
Jung began his formulation of archetypal theory in his 
work from 1908 to 1910 when he encountered unconscious 
contents in his patients which resisted integration into 
consciousness. This material was made evident in the dreams, 
symptoms and fantasies of patients. Jung was accustomed to 
receive from patients a projection of archaic motives onto 
himself as physician. These took the form of a transfer of 
the figure of the medicine man or magician onto the doctor.
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These primordial images, a designation Jung took from a 
letter (circa 1855) of Jacob Burckhardt to a student, Albert 
Brown, in which Faust and other 'genuine myths' were first 
described as 'primordial images', were seen to have four 
regularly appearing qualities which Jung thought to be: 
repetition as a universal across races, constancy within 
the races, a fascinating effectiveness or numinosity setting 
archetypal images apart from other images, and regularity 
within each individual's life.
In Latin, 'arche' is the beginning or primary cause 
and 'type' is imprint. "The religious point of view 
understands the imprint as the working of an imprinter; 
the scientific point of view understands it as the symbol 
of an unknown and incomprehensible content" (Jung 1944b). 
Jung was not the first to be concerned with archetypal 
images. Plato in the Symposium described images, schemata 
and inherited functional possibilities such as a knowledge 
of universels that are supposed to be innate. In ethnology, 
the study of races and people, Adolf Bastian (1860) was the 
first to draw attention to the widespread occurrence of 
certain 'elementary ideas'. Hubert and Mauss (1898) called 
a priori thought-forms 'categories': "They exist ordinarily
as posits which govern consciousness, but are themselves 
unconscious". Jung thought it a mistake to suppose that the 
psyche of a new-born child is a tabula rasa or blank slate 
in the sense that there is absolutely nothing in it. "In so 
far as the child is born with a differentiated brain that is 
predetermined by heredity and therefore individualized, it 
meets sensory stimuli coming from outside itself not with
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general aptitudes, but with specific ones, and this 
necessarily results in a particular, individual choice 
and pattern of apperception" (1959a). Jung developed 
this idea when speaking of the 'child archetype';
"It is not the world as we know it that speaks out of 
his (the Australian aborigine's) unconscious, but the 
unknown world of the psyche, of which we know that it 
mirrors our empirical world in accordance with its own 
psychic assumptions". "The archetype does not proceed 
from physical facts; it describes how the psyche experiences 
the physical fact..." (1959a).
Archetypes contain essentially mythological facts which 
have numerous centres, or modal points. These essential 
groupings display themselves over and over again with the 
same ideas and functions. Some of the archetypes are the 
'shadow', the 'wise old man', the 'earth mother' and the 
'puer aeternus' to name but a few. They are best described 
metaphorically. The archetypes occur at an ethnological level 
as myths and their effect is strongest where consciousness 
is weakest and most restricted and where fantasy can over­
run the facts of the outer world; "...this condition is 
undoubtedly present in the child ... the archetypal form 
of the divine syzygy (or conjunction of male and female) 
first covers up and assimilates the image of the real parents 
until, with increasing consciousness, the real figures of 
the parents are perceived - often to the child's disappoint­
ment" (Jung 1959a) . Thus the psyche is seen as a self 
regulating system, the unconscious having compensatory 
capabilities to correct deficiencies in conscious adaptation.
The technique of analytical psychology has been to 
find means to raise the contents of the collective unconscious 
to consciousness and to interpret their meaning. The 
techniques of free association and dream analysis are too 
well known to need amplification here. Active imagination, 
used by the school of C.G. Jung, needs more definition as 
it is not widely understood. If imagination runs free a 
person may create a drama in which he plays a part, or he 
may create a dance or vision. This can also be expressed 
through the media of clay modelling, sand pictures, painting, 
carving and drawing. Interpreting the material necessitates 
the amplification of the material by the analogical method: 
Jung used the knowledge and viewpoint of antiquity to throw 
light upon the unconscious products of modern man. In a 
similar way the meanings of Egyptian manuscripts have been 
decoded by referring to archaeological finds of antiquity 
which occur in the symbolization of later language. Such 
insights and amplifications are used by Jungians to interpret 
symbols produced in dreams and fantasies. It is clear that 
Jung has expounded a theory of the unconscious and its inter­
pretation totally different from Freud who conceived of the 
unconscious as an infantile phenomenon. In an interesting 
analogy, Fordham (1944) points out that in physiology nobody 
would assume that because both man and child have a heart, 
that it is an infantile organ. In tracing back fantasies 
of adults to childish roots, would the Freudians discard 
these experiences as merely infantile deposits? It is here 
with fantasy that Freud and Jung and their "schools" part 
company. Jung asserts that the whole of fantasy life is not
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infantile but parts of it are an attribute of man in 
general in the same manner of Fordham's analogy: that 
the heart is an organ common to the human race at all 
ages. "The unconscious bases of dreams and fantasies 
are only apparently infantile reminiscences. In reality 
we are concerned with primitive or archaic thought-forms, 
based on instinct, which naturally emerge more clearly in 
childhood than they do later". These archaic thought- 
forms may contain personal factors but impersonal motives 
may have great significance as well (Freud and Jung 1974.
See Jung's letter to Freud of 15 November 1909; 10 January 
1910; 30 January, 1910). Jung argued that there are ageless 
motives in myths, fairy tales and in folklore including 
ever-repeated themes which point to the existence of symbols 
common to all humanity. This led Jung to assume that there 
were impersonal nuclear processes in the unconscious psyche - 
he confirmed this on the basis of collective archaic patterns, 
the archetypes.
a-1. Hereditability and archetypes
Freud had studied the phenomena of the unconscious 
entirely within terms of his theory of repression. He 
studied unconscious products historically and personalisti- 
cally falling in line with the current view of the time 
that mind was an ontogenetic phenomenon, acquired in the 
course of individual development. Jung rejected the develop­
mental source as the only basis of the archetypal images.
He argued that archetypal themes in an individual could not 
have been in his consciousness before they emerged from the 
unconscious or that it was not the consequence of nurture.
- 10 -
He published extensive empirical proofs to support the 
contention in 'The Concept of the Collective Unconscious' 
(1936). It is with great caution however that Jungian 
psychology calls the archetypes hereditary factors. The 
notion that archetypes are the deposits of racial experience 
is emphatically denied by Weismann's (1893) theory of the 
continuity of germ plasm. As the body is a by-product of 
the germ plasm created by the union of the male and female 
cells, nothing that is acquired in a lifetime, in body or 
mind, has any effect whatsoever upon the germ plasm, i.e. 
all acquired characteristics die forever with the body.
Thus inherited body structure changes or change in psychic 
organization originate only in variable gene combinations 
or their structural mutations. The environment does 
contribute to the appearance of physical characteristics in 
that;if an unfavourable environment occurs in the inter- 
uterine development^ anomalies result. The only inherited 
factors are those within the fertilized ovum; everything 
else is the product of inherited factors and the environment 
together.
When it is said that archetypes are hereditary functions 
all that can be meant is that they are postulated to be 
somehow represented in the germ cells so that archetypal 
images in the conscious mind likewise contain within them 
the effect of genetic factors.
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a-2. Instinct and archetype
Jung saw that if instincts are taken to be innate
patterns of behaviours then archetypal images are comparable
and represent the instincts in consciousness. In The Study
of Instinct (1951), Tinbergen has investigated 'sign stimuli'
which release patterns of behaviour which are initiated by
a stable perceptual system within the animal e.g. the baby
gull, called the innate releasing mechanism (IRM). This
selects suitable stimuli from the perceptual field and
releases the instinctual response. As the whole behaviour
system is determined by this functional system it is more
than a reflex mechanism. Reflexes are accepted as innate.
In addition spontaneous rhythmic activities of the brain,
the spinal cord and the autonomic nervous system take part.
The central nervous system does not contribute special
movements from stimulation, but the rhythmic activities of
the central nervous system are released from an inhibitory
influence by the sign stimuli acting through the IRM. Thus
%
an innate neuro-endocrine system is the basis of instinctive 
behaviour.
Since archetypes are perceived in terms of acts and 
images, the organization of the brain must show a close 
relation to the organization and function of the archetypes. 
Neurologists have not always operated with the concepts of 
a neurophysiological substrate on the one hand and conscious­
ness on the other; in the history of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, several neurologists, physiologists and 
psychologists, following Charcot's studies of dissociation 
at the Salpetriere in 1878, became interested in the '
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possibility of unconscious brain influences. Despine 
published the view in 1868 that an automatic cerebral 
activity manifests itself without the participation of 
the self ('le moi') whereas the self is manifest by 
conscious cerebral activity. These ideas of "unconscious 
cerebration" as a physiological explanation for varying 
functions in different layers of cortical grey matter were 
picked up by Luys, Huxley and Maudsley. These theories 
were attacked by Bernheim (1884, 1888) as he found traces 
of 'le moi' still operative as a personal style in 
somnambulists and suggested this might be better explained 
by an increased speed of translating suggested image into 
action, than by an unconscious cerebration.
Already at the dawn of the eighteenth century Bichat 
had distinguished between central and autonomous nervous 
function. Du Bois Reymond and Helmholtz studied the speed 
of transmission of nervous impulse and learned that the 
stimulus impact and its registration are not simultaneous. 
Reflexes, studied in the nineteenth century, emphasized the 
unconscious aspect of reflex action in the subject- 
Bernard and Brucke as well as Du Bois Reymond and Helmholtz 
refer to unconscious homeostatic processes whereby body 
maintenance is regulated as to biological equilibrium.
Breuer, Fechner and Spencer used the notion of physiological 
equilibrium as well as the psychological aspects of its 
effect. Flugel (1955) in discussing Spencer's psychology 
mentions the homeostatic principle in so far as "adaptation 
of inner relations to outer relations" aims at a state of \ : : 
equilibrium.
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Galton (1879), in analysing word associations, inferred 
the importance of unconscious cerebration. Thus many 
eighteenth and nineteenth century scientists preceded 
Freud and later schools of depth psychology in postulating 
various forms of unconscious activity.
Concepts of cerebral activity including the idea that
the cortex, with the subcortical ganglia and the network
of association fibres,acts as a whole were put forward by
Flourens in an 1842 paper, "Recherches expérimentales sur
les propriétés et les fonctions du, système nerveux dans
les animaux vertebres". His work on lower animals, e.g.
rabbits, chickens, hens and pigs, enabled Flourens to study
general faculties but not individual differences. On the
basis of experimental results using ablation, he postulated
a unity of the cerebrum proper 'and its functional abilities
Localization of perception, however split up or localized
this might be when mapped on the brain, was found to be
dependent upon the cerebral cortex as a whole. Lashley
»
confirmed Flourens' generalization a hundred years later.
More recent work carried on research into concepts of 
wholes. A study by Head, Rivers, Holmes, Sherran, Thompson 
and Roddoch (1920) showed that patients having cerebral 
cortical lesions, that distorted their appreciation of 
posture and body-image, used a standard against which to 
measure all postural change that was not a visual or motor 
image; rather it lay outside consciousness and entered 
consciousness already in a relation to what went before 
and was directly perceived as a measured postural change.
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A whole body schema is postulated as necessary for under­
standing body-image generally. Body-image was defined by 
Head et al. as an unconscious physiological disposition 
used as an ongoing standard of comparison for postural 
change.
Perception of wholes or universels relates to cyber­
netics (Wiener 1948) in a brain conceptualized as dynamic 
and purposeful and which is described in terms of rever­
berating circuits, negative feed-back, scansion and 
oscillation. Wiener defines reverberating circuits as a 
closed chain of neurons which can be set into impulse by 
a single incoming impulse. This impulse passes around the 
circuit until other incoming impulses change it or the 
metabolism no longer supports it. Negative feed-back 
indicates a system where activity within the system is 
modified when some part of the output returns as input 
again. Wiener uses the term 'scansion', derived from 
television, to mean a rhythmic sweep of impulses through 
the cortex; i.e. alpha rhythm has been thought of as the 
'smoke' of the rhythmic sweep. Oscillation, as opposed to 
rigidity, is the correct feed-back state in a servo-mechanism 
where feed-back is set to maintain the system in an equili­
brium. "Not only has extrapyramidal function and dysfunction 
been given a new explanation, but what is more important ... 
a physiological interpretation has been suggested for 
psychological processes, such as perception of universels..." 
(Meyer and McLardy 1950). These newer concepts of cerebral 
activity suggest that where higher more psychic activities 
of the brain are concerned, the cortex, the subcortical 
ganglia and the network of association fibres act as a whole.
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If the theory of instincts leads to a concept of a 
nervous system containing innate patterns of energy (not 
only reflexes) then the analysis of the nervous system 
restricted to terms of reflex mechanisms is outdated; 
physiologists have introduced the concept of 'spontaneous' 
or self-activated rhythmic activity of brain cells. (This 
can be correlated with the rhythmic activity of the infant's 
earliest sucking activities).
a-3. Evolution and archetypes
The evolutionary theory of Darwin raises two problems 
which relate to the theory of archetypes. What origins do 
archetypes have and have archetypes undergone any evolution­
ary change? Jung (1953) believed that "... their (the 
archetypes) origin can only be explained by assuming them 
to be the deposits of the constantly repeated experiences 
of humanity". It is clear that on present biological theory 
these experiences cannot be inherited. The manner of 
experiencing the world, however, may be the result of 
changes in the germ cells. To align archetypal phenomena 
with what is known about heredity, one can say that primitive 
man experienced the world in terms of archetypal images as 
a consequence of archetypal activity in the unconscious.
Once evolution is applied to man, the enormous development 
of consciousness is striking. Unlike most animals where 
evolution may fairly be described as almost 'blind', man 
has transmissible variants which genetically produce 
anatomical changes (the upright posture), new physiological 
processes and new instinctual patterns. Variants survive
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or fall by natural selection. As transmissible knowledge 
is non-inheritable, so schools have developed everywhere 
to make secure the available traditions and influence the 
consciousness of history. Elliot Smith (1933) of the 
diffusionist school of anthropology, in postulating that 
the essentials of civilization all began in Egypt and then 
diffused outward from this single centre, forgets that 
diffusion depends upon the local consciousness of any area.
If that consciousness is not developed enough to make use 
of advances from elsewhere there is no soil for the seed.
No explanation of how assimilation of new concepts takes 
place is as convincing in the present state of knowledge 
as the way in which the C.G. Jung school redefines the 
problem theoretically: that the conscious originates in the 
unconscious. It has its first expression in images, dreams, 
inspirations, etc. The archetypal images take a major place 
and become eventually systematized as knowledge.
Jung believed scientific theories themselves can be 
based on quasi-mystical experiences. Pauli (1955) dis­
cussed the influence of archetypal ideas in the scientific 
ideas of Kepler. Pauli argues that scientific ideas and 
theories have developed beyond the possibility of experience. 
It accordingly becomes necessary to question the nature of 
the bridge between sense data and conceptualization of it. 
Pure logic has not been able to construct the bridge so 
Pauli suggests that the process of scientific discovery is 
not based upon perception on the one hand and the elaboration 
of logical construction on the other. He says, "The process 
of understanding nature ... seems to be based on a
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correspondence, a 'matching' of inner images pre-existent 
in the human psyche with external objects and their behaviour" 
(1955). Pauli believed the 'inner images' relate to arche­
typal image and that scientific theory is the abstract 
equivalent of these archetypes: "...the archetypes thus 
function as the sought-for bridge between the sense percep­
tions and the ideas and are, accordingly, a necessary pre­
supposition even for evolving a scientific theory of nature"
(1955). These ideas retain reason and logic in scientific 
discovery but throw into question its rationalistic basis. 
Rationalism has kept this bridge between the sense data and 
its conceptualization unconscious and Pauli uses Kepler as 
an example of a religious nature that ran side by side with 
abstract scientific concepts. At the root of discovery lies 
an archetypal form that does not change: what-does change is 
the form or image which it is given. Kepler's scientific 
discoveries reflect religious doctrines of great antiquity. 
What matters is where man's consciousness is; "...dream the 
myth onwards and give it a modern dress" (Jung 1951).
B. Symbol and myth
Jung observed attempts at myth-making in children and 
from this he originated the hypothesis of a creative urge 
toward mythology in the psyche, a condition to which Freud 
objected. Jung saw a profound tension of opposites in the 
meaning of symbols (such as God and the Devil). In a 
dynamic context this led to transcending the opposites 
while in content the presence of analogies facilitated 
symbol formation. Jung was unable to accept Freud's
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hypothesis that fantasy was distorted and falsified 
phenomena. Jung found the Freudian conceptual framework 
unendurably narrow. "Besides the obvious personal sources, 
creative fantasy also draws upon the forgotten and long 
buried primitive mind with its host of images, which are 
to be found in the mythologies of all ages and all peoples"
(1956).
The content of any particular image raises questions 
that are reflected in the protean use of the word symbol.
Stein (1957) points out the derivation of the word:
"... sym, i.e. syn, which means 'together, common, simul­
taneous, with, according to', and boIon which means 'that 
which has been thrown', from ballo, '1 throw'. 'Symbol'
thus means something perceptible as the result of an activity 
which throws together such things as have something in 
common, and in such a way that one thing somehow accords 
with another not presented to the senses and is synchronous 
with it". Definition is difficult. Recently neurophysio­
logists have called images symbolic. When it was discovered 
that the stimulated neurons in the brain form patterns on 
the cortex unlike the shape of an object under observation, 
its perceptual image was realized to be inferred and thus 
symbolic. In ancient Greece symbols were tallies. This 
brings us closer to Jung's definition of symbol. Tallies 
were, '"halves of two corresponding pieces of a bone, coin, 
or other object which two strangers ... broke between them 
in order to have proof of the identity of the presenter of 
the one part to the other... The symbol, the broken off part.
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is not a separate element, but carries with it and points 
to wherever it goes, the whole in which it has participated 
as well as the situation in which it was broken in half; 
when it is 'thrown together' and matched with the remaining 
half the whole has value because the symbol grips the two 
opposites together and so can convey - not create or apply - 
this value" (Stein 1957). This prepares us for Jung's 
definition of symbol: "... the symbol always presupposes
that the chosen expression is the best possible description, 
or formula, of a relatively unknown fact; a fact, however, 
which is none the less recognized or postulated as existing" 
(1923) .
Another aspect of perception is myth. Kerenyi (1951) 
discusses the concept of mythologem, a word denoting the 
core-concept of a single myth or of a class of myths. An 
example of a mythologem would be the 'divine child' under 
which Kerenyi subsumes Buddha, Cupid, Dionysus, Jesus, 
Krishna, Hermes, Strong Hans, Tom Thumb and others.
"In a true mythologem ... meaning is not something that 
could be expressed just as well and just as fully in a non- 
mythological way. Mythology is not simply a mode of 
expression in whose stead another simpler and more readily 
understandable form might have been chosen" (Kerenyi 1951) .
Jung (19 50) takes the position that the psychological 
meaning in myth comes from the archetypes as expressed in 
the archetypal images corresponding to Kerenyi's mythologems 
But Jung goes further and suggests the archetypal image 
alone is not the symbol. He thinks the conscious is also 
involved as data from every psychic function enter into its 
composition. In Jung's view a symbol prevents a clear-cut
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observational and intellectual process as the observer 
gets drawn into his objects and they invoke his whole 
conscious activity until he is "thrown together" into 
a unity. The symbolical experiences of wholeness revive 
again and again. This wholeness is not known outside 
symbolic expression but it can be thought to relate to 
child images and the self images. The root meaning of 
symbol does carry a reference to the concept of wholeness 
"as an integrate of all those contradictory and incompre­
hensible elements, which when thrown together, make the 
whole man" (Fordham 1957).
Children can be studied in relation to their parents 
and to the mythological world as well. As the child grows 
nearer to his inner nature via experience with the arche­
types, these developments can be seen by adults as part of 
the child but at first are felt as something quite other 
than himself. The child does not have the necessary control 
over these unknown symbolic forces he feels and parents 
need to mediate the child's experience of the unknown; 
this includes both the influence of outer objects and events 
plus the inner influence of archetypes and myths. All of 
these factors make up the growing personality.
All analytical schools would accept that the funda­
mental goal of a child's development is to establish himself 
in the world. The goal of childhood can be compared to the 
goal of individuation.
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C. Individuation in childhood
The origin of Jung's viewpoint concerning individuation 
can be traced to his theory that volition and cognition 
alone cannot account for emotional elements which create 
paradoxical behaviour and make understandable the unconscious 
tendency towards telling a lie, self-deception and slips 
of the tongue. Jung (1928): "Over against the polymorphism
of the primitive's instinctual nature there stands the 
regulating principle of individuation. Multiplicity and 
inner division are opposed by an integrative unity whose 
power is as great as that of the instincts". Jung always 
retained a concept of the total personality whereas Freud 
persisted in a world view based on determinism and a 
measurability of events and hoped to explain everything by 
the elementary mechanisms of repression, projection and 
condensation. Jung was concerned with the relationship 
between the partial and total personality and envisaged a 
totality so as to understand the particular from the whole. 
Thus he saw the tension between the tendency to dissociate 
and the inclination towards unity characteristic of life 
processes. Jung's investigation of fantasies arising from 
the unconscious enabled him to demonstrate empirically that 
the image sequence not only exhibited a disorderly variety 
of dissociated fragments but at the same time showed a 
tendency towards a gradual integration. Individuation was 
again defined by Jung in 1934: "It is the process of forming
and specializing the individual nature; in particular, it 
is the development of the psychological individual as 
differentiated from the general collective psychology ...
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Before individuation can be taken for a goal the educational 
aim of adaptation to the necessary minimum of collective 
standards must first be attained". At individuation, a 
person has to withdraw the projections of the collective 
psyche so they can be considered in relation to the 
individual and not just accepted passively as what every­
body does, thinks and feels.
The child, however, does not need to give deep conside­
ration to what is generally accepted (Fordham, 1944). Thus 
he can leave a large part of his psyche projected into the 
world. Young children may fight social, political or 
religious views for personal reasons but not because their 
individuality is at stake. Children tend to take a collective 
or one-sided view, as an individual standpoint involves 
becoming free from one-sided tendencies through a symbolical 
solution which would require that opposites be given complete 
equality. Jung, 1923: "... when the opposites are given 
complete equality of right, attested to by the ego's 
unconditioned participation in both thesis and antithesis, 
a suspension of the will results ... life cannot tolerate 
suspension ... which would lead to an insupportable condition 
... did not a new reconciling function arise ... beyond the 
opposites" (individuation). Individuation is contrasted with 
the goal of childhood which is strengthening of the ego 
development; adult individuation requires a temporary non­
ego position allowing integration with the self. To do this 
it is necessary to relate to the archetypes.
- 23 -
In the adult, as in the child, individuation can be 
otherwise expressed as the realization of the self. If 
the drive towards individuation is a spontaneous urge,
"not under the leadership of the ego, but of the archetypal 
movement in the unconscious" (Perry 1953), or non-ego, 
this is a specific and basic pattern of the individual. 
Individuation strives toward wholeness and totality 
developing the specific potentialities that form the 
particular personality. This unconscious dynamic matrix 
lies waiting for the ego to understand and incorporate 
these potentialities. Although Perry is arguing here for 
an innate teleological process starting from the unconscious, 
Fordham, 1958, argues against this view. He believes 
evolutionary theory cannot support individuation as an 
instinctive or innate process but it can support it as an 
extension of the ego. Fordham believes a child may be 
conscious of symbolic images of the self but that he cannot 
realize its implications. This dynamic development of self 
is seen as dependent upon the reaction of the unconscious 
to what is primarily ego activity. Therefore Fordham (1976) 
sees individuation as an extension of the ego reaching out 
and assimilating the archetypal movements of the unconscious 
as well as separating subject and object and then consciously 
integrating-deintegrating this potential which is postulated 
to contain the symbolical solution pointing towards 
individuation.
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In Psychological Types (1921) Jung describes 
individuation as a process of differentiation with its 
goal the development of the individual personality. 
"Individuation is orectically the same as the development 
of consciousness out of the original state of identity 
which is ... the original non-differentiation between 
subject and object". Fordham (1967) argues that by the 
age of two the infant has achieved a state of physical 
control over body activities which are "correlates and 
sometimes the expression of psychic operations". After 
birth the infant, during the first weeks, develops a state 
of 'identity' with his mother and the environment. This 
identity is not primary, but develops through fusion with 
the mother. It is inferred that the baby only fuses with 
those parts of the environment that correspond almost 
exactly to his needs; other events appear not to exist for 
him. This is confirmation of the theory that the primary 
unity of the self (expanded in Section 3) exerts a 
conservative influence. This phase is superseded by the 
omnipotence of object relations over all else as archetypal 
forms deintegrate more clearly out of the self and gain 
expression in perceptual imagery. The mother-infant unit 
is the most important area of study and in the section to 
follow on deintegration its development is discussed at 
length. Here it will suffice to say that the days have 
passed when the infant can be thought about either as only 
a physiological unit or just as an auto-erotic being.
He is now seen as a psychosomatic unity relating increasingly 
through the first two years to all objects with his libidinal 
and aggressive drives. The infant uses his developing
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imagery by deducing and evaluating experiences with his 
thoughts and feelings. "The achievement of a physical 
control over bodily activities means that the two-year- 
old has also grown psychically out of the state of 
identity into a separate being with an individual unit 
status" (Fordham 1976).
On this basis it can be asserted that by the age of 
two an infant can achieve the essential elements of child­
hood individuation, "...he has emerged from a primitive, 
ruthless way of living to become a person who can show 
concern for others; he has known love, hate, fear, grief,
sadness; he has the basic rudiments of a conscience, and
he has developed a clear distinction between internal and 
external objects, which he evaluates as good or bad; he 
distinguishes an inner world from the outer; ...he has 
developed true symbols that express his inner life"
(Fordham 1976) .
Thus Fordham makes a strong case'for using the term 
individuation for the developmental process in the first 
two years of childhood which Jung introduced referring only 
to the adult stages of individuation.
2. Jung's theories of the self
a. Self as totality
Jung developed two theories of the self: 1) a 'totality' 
theory and 2) the 'self-as-archetype' theory (p.34 ff) . The 
origin of the totality theory of self came from oriental formu 
lations concerning 'atman', which is regularly translated as 
'the self in English. In Psychological Types (1921) Jung -
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discussed atman in a footnote; "Brahman is the designation 
generally applied to the Supreme Soul (paramatman) or 
impersonal, all-embracing, divine essence, the original 
source and ultimate goal of all that exists". Putting 
the oriental view into a psychological frame of reference 
makes the self an organized wholeness of the personality.
This is expressed in symbolic experience which is trans­
personal and transcends the incompatible opposites of 
which man both psychically and physically appears to be 
composed; e.g. psyche, soma; ego, non-ego; inner, outer. 
Another source for the self-as-totality concept seems to 
grow out of Jung's idea of a transcendent function (1916).
"The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents 
the transcendent function of the opposites. The confronta­
tion of the two positions generates a tension charged with 
energy and creates a living, third-thing - not a logical 
stillbirth in accordance with the principle tertium non 
datur, but a movement out of the suspension between opposites, 
a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new 
situation". This is manifested as a quality of conjoined 
opposites and is closely related to the theory of the symbol 
which by uniting opposites becomes the union of the conscious 
with the unconscious. Jung posits nothing metaphysical in 
considering the lack of parallelism between conscious and 
unconsciousness needing unity.
Jung sees one functional aspect of the self to be the 
meeting place of all opposites and their synthesis. Redfearn 
(1977), a neo-Jungian, states: "The image of opposing 
entities meeting, with the liberation of great energy.
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good or bad, is so all-pervasive that it is hardly possible 
to exaggerate its universality and importance. This is 
the energy underlying, for example, primal scene excite­
ment at its most archaic level, schizoid splitting and 
defences, the illuminating or blinding properties of the 
God image, and the individuation process".
An example analogous to this general idea would be 
how easy it is today to see in society how little people 
are able to let the other man's argument count, although 
this capacity is fundamentally indispensable to a peaceful 
national or international community. To the degree that 
one does not admit the validity of the other person, he 
denies the 'other' within himself the right to exist, and 
vice versa. The inner dialogue of conscious and unconscious, 
which the transcendent function can enable, is a "touch­
stone for outer objectivity". "Thus, in coming to terms 
with the unconscious, not only is the standpoint of the 
ego justified, but the unconscious is granted the same 
authority (e.g. in Jungian interpretation during psycho­
therapy) . The ego takes the lead, but the unconscious 
must be allowed to have its say, too - audiatur e altera 
pars" (Jung 1916) .
As early as 1921 the totality definition had discrimin­
ated between the ego and the self. Jung states that the 
self "embraces and includes the ego" as well. It is 
important to distinguish the empirical ego, i.e. the ego 
as experienced, from the spontaneous images of imagination 
or non-ego. Thus Jung saw the ego as a part system.
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i.e. one system among others of a different kind. His 
formula expanded to 'self equals ego plus archetypes' 
which equates with the usual definition of the self as 
a combination of the conscious (ego) and the collective 
and personal unconscious (archetypes and personal 
repressed material).
To clarify this position 1 quote from Fordham, (1963): 
"If the self is the whole psyche, then it cannot be 
observed as such by the ego, since the ego is contained 
in it as a part and there is hence no observer. It is 
only when the unity is de-integrated and when some part 
of the ego stands separate from or only participates up 
to a point in the rest of the whole that data about the 
self can be collected. The data are called 'symbols of 
the self'".
The self as 'unknowable' became a position taken by 
Jung in a passage in "The Holy Men of India" (1944) :
"India is,'prepsychological': when it speaks of the 'self', 
it posits such a thing as existing. Psychology does not 
do this ... though very well acquainted with the self's 
peculiar and paradoxical phenomenology, we remain conscious 
of the fact that we are discussing ... something essentially 
unknown and expressing it in terms of psychic structures".
However by deriving inferences from the data of each 
incomplete symbol, it does seem on reflection that a 
theoretical construct, not testable more directly than 
with the derived symbolic material, can be made.
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The self as a whole would then remain inexperienceable 
rather than unknowable in a theoretical sense. There is, 
too, the question of hypostatizing a scientific thought, 
i.e. treating a scientific inference as if it were a 
known empirical fact. Jung implies hypostatization when 
he describes individuation as 'realization of the self'.
Jung seems to mean that inner experiences are to be given 
equal status with the facts of the external world. It is 
clear and fair to say, 1 think, that the self as a concept 
of totality is particularly difficult to construct as the 
archetypal images cannot be the actual self but only 
representative of it. These images or approximations can 
only represent states of relative wholeness. Only if bits 
of the ego are split off and function as observers of these 
images can the self be inferred.
A further problem may well remain. That is the relation 
of the ego or conscious 'knowledge' to introspection and its 
report, such as in association to dreams or other images 
that persons discuss, and Freud's famous fear that intro­
spections are rationalizations. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
found evidence that suggests there may be "little or no 
direct introspective access to higher cognitive processes". 
Subjects tend to give reports based on a priori, implicit 
causal theories, or to judge if what they report seems 
"plausible". Nisbett and Wilson conclude that introspection 
will be more accurate if influential stimuli are salient as 
plausible causes of the responses they produce. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) agree that if a stimulus seems "representative
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of the kind of stimuli that influence the response in 
question, the stimulus is reported to have an influence 
on the response, otherwise it is thought to be non- 
inf luential " .
Wason and Evans (1975) assume two processes: a type I 
process underlying behaviour and unavailable to consciousness 
(like Jung's archetypes), and a type II process underlying 
protocols and available to consciousness (like Jung's ego- 
bits that interpret the archetypes in the earliest ego 
development in infancy). The relationship between these two 
processes is theoretically developed by Fordham's de-inte­
gration theory (see Section 3). Valentine (1978) points out 
that the relation between these two types of processes 
(unconscious and conscious) is one of the least investigated 
problems in psychology. It has, of course, been the under­
lying theoretical and empirical preoccupation of Jung and 
later his 'school' of analytical psychology since about 1920, 
but is often ignored by other workers in psychology.
Another aspect of conscious report is the influence of 
subliminal perception in introspection. Acceptance of sub­
liminal perception has largely rested on methodological 
innovations in the form of signal detection techniques and 
dichotic listening procedures (Wilson, 1975) and persuasive 
theoretical arguments by Erdelyi (1974) which derive the 
subliminal phenomena from notions of selective attention 
and filtering. Many more stimuli are apprehended than can 
be stored in short term memory or transferred to long term 
memory. So subliminal perception which was previously
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regarded as paradox - how can one perceive without 
perceiving? - would be a logical consequence of selective 
filtering. We can perceive without remembering. Some 
stimuli may affect ongoing mental processes, including 
higher order processes of evaluation, judgment and behaviour 
initiation without being registered in short term memory 
or, in any case, without transfer to long term memory.
This also indicates that where subliminal perception is 
operating, subjects might not be aware of influential stimuli, 
and therefore that these stimuli are unconscious: this brings 
us back full circle to Wason and Evan's type I process 
unavailable directly to consciousness and to Jung's arche­
typal construct of the collective unconscious.
B. The ego-self relationship
The ego-self relation needs further elucidation. Ego 
theory has been much argued by and among Jungians. Basically, 
Jung (1921) described the ego as "a perceptual system which 
has affective roots in the unconscious". He defined the ego 
as both a relatively independent centre of consciousness, 
the agent of repression and both the internal and the external 
defence systems. Jung postulated an unconscious ego, or 
'shadow', using this metaphorical term as he always did for 
unconscious contents. In general the ego is seen as needing 
its shadow for the stability of the psychic system. As the 
shadow is collective or archetypal the ego innately emerges 
from it at least in part. Early in childhood the perceptual 
and integrative functions of the ego become differentiated 
from the essentially unconscious archetypal structures.
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Both ego and archetypes are part systems subject to the 
purposive aims of the whole organism. Indeed Storr (1955) 
compares the homeostatic systems of the body to the way 
in which the infant's developing ego discriminates between 
internal and external controls, mediating and modifying both. 
The conscious ego and the archetypes relate in a compen­
sating and therefore rather homeostatic manner.
Arguments have arisen over the way Jung uses both 
metaphor and abstraction in his description of the self 
and the ego: "The term 'self' seemed to me a suitable one 
for the unconscious substrate, whose actual exponent in 
consciousness is the ego. The ego stands to the self as 
the moved to the mover, or as object to subject, because 
the determining factors which radiate out from the self 
surround the ego on all sides and are therefore supraordinate 
to it. The self, like the unconscious (archetypes), is an 
a priori existent out of which the ego evolves. It is, so 
to speak, an unconscious préfiguration of the ego" (1959b).
Fordham (1960) points out that the phrase above (which 
I have underlined for clarity of reference), "moved to the 
mover", is metaphorical and that the phrase, "The self ... 
is an a priori existent" is an abstraction. This distinction 
is important. For Neumann (1955) began writing about the 
ego and self as two separate entities. If the ego is defined 
as a part of the self it cannot be a separate entity. What 
Neumann does is to abstract Jung's metaphor in his theory 
so that the self does not equal the ego plus the unconscious, 
but the ego is discussed as an independent aspect not 
contained within the self.
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Following in this theoretical confusion, Edinger 
(1960) describes the task of the child at first as one of 
separating out the ego from the self. He then suggests 
there is a repeating tendency to alternate between self­
ego union and self-ego separation. Thus all development 
is seen as a continuous dialectic between the ego and self 
leading paradoxically to both greater separation and greater 
intimacy. This implies that the ego has functional autonomy 
which Neumann also believed. The paradox would be that if 
the ego is autonomous it would become 'inflated' and on the 
other hand if it is dependent and determined by a super­
ordinate force it remains 'irresponsible'.
But Fordham (1960) points out that the paradox may be 
removed by considering the self not so much as a total 
integrate, i.e. conscious and unconscious, but as an ordered 
number of systems that result from division of the integrate 
into part systems all subject to the functioning of the 
organism as a whole. In infancy there is assumed to be a 
total integrate which may be considered the original state 
of the self. This de-integrates in instinctual experience 
conceived as a release mechanism (Fordham 1957) . "The 
result is intense perceptual stimulation and as one result 
the ego starts to separate out and develop. At the end of 
any particular instinctual experience the organism integrates 
again and in this way the experiences become built into the 
whole organism". In the Jungian view, the archetypes, being 
the instincts and their unconscious fantasy representations, 
are also thought to separate out from the integrated whole, 
as does the ego, in the instinctual experience. They also 
integrate again afterwards.
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Piaget in Insights and Illusions of Philosophy (1972) 
is critical of pre-reflective experience as a notion and 
he sees a contradiction between the idea of pre-reflective 
experience as the origin of knowledge and the unchanging 
background for acts of interpretation (such as archetypal 
material), and the idea that intentional consciousness 
(ego) is continually creating new meanings during development. 
Jung, however, sees no real contradiction in that Jungian 
interpretation of the symbolic images of archetypes is 
rightly determined by the developmental status of the 
individual and the appropriate level given the interpretation 
given this development. with this qualification of inter­
pretation there is no problem posed vis-à-vis an unchanging 
unconscious archetypal given as the theoretical source 
behind symbolic material. The Jungian view is that the 
self-images symbolize a central integrative system and the 
self is thus seen as something like a central ordering 
system. Jung contended that the ego might be able to take 
over all of the pattern contained in the self briefly but 
that it is ultimately subordinate to it.
C. The self-as-archetype theory abandoned
The second of Jung's theories of the self, the 'self-as- 
archetype', causes a contradiction. In Aion (1951) Jung 
writes: "... the self is the real organizing principle of 
the unconscious, the quaternity, or squared circle of the 
self". Jung ambiguously implies here that the self is an 
archetype of order, or may be seen as an organizing principle, 
or may be the totality of the archetypes. The question
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immediately raised is does Jung mean the self is not the 
whole psyche-soma, as the ego is here left out altogether 
in the self-as-archetype theory? The ego has been 
specifically differentiated from the archetypes in Jung's 
general theory of the psyche (self equals ego plus arche­
types) . In tracing Jung's confusing discussion between 
these two definitions of the self we see that in Aion 
(and also in 1944b,1954 and 1959b) he refers to the self 
as an archetype (the second definition) repeatedly but also 
says: "I have suggested calling the total personality which, 
though present, cannot be fully known, the self. The ego, 
is, by definition, subordinate to the self and is related 
to it like a part to the whole" (the first definition: self- 
as-totality).
Curiously the concept of the self as an archetype began 
after the idea of it as the totality of the psyche in Jung's 
writings. The archetypal theory was published in 1919, two 
years before Psychological Types (1921) where the first 
definition of the self appears; "... the self is my totality 
... hence it includes the unconscious psyche". Attempts to 
deal with the two definitions are several. Perry (1957) in 
studying schizophrenia recorded self images neither related 
to integration nor to individuation. Perry argues that the 
archetype lying behind the images should be termed 'central 
archetype'. Jung (1958) considered this, "... a central 
archetype ... which I have called the archetype of the self" 
Both Perry and Jung observed that self images occur in 
abnormal chaotic states when the relation between the ego 
and archetypal images gets diffused and the play of fantasy 
may go beyond normal psychological limits.
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There are passages where Jung combines the idea of 
self as totality with that of the self-archetype. In Aion 
(1951) he writes: "... definable psychic contents emerging
from the unconscious indicate the psychic totality of the 
individual. They indicate the presence of an archetype 
of like nature, one of whose derivations would seem to be 
the quaternity of functions that orient consciousness 
(thinking, feeling, intuition and sensation). But, since 
the totality exceeds the individual's consciousness to an 
indefinite and indeterminable extent, it invariably includes 
the unconscious in its orbit and hence the totality of all 
archetypes. But the archetypes are complementary equiva­
lents of the 'outside world' and therefore possess a 'cosmic' 
character".
Jung mixes metaphor and abstract statement and slides 
from one level to another throughout his writing. Neverthe­
less, neo-Jungians have considerably cleared confusion by 
careful study and re-evaluation of Jung's ideas. What is 
perhaps most important in the Jungian theoretical definitions 
of the self is to bear in mind that the self contains 
opposites. This is not a paradox since the whole is not 
an opposite of its parts, but it is true that formulations 
about opposites may need to be stated paradoxically.
Actually neither the totality theory nor the archetypal 
concept refers to the contents of the self directly, but 
to its place in the theoretical model of the psyche.
A possible revision concerning Jung's two theories of 
the self has been suggested by Fordham (1960). The self-as- 
totality theory is seen as an abstract theory of the whole
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personality. In dealing with a whole, we define a totality 
which can be seen in several different states such as 
integration, deintegration and disintegration. We can add 
an entity into, or subtract an entity out of, the totality 
theory in the sense that the theory distinguishes a total 
integration from the joining up of psychic fragments by the 
ego. "The self as a totality also gives a theoretical 
limit to life, i.e. the organism starts from a unity (the 
original state of self in infancy) and ends as a unity at 
the end point of individuation; these two states are out­
side experience" (Fordham 1963) . The total self theory can
form a basis for a full developmental theory in that it
persists through life.
To supplant Jung's unsatisfactory self-as-archetype 
theory, Fordham proposes a central archetype of order (1963) 
It is assumed that each archetypal image contains an ego 
fragment which renders it conscious. This ego fragment can 
become linked with the ego centrum (or ego as the centre of 
consciousness in Jung) in a process which involves 
unconscious integrating functions. The advantages of a 
theory of a central archetype of order, postulated as the 
unconscious system behind conscious ego-formation and as 
a part system of the self, to replace the self-as-archetype 
are several. It leaves the ego the position in theory it 
has always had throughout Jungian work. A central arche­
type can theoretically be included among the other arche­
types operating with the same ability to be introjected.
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projected, assimilated to other unconscious elements, or 
identified with the ego consciously, etc. The central 
archetype would be thought to express itself in images 
depicting wholeness and transcending and uniting opposites 
in close relation to the central ego. (Its role in 
important development will be discussed in Section 3).
The self-as-totality would remain the principal definition 
for Jungian self-theory and the self-archetype would be 
abolished in favour of the more subsidiary central arche­
type of order. This would be included within the basic 
archetypal structure Jung has proposed and the separate 
ego structure that make up the self.
3. Fordham's de-integration concept
&. The childhood ego
Inclusive to this view of the central archetype but 
deserving attention in its own right is Fordham's (1951) 
view of deintegrates, a term he created to extend the self 
theory into its development during infancy. It will be 
helpful in considering the background to the de-integration 
concept to develop the Jungian view of the ego's origin in 
childhood.
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Jung saw the psychic development of children centering 
mainly around ego formation within natural growth. He 
believed the origin of the conscious ego was the unconscious. 
"The greatest and most extensive development takes place 
during the period between birth and the end of psychic 
puberty ... This development establishes a firm connection 
between the ego and the previously unconscious psychic 
processes, thus separating them from their source in the 
unconscious. In this way the conscious rises out of the 
unconscious like an island newly risen from the sea"
(Jung 1954) .
The archetypes, as organs of the unconscious and 
possibly bound up with the functioning of the central 
nervous system are assumed to be formed before birth when 
the brain is formed. Jung originally thought that arche­
typal images in children's dreams and fantasies, because 
of their adult nature, related to the parents' psychology.
But later Jung came to believe that children were expressing 
their own archetypal images which had an apparently adult 
character. In The Development of Personality (1954) Jung 
says: "The child's psyche, prior to the stage of ego con­
sciousness, is very far from being empty and devoid of 
content ... The most important evidence ... is the dreams 
of three- and four-year-old children, among which there are 
some so strikingly mythological and so fraught with meaning 
that one would take them at once for the dreams of grown-ups, 
did one not know who the dreamer was". And further: "These 
archetypes of the collective psyche ... are the dominants
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that rule the preconscious soul of the child and, when 
projected upon the human parents, lend them a fascination 
which often assumes monstrous proportions".
Archetypal images in childhood dreams, play and fantasy
and in their pictures and sandplay are relevant to children
themselves. Children unceasingly demand repetition of fairy
stories and folk tales. This natural phenomenon represents
the activity of archetypes within the child, and has little
that is pathological or especially adult about it. It is
very hard to eradicate in much parental experience. Jung
describes children under the influence of archetypes as
preconscious, here designating a state of consciousness in
which the ego is very weak. Jung also believed that the
images that represent unconscious vitality are high in libido
The general Jungian concept of libido is that this term
includes all available psychic energy, it does not refer
only to sexual energies as in Freudian terminology. These
highly energized archetypal images are described by Jung as
'numinous'. With a more developed or organized ego formation
-e
a more strongly coherent and conscious mind em^ges. A pro­
gression is postulated from unconscious to preconscious to 
an organized conscious mind.
In the child, Jung thought that the unconscious and pre­
conscious stages included a primitive identity which he 
referred to as 'participation mystique'. Jung thought that 
since identity derives at the start from the unconsciousness 
of the small child, this suggested a non-differentiated state, 
Without a clearly developed ego, the child cannot distinguish 
whether events belong to him or to another.
All that is felt by the child, in Jung's view.
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is that someone should be affected by emotional reactions 
which become infectious to anyone in the vicinity, often 
involuntarily. The weak ego consciousness does not allow 
the child to yet say; "I am not reacting as you are because 
I am not you". The child doesn't know clearly his own ego 
separateness so this primitive identity enables the uncon­
scious of parents to enter the child's psyche where children 
act out or interiorly live through the problems of their 
parents. Thus the concept of ego boundaries are hazy in 
the early stage of primitive identity and no boundaries of 
the self are apparent. This is clearly different from 
later more conscious identification with parents, as a part 
of cognitive development and of emotional feeling.
In infants, Jung traces libido as manifesting itself 
initially in the nutritional zone. By sucking, food is 
drunk with rhythmic movement. Contiguous with the first 
period of breast feeding there is rhythmic movement of arms 
and legs. This model of rhythmic movement moves to other 
functional zones and produces pleasure with sexuality its 
ultimate goal. Other body openings become an object of 
interest, then the skin. Rhythmic movements extend to 
picking, boring and rubbing. Rhythm may influence the 
sexual zone and the first attempts at masturbation begin. 
Jung saw the period from birth to the first clear manifesta­
tions of sexuality as the 'presexual stage'. When the 
rhythmic activity no longer relates to breast feeding in 
the nutritional phase, it transfers itself to sexuality.
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It is assumed that in the act of suckling and while 
excreting that infants experience various fantasies which 
they cannot separate out from the physical experience.
Jung sees these fantasy systems as preconscious and 
expressing archetypes. Libidinal zones, on this basis, 
are seen as preconscious centres of awareness having 
primitive images that form themselves into the first ego 
fragments. A linkage between libidinal zones is necessary 
for differentiated ego functions. These zones or precon­
scious centres will be described below as aspects of the 
original self which Fordham has named 'deintegrates' which 
have a tendency to unite as they are derivatives of the 
archetypes of wholeness.
It is justifiable to set out these arguments as if 
there were no real parents or real environment because we 
are discussing the states of awareness of infants. The 
concept of having parents develops very gradually, as an 
image, to the baby. They have not appeared within the 
infant's scene as persons distinctly apart from himself.
Fordham (1957) argues that the development of conscious­
ness in the child violates an original condition of wholeness 
and postulates a primary integrated state at birth. Although 
psychologists are ready to recognize that infants' important 
reactions are total ones of 'self reactions' in the 
undifferentiated but complete sense, the current dichotomous 
nature of biological and psychological concepts makes it 
difficult to conceive of a state previous to descriptive 
units like psyche, soma; self, environment; mind, body; ego, 
non-ego; conscious, unconscious.
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D.W. Winnicott (1953): "Let us assume that health in 
the early development of the individual entails continuity 
of being ... The early psyche-soma proceeds along a certain 
line of development provided its continuity of being is 
not disturbed". Winnicott then insists a nearly perfect 
environment for the baby is essential at first. By this, 
Winnicott merely means that if parents face the conflicts 
of the baby in a normal way nothing else can go wrong 
psychically. 'Continuity of being' implies a condition 
of wholeness but Winnicott is speaking of psyche-soma and 
environment which divides up the self even if the inner- 
outer fit be perfect. Winnicott's 'continuity of being' 
implies time. Compared to Winnicott's concepts, Fordham's
(1957) description, the original self, is theoretically a 
purer start getting rid of both the psyche-soma-environment 
duality and of time. The original self has retroactive 
evidence in that mature persons, when facing difficulties 
felt to be insurmountable, return to an original condition 
which can be named the original self or a primal condition 
of wholeness. Adults may approach this through memory or 
a regression.
k. Deintegration, disintegration, integration
In the development of consciousness, the child violates 
the original wholeness with a spontaneous division of self 
into parts. Fordham has proposed the term 'deintegration' 
as a property of the self behind ego formation which is 
present first. This is distinct from the concept of disinte­
gration, which presupposes an already formed ego which is 
split into a number of fragments. It explains the difference
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in Winnicott's and Fordham's view. Fordham sees the self 
as dividing itself up to form the ego and as being uninte­
grated or deintegrated from the level of the self until 
reintegration of the new formation. Winnicott sees a 
primary unintegrated state based on a viewpoint which is 
limited to Freudian ego psychology without a self-concept. 
Kohut (1977) has however put forward a theory of the self 
contained within a Freudian framework (see Chapter II,3-b).
The Fordhamian position is that the self cannot dis­
integrate. Only the ego can be split or even destroyed.
The ego integrate then regresses. If the process is at 
catastrophic level, the ego does not integrate to an earlier 
level of its history, either because there is not another 
earlier level available as may be the case in schizophrenia, 
or because the disintegration has a high anxiety level which 
blocks a regression to an earlier ego level. If the disinte­
gration is at complete level, a simpler ego integrate appears 
naturally and an earlier ego stability is re-established.
In the deintegration hypothesis of Fordham a spontaneous 
division of the self is proposed (see Diagram 2). Indirect 
evidence can be had from various sources. Jung believed that 
a new concept has certainly been reflected in ancient myths 
and this can amplify the concept of deintegration. The 
cosmic creation myths may be a source of parallel ideas to 
the deintegration theory. In the Orphic cult in Greece we 
find the cosmic egg as "...the symbol of what gives birth to 
all things and in itself contains all things" (Plutarch, 
cit. Harrison 1908). And again, "Orpheus likened chaos to 
an egg in which was the commingling of the primaeval elements"
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Eros sprang spontaneously from the cosmic egg, he "... 
revealed and brought to light everything that had previously 
lain hidden in the golden egg" (Kerenyi 1951). The process 
is spontaneous like the deintegration concept.
Jung discusses the scintillae of the alchemists which 
he describes as "seeds of light broadcast in the chaos, which 
Khunrath calls 'the seed bed of the future world'" (1960) .
Jung sees the scintillae as like the archetypes as he implies 
the origins of consciousness are in both and scintallae 
could correspond to "tiny conscious phenomena" and be 
closely related to the concept of the deintegrates.
How could the first element of consciousness as a formal 
image arise? We can easily but very incorrectly infer this 
by taking the image found in small children's circles as the 
representation of the original self at birth. This is 
incorrect because the original wholeness is imageless before 
the first deintegration achieves consciousness in Fordham's 
theory. Fordham postulates that a deintegrate may be 
described as a readiness to perceive and act which only 
enables a correct perception to occur if the object exactly 
fits the deintegrate because only then is the state of 
affairs where the baby cannot distinguish between subject 
and object possible. If the correspondence between object 
and deintegrate is not exact, it may at first not be perceived, 
but a tolerance later develops of the object not fitting the 
deintegrate until the distinction between subject and object 
dawns upon the infant.
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Fordham has as an hypothesis in the deintegration theory 
the idea that a perception is not a passive act but part of 
object-seeking activity. Piaget also postulates a clear 
need for the outer object to comply with what seems to be - 
inner requirements. In the Origins of Intelligence of the 
Child (1966) he concludes from studies of his own children 
that a schema lies at the root of imitation, play and 
intelligence. If we assume his schema to be a deintegrate, 
the deintegrate can develop through imitation in play and 
symbolic activity. Piaget describes his schema as unconscious 
elements upon which the psychic life of the infant is 
organized. These are 'global' reactions to which objects 
are assimilated. Piaget postulates that only the resistances 
of the environment or the incompatibilities of the infant's 
activity in relation to it prevent this generalization from 
occurring. "Now this schema...is not limited to functioning 
under compulsion by a fixed excitant, external or internal, but 
functions in a way for itself... From the point of view of 
awareness, if there is awareness, such assimilation (sucking) 
is at first lack of differentiation...but from the point of 
view of action, it is a generalizing extension of the schema 
..." (1966). Piaget, of course, based his investigations on
a different set of theoretical concepts than Fordham.
Piaget believes the infant's first reactions are reflexes 
and that the schemata represent reflex action. What is 
interesting is that Piaget sees imitation in the infant as 
only built upon schemata and that the infant will only 
imitate other's behaviour if this behaviour corresponds 
closely to the schemata already expressed by the child.
Inner requirements need to be met by the outer object.
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Empirical evidence is difficult to assess as the infant's 
unconscious as well as his pre-speech'period contain much 
that has been incorporated into theoretical interpretation 
by Fordham, Klein, Winnicott and Piaget. Thus diverse workers 
base their postulations on direct observation alone or on 
experimental results. Kris's (1955) work in 'well baby 
clinics' broke ground because he made predictions of how a 
baby would develop and then did longitudinal studies of his 
mothers and babies to see if his predictions were valid. 
Escalona in The Roots of Individuality (1969) studied babies 
at home, in the first four months of life, rather than in 
a clinical setting later as Mahler et al. (1975) have done.
The inclusion of very early life helps round out a difficult 
area of study.
The psychoanalysts, more than the Jungians, doubted 
reliability in infant observation, fearing that projections 
of the experimenter might occur in the observation as well 
as in the experimenter's fantasies about infants. Some 
analysts thought it safer to wait until verbal communications 
gave information from which constructions about infancy 
could be made. Whatever anxieties remain about this, 
observation, while not totally reliable in giving exact 
information about internal psychodynamic processes, can 
provide hypotheses whose validity can be checked against 
further observations. In general one finds that theory abounds 
most where observation is least. Nevertheless, along with
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child analysis, infant observation can give a realistic 
picture of what mothers and babies do in the sense of the 
general relation of the infant to his mother and the 
building up of a timetable of changes within the infant 
self (Mahler et al, 1975).
A supporter of direct observation is Blackburn (1971): 
"The most reliable and effective knowing follows from 
direct and open confrontation with phenomena, no matter 
how complicated they are. Nature can be trusted to behave 
reliably without suppression of the manifold details of a 
natural environment, and nature's ways are open to direct, 
intuitive, sensuous knowledge". And again, "Since the self 
and the environment are inextricable (contrary to the 
philosophical stance of classical science), one can under­
stand his surroundings by being sensitive to his own 
reactions to them".
Obviously workers in the field of infant observation 
and child analysis attempt to observe the phenomena involved 
in a way that would ensure that another observer (in the 
same situation) would reach the same conclusion. Blackburn 
(1971) points out: "Before conventional scientists (by this 
is meant workers outside psycho-analytic orientation) rush 
in with cries of "subjectivity" in criticism of the sensuous 
approach (i.e. the response of the whole body, including the 
senses, to phenomena ... dependent on factors such as mood 
and attention, but ... undeniably a source of information 
about the world around us), they might stop to consider 
whether or not a person selected at random off the street
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could be asked to repeat their highly sophisticated 
observations from laboratory experiments". With proper 
training, they could. But this is exactly what the 
sensuous observer would reply is necessary for his method 
as well. Obviously the position of a pointer on a scale 
cannot be the only way of gaining quantitative knowledge 
and there is other knowledge besides quantitative knowledge. 
The predators to Homo sapiens would have destroyed him if 
human beings, were not instruments capable of understandably 
confronting the "messy" world outside the laboratory. This 
eliminates the tendency to abstractions in laboratory 
studies, and points up the claim that laboratory science 
may be "irrelevant" to the study of very young children 
because it doesn't fit their natural behaviour as child 
analysts insist it must.
C. Object relations
A wide recognition of the importance of object relations 
has developed because young children universally need objects 
either as parts of themselves or of others. This implies 
that perception becomes image. This is a development that 
Piaget puts at about one year of age. Through objects, the 
child begins to see himself and other persons as a whole.
The first image, separate from an immediately present object, 
is presumably linked up with the development of memory.
Once images are formed apart from the object, they can 
represent absent objects or, if taken hold of by the arche­
types, can be used or altered to make up archetypal images.
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The Kellogg (1969) research on 100,000 pre-school 
children's early pictures and scribblings, which includes 
her theory of abstraction, can be correspondingly compared 
to deintegration. From twenty basic original scribbles, 
five diagrams or shapes were abstracted as most significant 
to the majority of the subjects; two forms of cross (+ and 
x), the square, the triangle, irregular-shaped enclosures 
and the circle. The children then made 'combines' of the 
diagrams. The mandala was the most frequent combine from 
which a human figure was later drawn by combining circles 
and a modification of the mandala. This study points out 
that the human figure is not copied from perception of it 
as a whole, but grows through a process of combining and 
abstracting various forms, including the mandala image, 
which Jung sees as a representation of the self. This 
image was often transformed by the children into a human 
figure or ego representation. The abstraction of 'diagrams 
from the scribbles can be likened to the deintegration 
process. The recognition of an external object (scribbles) 
releases an instinctual or unconscious archetypal response 
which separates out the image of the diagrams. Random 
activity plus abstraction or deintegration is followed by 
combination or integration.
In deintegration with the resulting images, we can 
speak of the preconscious state when fragments of ego 
consciousness exist and unite to form an ego centre. The 
self is seen as the integrater of the ego fragments.
G. Adler (1951): "... in childhood ... the non-ego has the 
upper hand at first, and the self charges the ego-function
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with sufficient energy for it to establish itself against 
the non-ego, so that it can fulfil the demands of adaptation 
to the outer world ... the self operates as an image of 
potential wholeness behind the psychic processes and bends 
them towards realisation of this wholeness, which appears 
as the synthesis of ego and non-ego, of conscious and 
unconscious, of the inner and outer worlds".
Other psychic activities enter into the growth of the 
ego. Fordham (1957) suggests as examples: recognition of 
similarities, association in time, infantile logic, concept 
building, instinctual drive aspects of the archetypes 
(e.g. infantile sex instincts), archetypal images having 
an integrative effect because the self lies behind them 
and education.
Integration of the self follows deintegration to form 
the ego nucleus in a periodic manner. After the original 
self deintegrates spontaneously, perception and action may 
occur according to the patterns of the deintegrates. For 
this we are reminded that a perfect fit with the environment 
is necessary in Fordham's view. With this fit, reaction 
patterns develop based on preconscious image. These deinte­
grates grow into ego nuclei which are brought together 
through the integrating action of the self into a single 
ego centrum. The ego continues to develop through periodic 
deintegrative actions leading to specialized units of 
consciousness for which I propose to introduce the new term,
'con-integrates'. Various con-integrates I would propose 
would be speech, defence of self, ego-persona, play, the
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aesthetic, the ego-ideal and the ego-shadow. The combina­
tion of abilities and perceptions required for these complex 
areas of behaviour, so universal across races as to imply 
an archetypal influence of a most fundamental and primordial 
nature, suggests a special case of unifying deintegrates, 
on a very complex and multitudinous scale^into 'con-integrate 
areas' within the integrated self. This results in the 
almost inconceivable ability, for example, to learn and 
speak the English language if the difficulties of doing so 
are analyzed into detailed component parts. The same may 
be said for infants' symbolic play where concentration is 
required on all hierarchical levels of play difficulty.
Body motility, similarly directed mostly from an unconscious 
level suggests con-integrates are huge, unifying. Gestalt­
like complexes of deintegrates, conjoined to insure survival 
through effective performance and perception. Speech, play- 
work and body motility influenced by defence of self, the 
ego-persona and ego-shadow and the ego-ideal with the 
aesthetic seem essentially basic to the psychological life 
of almost everyone and imply a vast coordination system 
between the conscious and unconscious mind. While con- 
integrates are built by deintegration and are therefore a 
postulation subsumed by Fordham's theory of deintegration- 
reintegration, I maintain that my term 'con-integrates' 
helps clarify a group of very large deintegrated aggregates 
which reintegrate in special systems of great biological 
significance. This concept adds clarity to Fordham's 
deintegration proposal by separating out certain reinte­
grations into this special category of con-integration and 
to coordinate con-integrates into the overall neo-Jungian system,
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I am, of course, not implying that these areas should be 
called anything other than their ancient and regular names 
when being discussed outside the hierarchical framework 
of a new ego theory of the self and its development in 
early childhood. This conscious development runs parallel 
to an unconscious deintegrating into the archetypes of the 
collective unconscious, which become more discrete if 
individuation develops where the ego moves forward and the 
self is less apparent in the foreground of the child's 
personality.
The other important development with deintegration is 
that because the environment can exactly fit a deintegrate, 
so that at first there can be no differentiation between 
them, bits of ego develop, and where the environment fails 
to fit the deintegrate a separation occurs if the frustration 
involved for the infant is tolerable. The infant is assumed 
to tolerate more and more of these frustrations until a 
duality is established between the environment and the self 
composed of the growing ego nucleus and a whole body image. 
Taking in and ejecting occurs in feeding and excreting with 
later childhood development giving conscious psychic equiva­
lents. As the ego increases in strength, play, fantasies 
and dreams become less important although these preconscious 
conditions remain in the background. As the ego develops 
clearer boundaries, the emotional environment also has less 
influence. Theoretically, it is only the preconscious state, 
or in the pre-ego state, that the environment cannot be 
psychically handled by the child. ■
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Children do not progress simply from an ego develop­
ment to integration. During this development some psychic 
experiences may become disintegrated and repressed in the 
personal unconscious. Archetypes, as essentially unconscious 
constellations, can never be totally integrated within the 
ego. Among the archetypal images are those of wholeness 
and order which have a controlling influence over unconscious 
fun^ftions. Fordham (1950) has postulated the central arche­
type of order discussed above which is seen as a potential 
integrate of the ego and the archetypes through a general 
"tendency to wholeness or a uniting of aspects of the 
conscious and unconscious mind". This kind of integration 
would be different from ego development or the growth of 
the conscious mind alone. The symbolism of the compre­
hensive synthetic process in adult subjects, concerning the 
general tendency to wholeness, has been demonstrated by 
Jung in four works: The Secret of the Golden Flower (1955), 
Psychology and Religion (1958), Psychology and Alchemy (1944b) 
and Gestaltungen des Unbewussten (1950). These studies 
demonstrate mandala symbolism in adults, but Jung does not 
deal with this phenomenon in children. Fordham (1947) 
however deals with three studies revealing mandala symbolism 
in one- and two-year-old children. Before considering this 
empirical material, we need to study the relationship of 
mandala symbolism to deintegration-integration.
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D. The mandala in childhood
Jung writes of mandatas as of magical enclosures 
which are often but not always round. "The round or 
square enclosures ... have the value of magic means to 
produce protective wall ... they prevent an outburst and 
a disintegration" (1953). In addition to the prevention 
of disintegration, mandatas are drawn by persons when they 
need to integrate a new element or as deintegration occurs.
It is around mandala studies that the closer relationship 
and theory of integration, deintegration and disintegration 
was discerned. In mandatas, variable contents are always 
arranged about a centre. The most frequent number of 
divisions between the centre and the circumference is four 
or a multiple of four. In Psychological Types (1921) Jung 
has put forward the view that this fourfold division 
represents the fourfold structure of the psyche (thinking, 
feeling, intuition and sensation). The centre "is simply 
unknowable and can only be expressed symbolically through 
its own phenomenology, as is the case, incidentally, with 
every object of experience". The self is believed to be 
represented by the centre, by the surrounding contents and 
by the circumference jointly. The mandala is thus the most 
powerful symbol of the self known to Jungian psychology.
In children where ego differentiation is not clear from 
self manifestations, the self seems to prepare the ground for 
the ego's emergence. An example of this is Fordham's 
description (1957) of a one-year-old boy who was allowed 
to scribble on the walls of his nursery. After initially 
making squiggles he became preoccupied exclusively with
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making circles. He continued this for a period of weeks 
when upon discovering the word 'I', he stopped making circles 
The relation of the circles to the discovery of 'I" suggests 
that the circle represented a matrix of the self from which 
the ego arose. Stein (1951) has done research into the 
origin of the word 'I'. He agrees that: "The linguistic
development (of I) ... reflects a process by which the ego 
is separated from the self". This is consistent with Jung's 
view that the circle is an archetypal non-ego. If the child 
identifies the word 'I' with the circle, he does not yet 
mean it necessarily as an organized ego, but rather as an 
awareness or discovery of himself as a whole, complete, a 
circle, a somebody if only for a moment. The circle probably 
also represents the boundary of the ego as well as referring 
to the integration of self-feelings.
Fordhàm (1944) describes the case of a girl of two-and- 
a-half years. When coming for analytical treatment she 
would scribble while held on the knee of the analyst, but 
upon drawing a circle, would get off and play elsewhere in 
the treatment playroom. When the circle appeared, she 
became free to express her ego in action in Jungian theory. 
Another girl of two was brought for treatment of fits 
during which she became completely unconscious. She was 
very dependent on her mother and could not feed or dress 
herself. She displayed great fear of entering the treatment" 
playroom but after scribbling with chalk, made a circle and 
said 'me'. With this her frightened manner changed and she 
went about playing with toys. This was interpreted to mean
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that the circle was a picture of the self and ego in union 
giving some security to the child if only temporarily.
The relief of anxiety after drawing the circle was also 
seen as the tendency to unite with the mother (the circle 
united with the word 'me'). This was periodically 
necessary for the girl's balance at this stage. The concept 
of deintegration helped to make comprehensible the source 
of the fits which were seen as the "dismemberment of the 
ego by the deintegrating self, a process described as 
disintegration" (Fordham 1957). Although pathological in 
itself, this disintegration made the girl have a regression 
to an earlier stage where mother and child once again 
represented the whole integrated self, from which the girl 
had been afraid to separate. Through spontaneous play, 
enabled by the analyst's presence giving a free and pro­
tected neutral space, the ego of the girl began to develop 
separately through deintegration of the self, because having 
regressed to the earlier integrate of mother-child unity, 
the energy formerly put into the fits was free instead to 
be put into a progressive deintegration to establish the 
child's own ego growth to a position of positiveness and 
separateness from the mother.
Fordham's theoretical basis for the discussion of these 
children's cases can be summarized in his own words: "The
danger (in these cases) is clearly from the child's psyche 
itself, and if it be accepted that he (or she) had made an 
image of the self from which the ego is budding off, then 
the danger to the ego can only come from the self" (1951) .
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Theoretically the self as a deintegrating-integrating 
system comes into this empirical material with the deinte­
gration of the self seen as a danger to the ego which can 
be split if separation of the two - ego and self - is not 
complete. This can be pictured as an insufficient ego 
deintegration so that just when the self, at reintegration, 
begins to deintegrate again in a regular rhythmic cycle, 
the ego can be split, rather than progressively built, if 
it is not deintegrated out enough to be separate or to have 
separate ego-bits completed.
In the Jungian view, the circle is seen to represent 
a delimiting or magical area used to ward off danger from 
within or without, or in the inherent and dangerous con­
dition of the ego-deintegrates as the ego comes into being.
It is also possible, using analytic interpretation, to link 
circles and mandalas with the body-image experience of 
young children. Early experience of parts or of whole 
body-images may correspond to the impenetrability of the 
circle. It must be remembered that eyes, breasts and the 
principle body orifices are all circular. Jungian psychology 
argues that it is not possible to account for circular 
imagery entirely on the basis of perceptual experience of 
external objects as they can be images of the self which 
are symbolically observable in empirical situations like 
the analytical treatment of children as described above. 
Nevertheless, Jungians would be the first to realize that 
the "magical omnipotence of the circle image" (Fordham 1957) 
is often used by children to simulate a control system.
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inside of which they can place bad or terrifying objects 
and hold them there. In the same way, precious or good 
objects are placed within the circle to protect them from 
outside dangers.
6 . Objects in symbol and meaning formation
A number of features of symbolization in infancy require 
elucidation. An essential characteristic of a symbol is 
that it represents a relatively unknown influence. It is 
different from a sign in that its unknown part cannot be 
made completely conscious by getting rid of repression or 
by lifting its disguise by interpretation. In general 
symbols have a plurality of possible meanings as they may 
combine opposites, or transcend them in a unity which refers 
to the self. For a small child, parents are known to exist 
but their nature is obscure. They are experienced through 
archetypal imagery. As the child grows up he sheds the 
symbolic image, if and when he is able to see his parents 
wholly without fantasy. A baby cannot take up a 'symbolic 
attitude' until he can pretend and take up an 'as if' quality. 
It is not known if there is an incipient capacity for the 
baby to hold its experience of deintegrated and integrated 
states until they are represented later symbolically, 
because the images depend on a certain degree of conscious­
ness and on memory.
Presumably the infant's consciousness, in the sense 
of meaning formation, is vague initially and objects are 
only gradually constructed. At first these objects are 
not differentiated from the self so everything is a self­
object and the mother meets and satisfies all the self-
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objects' needs. The Jungian view holds that the self­
objects are organized on archetypal models. Other sense 
data which are not self-objects are experienced as not- 
self when they integrate. These are at first attacked or 
rejected by screaming, crying and excreting or spitting 
and vomiting. These not-self objects form the basis for 
later bad objects. As there is no capacity to sustain 
conflict between the opposites of 'good' self-objects or 
'bad', not-self objects, symbolization of objects does not 
occur.
Fordham (1976) postulates that the first grouping of 
experiences is in terms of their sameness. The case of 
Alan, which he discusses, shows how the self-object will 
tend to treat apparently very different objects as if they 
were identical. Segal (1957) called this characteristic 
'symbolic equations' and thought that this related to 
certain states of ego-fragmentation where projective 
identification is prominent. In Segal's view, based on 
Kleinian theory, an hallucination or a thumb is experienced 
firstly as the same as the breast, as the first self-object, 
and eventually either one may come to represent the breast.
An essential prerequisite for symbol formation is 
object-constancy or the ability to maintain an object in 
memory after it has been experienced. It is widely believed 
that infants do not at first have this capacity and cannot 
sustain an image of a feed after they have experienced it. 
For a symbol to influence experience, it must continue 
and develop so as to achieve a dream-like or
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hallucinatory quality having archetypal characteristics.
Since the archetype, although it creates an image or 
self-object, does not control its persistence in time, 
the persistence or constancy of an object "must be 
attributed to the development of consciousness" (Fordham 
1976).
With development, the child may relate symbolization 
to absence or loss of a valued object. The affect associated 
with this is mourning and its early prototype is the 
"depressive position" advocated by Klein (1948). Initially
the lost object is the breast. In the depressive position,
the child symbolizes the lost breast by a reparative act 
internally using imagery and thought. This increases the 
perception of the real mother. To create a symbol, the
self-object must be destroyed. Only then is the need for
a creative act great enough. The breast, as self-object, 
is destroyed but as the real breast is still existent the 
constructive act must abstract from the object and this 
abstraction is the symbol. The significance of the 
destructive fantasy must include perception of the breast 
as both a good self-object and a bad not-self-object.
When these two aspects are identified within one object, 
the nature of the destruction changes. There is no feeling 
of loss if the baby is only attacking the bad breast but if, 
at the same time, the good breast is attacked there is 
experience of loss. Reparation must be made if the self 
is to survive.
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Once the child can pretend, fusion in self-objects • 
becomes sufficiently dissolved for self-objects to become 
representational. Winnicott (1971) has discussed a 
special 'transitional object' which helps to separate the 
fusion between the self and self-objects. In first feeds, 
if a baby is satisfied at the breast, it is postulated that 
he creates a breast through deintegration over which he feels 
he has omnipotent control. In reality the baby has not any 
control except in aspects of his inter-action as to the 
length of feed. Gradually the baby comes to recognize his 
mother as a separate object out of his control. The need 
for omnipotence makes the baby stuff bits into his mouth or 
thumbsuck. He does this as he can control these actions.
The bits stuffed into the mouth can be put to various 
.imaginative uses and acquire properties in imagination they 
did not have before. At first, however, the thumb or bits 
are a true self-representation in the sense that this is a 
demarcation area between an inner psychic world (or omni­
potence over the breast) and "the external world as perceived 
by two persons in common" (Winnicott 1971). This refers to 
a state where both baby and mother have a different and a 
separate relationship to the breast as perceived by the child. 
Later the thumb may represent only bits of mother, or the 
infant himself.
The transitional object appears between four months 
and one year. It is like a symbol in that it has a 'life 
of its own', it contains opposites and it can die by being 
relegated to 'limbo' if its meanings become exhausted 
and/or assimilated into dreaming, play, fantasy, thought . 
and creative activities. The transitional object discovers
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the not-ego (the mother) in a way that is not felt to be 
alien or 'needing to be destroyed' as it would be at first 
as the not-self. The processes underlying symbolization 
in separating out from the not-self are vital to the 
discovery and construction of reality. When deintegration 
makes the mother-object or not-self a part of the self, 
disillusionment gradually leads to a reappraisal by the 
infant and a not-self reality is discovered. The transi­
tional objects help the child to use imagination and 
symbolization to contain parts of the self as they are 
seen to be actually not-self reality, a reality that is 
constructed piece by piece.
In summary of this section on deintegration, the self 
is seen throughout the discussion as a primary c/atum. This 
hypothesis assumes the self is not reducible to anything 
else and is, on this, basis, a parsimonious theoretical 
approach. The symbols that depict union of opposites in 
children have been believed to refer to a state from which 
the infant began. The first self-integrate in infancy has 
been termed the 'original self' by Fordham. This suggests 
that current ideas of the mother as 'carrier of the self' 
are misleading unless this concept is restated to indicate 
that to the baby his mother is a part (deintegrate) of the 
self. On this view the infant creates his mother in the 
light of his own needs initially and she represents, in 
this sense, a part of the infant-self. Without the concept 
of an original self, a basis is lacking for the persistent 
recurrence of integrative states.
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The primary state of unity gives rise to later self-repre­
sentations in the ego expressed as 'unit states' and a 
sense of self in the baby at about two years of age 
(Fordham 1969). Earlier derivations of self are a fusion 
experience where the infant treats his mother as part of 
himself rather than as a separate object. Although early 
perception may be global and cause fusion, it also suggests 
that fusion is due to the organization of perceptual input 
into a unitary perceptual system "which only later deinte- 
grates into specific and clear perception".
"The use of the term deintegration - corresponding to 
instinct defusion - is valuable because it keeps in mind 
the essentially interrelated activity of functional systems 
of adaptation and provides a basis for ego-formation and 
for the periodic integration of ego-fragments into what we 
know later is an organized ego-structure" (Fordham 1976) .
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Qh^-Pter II. The contribution of Freud and the neo-Freudians 
1. The Freudian background
S. Freud, the father-figure of psychoanalysis and a 
genuine pioneer, believed that neurotic symptoms could be 
explained in terms of the patient's life history. Freud 
found that in the hysteric neuroses, symptoms could dis­
appear if the patient felt secure with the psychoanalyst 
and reappear if that relationship became disturbed. In 
1908^ when Freud wrote "Civilized sexual morality and modern 
nervousness", he thought that the repression of instincts 
and sublimation, or the diversion of instinctive energy to 
socially approved goals, created such difficulties that it 
forced many people into severe neurosis. Freud's clinical 
observation turned up similar psychic experience in a wide 
variety of persons. Obviously Freud's discussion of fear, 
anxiety, love, jealousy, sexual desire, aggression, anger, 
hate and the way these may occur in the same person broke 
ground in clinical thinking about conscious experience and 
behaviour. As turbulence is mentally suppressed, the 
symptoms of psychoneurosis, whether physical or mental, 
arise on Freud's theory. Not only illness may arise but 
antisocial behaviour may be acted out or dream material and 
daytime fantasy may suggest meanings that are intelligible 
by studying a person's life history. Freud took as a 
resultant hypothesis that persons apparently do not out­
grow early childhood experiences and that early acute anxiety,
anger and insecurity are repressed to the unconscious while 
the conscious self develops either conformity or rebellion 
or a mixture of the two as its day to day basis.
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What distinguishes Freud's concept of ego-instinct 
(Ichtrieb) is that he has made instinct- a structure 
existent before the phenomenal relation of subject-object. 
Instincts are thought of as freed both from a rigid 
reference either to objects or to the subjects and are seen 
to be variably directed, (tg objects may be exchanged by 
means of substitutions or displacement of cathexis. The 
self (Selbst) and self-regard (Selbst-gefuhl) are discussed 
by Freud only in this sense of redistribution of erotic 
cathexes (Standard Edition '14, 73-102) . Freud eventually 
saw the sexual instincts as most indicative of the primacy 
of aim over the object and separated sexual instinct from 
ego or self-preservative instincts. He posited a primal 
confusion between thing-love and self-love. "If one admits 
a narcissistic phase in which the external world is 
indifferent and the subject the sole source of pleasure, 
then the process of distinguishing between the external 
and the internal, between the world and the ego, is a process 
of economic division between what the ego can incorporate 
into itself and prize as the possession of the "pleasure- 
ego" (Lust-ich) and what it rejects as hostile, as the 
source of unpleasure" (Ricouer 1970) . Narcissism is 
introduced into psychoanalysis to include both aims of 
instinct, the object and the ego, making the conception of 
instinct more radical a concept than subject-object relation 
by itself. Object-choice is seen as a departure from 
narcissism and economically, in the broadest sense, there 
only are departures and returns to narcissism. - Freud updated 
his topography after 1924 to include the structure of ego.
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id and the superego and formed the idea that a displacement 
of narcissism brings about the formation of ideals. In the 
sense that the subject measures his own ego or self-regard 
(Selbstgefuhl) by his ideal, this becomes the only sense 
in which Freud is dealing directly with a part of a visible 
'self-theory'. He ties this development to childhood:
"This ideal ego is now the target of self-love which was 
enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The subject's 
narcissism makes its appearance displaced into this new 
ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, finds itself 
possessed of every perfection that is of value. As always 
where the libido is concerned ... (the person) is not willing 
to forego the narcissistic perfection of childhood; and 
when ... he is disturbed by the admonition of others and 
by the awakening of his own critical judgment, so that he 
can no longer retain that perfection, he seeks to recover 
it in the new form of an ego ideal. What he projects before 
him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism 
of his childhood in which he was his own ideal" (Freud, S.E. 
lA, 94).
Freud leads us back from instinctual factors and their 
vicissitudes to their derivatives in consciousness. The 
object can only be traced back by understanding the economic 
distribution of the libido and its linked genesis with love 
and hate. Freud reduces all derived forms of instinct away 
from the first truth of reflection, "I think" or "I am", to 
something altogether primitive and primordial named 
'primary narcissism'. Freud thought the 'resistance to 
narcissism (n gaining self-knowledge'was man's third
- 68 -
humiliation by science, the first two having been the 
cosmological blow from Copernicus (that the earth is not 
the centre of the universe) and the biological humiliation 
of Darwin (that man's ancestry was recently most simian 
indeed)1 Freud moved the description of consciousness to 
a topography involving psychical apparatus in order to 
include the contrary nature of narcissism. In doing so,
P. Ricoeur (1970) remarks that Freud comes near to a point 
of phenomenological impoverishment as consciousness becomes 
as obscure as unconsciousness. The "I think" and "I am" 
vacillate on Freudian theory. In introducing the inter­
pretation of hidden meaning in apparent meaning, Freud found 
a way back, by linking the topographic-economic explanation 
to the work of psycho-analytic interpretation. In relin­
quishing an obvious phenomenology (Bewusstsein), or self­
evidence of being conscious, for a process of becoming 
conscious (Bewusstwerden) the only way to underpin such a 
claim was to turn to the unconscious as a locality where 
ideas and representations reside, which will mediate the 
interpretation of the object in a reflection rather than an 
immediate consciousness. E. Husserl in the Cartesian 
Meditations (1960 edition) admits that at the heart of the 
certitude of the "I am" there remains a question: "How far 
can the transcendental ego be deceived about itself?"
By using the same language for both unconscious and 
conscious Freud enables affinities of meanings between the 
two: we can speak of unconscious ideas and conscious ideas. 
Apperception is no longer defined by the fact of being
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conscious but includes the unconscious influence on the 
conscious in its perceptual life. The psychical cannot 
be defined apart from the possibility of becoming more 
conscious as it is "the only characteristic of psychical”’ 
processes that is directly presented to us... (it) is in - 
no way suited to serve as a criterion for the differentia­
tion of systems. In principle, psychoanalysis should 
translate the delimitation of meaning via the remote primary 
instinctual representatives back into a fuller conscious 
psychism" (Ricouer 1970). (The unconscious is not seen by 
Freud as an absolute 'other' to the conscious but as homo­
geneous with it interpretively and reflectively.
With the ego, superego and the id, Freud postulated 
a structural topography the neo-Freudians have later 
modified. His theory of excitation and detensioning, as 
basic to all experience and based on instinctual life, 
constituted the basis of the economic theory. Freud posited 
an antithetical position to the self concept because a 
progressive synthesis, inseparable from its production, 
cannot be posited in Freud's topography nor can it "appear 
among the vicissitudes of the instincts which constitute the 
theme of the economics" (Ricouer 1970). The meaning of 
"Selbst" implies a self-other difference from which the 
self-identity surges. This ever-recurring separation of self 
and otherness resides in life experience, inner and outer. 
That is "it is life that becomes the other, in and through 
which the self ceaselessly achieves itself". Freud takes 
unconscious archeology as expressed in themes of instinct and 
narcissism and links them with a concept, not made clear as
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to its exact themes, of a teleology within the process of 
becoming conscious. Some of the themes involved include 
identification and sublimation of the self or parts of the 
self which the neo-Freudians studied. Freud's use of 
"das Selbst" in his early work refers to the ego and is 
almost synonymous with it. Later he defined the self as 
the totality of the id,, ego and superego. He argued that 
the conscious has to develop ego-defences against unconscious 
conflicts which if they erupt into consciousness cause mild 
to severe anxiety symptoms.' An important aspect of repressed 
childhood experience is that in the adult the sublimated 
emotions involved may 'transfer' on to an analogous figure 
of the day through identification causing disruption in 
friendship, marriage and politico-cultural choices. Freud 
used a 'talking out' method of free association to enable 
the pati’ent to voice freely whatever occurs to him without 
losing the analyst's respect in discussing what seemed 
previously prohibited to the patient. Psychoanalysis relies 
on the analyst offering reliability, sympathetic objectivity 
and an attempt at genuine understanding of the patient 
within the theories Freud made explicit. Through free 
association, the patient, theoretically having a trusting 
transference to the analyst, may resolve past unhappiness 
and be enabled to make appropriate relationships, to 
recognize his motives and the motives of others through 
better understanding himself.
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Although Breuer's "cathartic procedure" using hypnosis 
may be regarded as a forerunner of Freud's work, Freud 
discarded the hypnotic method altogether and introduced 
free association. Much that is really particularly 
characteristic of psychoanalysis has been originated by 
Freud. In Studien uber hysterie written jointly by Breuer 
and Freud (1895) , the claim was made that the symptoms of 
hysterical patients are founded on traumata in their past 
life. Breuer obtained catharsis under hypnosis as therapy; 
theoretically it was thought these symptoms represented an 
"abnormal form of discharge for quantities of excitation 
which had not been disposed of otherwise (conversion)" 
(Freud SE 14). Breuer and Freud had different theories of 
the mental dissociation of hysteria, but Breuer broke with 
Freud concerning the extent of the importance of sexual 
aetiology in neurosis. Freud clearly contends in his 
1914 paper, "On the history of the psychoanalytic movement" 
that his concept of repression was original to himself.
He did not know, until Otto Rank pointed it out, that 
A. Schopenhauer in his The World as Will and Representation 
(see 1966 translation of 1819 first edition) describes 
a similar phenomenon concerning struggle against acceptance 
of a painful part of reality. Freud refused to read 
Nietzsche during his later life as well as most other 
philosophers because he wished to derive his ideas from 
clinical psychoanalysis, not from philosophy. Freud also 
claims that he had come to his central ideas of his dream- 
theory - that the reduction of dream-distortion could be 
traced to an inner conflict - before reading a similar 
idea from the engineer, J. Popper, whose Phantasien eines
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Rpalistin (1899) was published under the pen-name of 'Lynkeus'
Where Freud was directly influenced by others we must 
be rigorously specific. The generalizations about this in 
the literature are notorious. Ernest Jones (1953,1957) 
states that Freud often quoted von Schubert (Die Symbolik des 
Traumes, 1837) and Reeves (1965) concludes Freud had read 
von Schubert's dream"theory. Von Schubert's concept of 
"Zweideutigkeit" or a double ambiguous significance, like 
a Janus-face, which he found in nature, religious practice, 
prophetic insight, dreams and in somnambulistic behaviour 
may have been an influence on Freud's pleasure-pain principle 
and concept of opposites. Von Schubert (1837) mentions a 
striving or desire as the essential drive with an opposing 
"desire of spirit" as directed to a world beyond the senses. 
Whether one disregards this as too metaphysical or not, the 
opposite concept of a desire that remains biological leads to 
an intense attachment to a more limited object of which von 
Schubert thought the reverse side to be destruction.
Aggressive destruction goes together with intense attachment 
whether in the natural, biological or social world on this 
view. The important point here is that resulting dissociation 
states were postulated which may have directed part of 
Freud's thinking on the subject. Von Schubert believed 
in metastasis, or that organs designed to function in one 
way may take over the function of another. This was important 
in dream interpretation because von Schubert postulated a 
metastatic linguistic confusion of reference in dreams as 
well as in myth, poetry and prophecy.
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He argued that the language of dreams followed differing 
laws of association to everyday speech using symbolic, 
condensation so that one hieroglyphic image might act as 
symbol for something more complex or unknown. Obviously 
von Schubert's contribution to ideas about unconscious 
functioning had some influence on Freud but it should not 
be exaggerated. The other influence attested to by Freud 
in the posthumously published letters to Fliess was his 
interest in Taine's On Intelligence (1871) which Freud 
would probably have known as he formulated the Project 
(Freud 1895b and see Pribram and Gill 1976).
As Taine probably influenced Freud's theory of primary 
and secondary processes which relate to his ego theory as 
stated in the Pro 1ect, this material heeds thorough conside­
ration. The Project stresses an economic account of the 
organism as having limited energy, if one uses energy for 
one thing, Freud believed there was less for something else.
He tied this idea to two proposed neurological principles: 
a) neuronic inertia by which motor neurons keep the organism 
free of stimulation and b) constancy or the maintenance of 
equilibrium. Freud saw any action as reducing the tension 
of imbalance so that pain and pleasure were defined in terms 
of tension and detensioning throughout his theory.
Of particular relevance to this view is Taine's idea of 
perception as "veridical hallucination" containing antagonistic 
forces between 'sensations' and 'images'. Taine defined 
sensations as those processes that project outwards arising 
from the stimulation of receptors, sensory nerves and corres- _ 
ponding central areas. Taine believed that images are caused
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by a revival of the memory of a sensation. Where recollective 
images become hallucinatory these could be neutralized by 
the external sensory input. This input, as a rival system 
of images, created a normal state. This idea of antagonistic 
and complementary nervous function seems fundamental to 
Freud's concept of primary and secondary processes.
Freud saw any deficit in hunger or sexual satisfaction 
as well as a stock-piling of aggression as creating an' 
imbalance which produced tension. The primary process was 
thought to be immediately concerned with avoiding stimulation 
to get equilibrium. This was the sum of the representative 
product of externally induced change,plus the immediate 
product of internal stimulation. The secondary process 
involves a toleration of some energy to satisfy the basic 
drives. In the neuronal theory of the Project, the Psi 
neurones operate as a sub-system always energized to inhibit 
both internally-produced images and motor actions from the 
primary process. These responses Freud thought to be 
acquired or secondary.
In the Proiect the ego was this sub-system of neurones _ 
permanently cathected. The ego has two dangers to overcome: 
there could be a failure to separate hallucination from 
externally produced perception so hallucinatory tension 
would not be reduced and, similarly, internal memory might 
overwhelm external perception. The Project contains a 
simple explanatory model which discusses the discrepancy 
between memory and perceptual image: 1) 'wishful cathexis' as
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neurones 'a' and 'b'; 2) 'perceptual cathexis' as neurones 
'a' and 'c '; the ego halts action because 'b ' and 'c ' are 
discrepant and a search process is begun, on Freud's theory, 
until a perceptual discharge equalling 'b ' is achieved.
We have discussed the widely accepted theory that 
infants are not thought to have a fully developed criterion 
for distinguishing external from internal image in the 
first weeks of life. Freud thought the ego was naturally 
the criterion as it could inhibit the intensity of internally- 
produced imagery but only through 'biological experience'.
This would suggest that the ego needs to have a primary 
capacity for the whole organism to allocate stimuli associated 
with the past either to pleasure or to pain. Freud assumed 
that a baby has a very accurate memory image of anything 
that has satisfied. We have seen that M. Fordham, following 
Jung, postulates that the ego deintegrates out searching 
for a 'match' to fit the needs of the baby and that at first 
the baby can only tolerate a perfect fit without disinte­
grating. In the baby's long period of dependency, primary 
narcissism would be a basic a priori assumption behind 
psychodynamic theory in the first two years of life.
Freud has only a limited debt to acknowledge to the 
early ideas his teachers propounded. To defend this 
independent position, historical details of Freud's life 
must be kept in mind. Throughout his life work, it is to 
be remembered that Freud was to use these prevailing ideas 
extant in Vienna during his training in new and extended ways.
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In his medical training Freud was taught .by the physicalist 
group of Viennese neurologists who looked to Helmholtz and 
Mach. They tried to describe biological phenomena in terms 
used by natural science and they were helped by electrical 
stimulation and recording from biological tissue and 
measuring its effects on neural activity and on bodily 
chemical processes. - ,
E. Jones (1957) traces Freud's work under Meynart and 
Brentano (see also Bernfeld, 1944,1949; Merlan, 1949) and 
his tenure in Charcot's clinic where trainees studied problem­
solving behaviour by using hypnosis and observation of 
seemingly unrelated associations. The claim that action is 
intentional was a basic assertion of the training. This 
had been argued by Brentano and may have influenced Freud's 
distinction between what is perceived (real?) and what is 
conceived (only thought?). Although Freud's refusal to have 
much to do with philosophy is well-documented, he does admit 
that the concept of unconscious determination in psycho­
analysis is a psychological counterpart of Kant's philo­
sophical views (Freud SE 14). Rapaport (1960) sees the 
epistemological implications of psychoanalysis as closest 
to Kant.
Freud's teachers were living in a time when Central 
European thought was somewhat influenced by Schelling. He 
propounded 'naturphilosophie' to be 'speculative physics'.
All of nature was viewed as an organic, evolving unity with 
organic processes as the fundamental explanatory principles 
thus reducing nonliving nature to the living.
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The true vogue for this thought was in Germany in the 
middle of the eighteenth century. Bernfeld (1949) points 
out emphatically that in Austria naturphilosophie never 
had much power and was at minimal influence in Vienna.
It would be true to say, however, that Brucke who taught 
Freud his first courses in physiology was in reaction 
against J. Muller^ a vitalist, who always doubted that the 
velocity of the nervous impulse could be measured.
H. Helmholtz, although his pupil, succeeded in measuring 
this and formed the Berlin Physical Society (1842) with
E. Brucke, C. Ludwig and E. du Bois-Reymond, in order to 
destroy vitalism, the fundamental belief of Muller.
It is doubtful if naturphilosophie, although an attempt 
at monism in which mind might be the only reality, was 
actually exactly a vitalism. It did have a Heraclitean 
emphasis on 'becoming', common also to monism. In Kant's 
sophisticated version of nature as 'unity', he postulated 
a uniting of the mechanical and the teleological. He thought 
parts of the organism could only be understood in terms of 
their function for the whole. (In this theoretical approach 
Kant supports the theory of the whole as more parsimonious 
than reducing theory to separate bits or parts of the whole 
and thus indirectly supports the idea of self as vital to 
theoretical framework and irreducible from this point of 
view of explanation). Kant maintained that the existence 
of the whole implies an end. One cannot see in nature a 
visible purpose but Kant thought one can only understand an 
organism if one regards it as produced under the guidance 
of 'thought for an end'. Goethe picked up this influence 
and developed a more Platonic implication of this thought
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by postulating "ideas" in "God-mind" manifested as a limited 
number of patterns for the structures of organisms. The 
root of this was Plato's conception of the macrocosm of 
nature as reflecting the microcosm of man and Kant restated 
this idea believing processes of mind reflect the processes 
of nature. Jung, in his conception of the collective 
unconscious, postulates the archetypes as carriers of the • 
'patterns' of psychological adaptation available to the 
organism.
Was Freud, after he entered University, any longer 
concerned with naturphilosophie? Probably not. The only 
philosophy he studied was in five courses with Brentano, a 
classical and Aristotelian philosopher. The influence of 
Lenarch and Muller as vitalists had been over-ruled in 1842 
and Freud did not enter medical school until 1873. The 
faculty was more analytic by then and the older philosophic 
style of broad, synthetic, deductive theory-formation no 
longer held sway. Freud is reputed.to have heard Goethe's 
essay on nature read by Professor C. Bruhl at the Gymnasium 
although J. Strachey, editor of many of Freud's publications 
in English, doubts that the essay was actually written by Goethe
I reject naturphilosophie as a part of Freud's mature 
inner Zeitgeist by a thorough review of the facts surrounding 
his University teachers: we know that Brucke, with whom Freud 
studied the nervous system for six years, was close to 
Helmholtz. Both Briicke•and Helmholtz were Muller's pupils 
and founded a club together in Berlin. Helmholtz's contri­
bution to physiology emulated physics and chemistry in its 
approach. His discoveries were many. One can mention the
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description of the peripheral nerve fibres, the principle 
of conservation of energy, the measurement of the velocity 
of nerve conduction, the muscle heat production studies 
and the several visual and auditory studies.
Freud states that BrucKe's influence (see CW 1927, 
p.253) carried most weight with him during his studies.
S. Exner, Brucke's'assistant, like Brucke himself, postulated 
the accumulation of excitation at the cortical centres which 
Freud was to use in his theory as well. T. Meynart's 
Psychiatric Clinic, where Freud worked for five months after 
his clinical training was another influence of sorts.
Freud used this laboratory for several years.
Meynart's school tried to reduce all nervous function 
to physical reflexes. Mind as an efficacious agent was 
apparently eliminated. Meynart's model is important because 
Freud did have somewhat similar ideas and presented them, 
after much new elaboration, in the Project (1895). Meynart 
‘attempted to work out a theory of how the cortex developed 
in response to its environment. By its environment Meynart 
meant both its own body and the external world. He saw 
excitation as pain producing. The discharge of excitation 
was by the subcortical reflex system but this would not 
stop the impingement of excitation as shown behaviourally 
in restlessness or convulsions. Meynart postulated a 
cortical image of an external agent which could stop the 
impingement of excitation.' He thought that cortical inner­
vation sensations were mediated through subcortical reflex
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pathways so that a cortical representation occurred at the 
end of impinging excitation. Association fibres were thought 
to connect this system physiologically and Meynart used a 
sucking infant as his example in lectures.
Meynart, before Freud, postulated the primary ego (Ich) 
as the "nucleus of individuality" which by association was 
built up to a unique psycho-motor intensity. He used 
teleology in his theory by defining ordered thoughts as 
"goal ideas implanted in the ego" (Meynart 1889), "The goal- 
idea, is, for example, the cessation of hungerî the means- 
idea which fits with it can be robbery, work, or someone 
else's hospitality. Which mean^-idea gains the force depends 
on the synergistic and antagonistic ideas which are already 
sufficiently well laid in the ego". How far was Freud 
influenced by Meynart? It is fair to say merely that he also 
believed that all nervous excitation and the transmitting 
cortical pathways involved were thought to serve the dis­
charge of all impinging sensation and he also believed in an 
ego structure. The claims that Freud's Project was a 
rewrite of S. Exner's (1894) Entwurf. zu einer physioloqischen 
Erklarung der psvchischen Erschej^unqen are overstated.
Exner's paper shares only in a vague way some of the back­
ground ideas of the Project : it compares to Brucke's lectures 
on neurophysiology and Meynart's work on cerebral function 
in the sense of using Brucke's fundamental mechanisms and 
Meynart's nervous mechanisms to explain complex psychological 
processes.
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What is important to remember is that neither Meynart 
nor Exner had physiological or anatomical postulates for 
their assumptions. Freud's Project changed this.
Via his own studies of aphasia, Freud began to see the 
speech area as less circumscribed than had his teachers. 
Freud's case studies did not fit the cortical location of 
the speech apparatus that his teachers propounded. In the 
Project, Freud added to the prevailing reflex concept by 
postulating, in addition, a mechanism on the cellular 
neuronic level which resulted in the transfer of excitation 
from one periphery of the neurone system to the other.
Exner had only assumed this transfer but did not postulate 
a mechanism for it. Freud postulated the Omega neurons 
which received excitation only \hen the Psi neurons did and 
assigned consciousness to these. His teachers had no such 
postulations.
The Project had several other innovations as well :
1) The theory of dreams as wish fulfilments following on 
experiences of satisfaction in infantile sexuality has no 
equivalent in his teachers; Freud argued for somatic sources 
of excitation as responsible for satisfaction in infantile 
sexuality, not just excitation from the afferent periphery, 
as he thought the latter to be insufficient to explain the 
considerable excitation involved. 2) The repression of 
hysteria contained a new concept of repressed ideas; Freud 
believed them to be isolated from association whether the 
ego functioned or not, whereas Meynart's 'amentia' involved 
a weakening of the ego so that hallucinatory ideas were cut 
off from associative processes. 3) Freud's therapy method 
was different from everyone else's and clearly innovative.
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As regards the influence of his teachers on the Pro 1ect 
about all that can be said is that Freud generally regarded 
the cortex as an association mechanism as they did. He then 
extended and modified these ideas to entirely original 
innovative concepts as early as 1895 and continually later 
on throughout his life. Rather than express his Zeitgeist, 
Freud used part of it as a launching pad for his new missile- 
ideas which were in sharp contrast to the available ideas 
of his teachers. It could be said that Freud was trying to 
apply thermodynamics to man and assumed that the nervous 
system is passive having as fundamental function the removal 
of the energies fed into it. More importantly, Freud 
included the unconscious within his theory. Freud's work 
unveiled "...the meaningfulness of unconsciously determined 
behaviour as an indicator of a scientifically accessible 
process, whereas others had merely concerned themselves with 
the obvious, i.e. the conscious" (Pribram & Gill, 1976). 
Freud, (SEl), wrote: "We at once become clear about a postu­
late which has been guiding us up to now. We have been 
treating psychical processes as something that could dispense 
with ... awareness through consciousness, as something that 
exists independently of such awareness. We are prepared to 
find that some of our assumptions are not confirmed through 
consciousness. If we do not let ourselves be confused on 
that account, it follows, from the postulate of consciousness 
providing neither complete nor trustworthy knowledge"of the 
neuronal processes, that these are in the first Instance to 
be regarded to their whole extent as unconscious" and-âre to 
be inferred like other natural things". ^- - - - -
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This solution to the mind—brain—behaviour problem
smashed the Zeitgeist of Freud's time surely. Freud was
a busy clinician making his living with very little time
to read outside his direct field. Although initially'
influenced by Charcot, Breuer and also probably by von
Schubert and Taine, the academic interest in tracing Freud's
precursors has been misplaced as he was an innovator
drawing his conclusions from his clinical material much
more than from what others thought. He actually represents
very little of his Zeitgeist in the sense of the prevailing
scientific opinion because he applied a new interpretation
to all this in psychoanalytical interpretation. The rampant
sexuality of Vienna could hardly have been expected to lead '
him to a theory of repression! Pioneers cannot be 'placed'
into historical perspective by the wishful thinking of 'tidy
intellectuals who are afraid of originality in psychology
and hence of non-perseveration. There is little point in
reflecting that others partly paved the way for Freud. He
«
simply did not know very much about most of them: He had
not read many of the similar ideas to his either before, 
during or after his major discoveries with the exceptions 
discussed above. Freud was an original genius.
M. Jahoda's claim (1977) that Freud suffered from 
cryptomania, or forgetting the source of an idea while 
remembering its content, is based on her reading of M. Dorer 
(1932) who claims Freud's ideas were "similar" to those of 
Herbart and to Freud's teacher Meynart. Freud denies this 
when in his "A note on the prehistory of the technique of
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analysis" (Freud SE 18) he acknowledges three predecessors 
who used free-association as a means of self-discovery in 
creative writing (but not in the context of an analytic 
system): Schiller, in a letter to the poet Kerner (1819);
Dr. J.J.G. Wilkinson (1887), in his published verse which 
were free-associations on chosen themesjand the writer L.
Borne (1858), who said novels should be written after three 
days of associating. Freud, as usual, maintains that 
colleagues drew these sources to his attention after his 
own invention of psychoanalytic method and, unlike Jahoda 
(1977)^ I believe this assertion without reservation. Jahoda 
(1977) goes so far as to claim in Freud and the Dilemmas of 
Psychology that "there can be little doubt that further work 
... restricted to European ideas, will uncover additional 
material (to be added to L.L. Whyte (1962) and A.F. Ellen- 
berger (1970)J, demonstrating that virtually every single 
idea of Freud's has been conceived by somebody else before 
him". What Jahoda seems not to consider sufficiently is 
that Freud was a divergent thinker in Liam Hudson's sense 
of the term and used the idea of free-association as a cure, 
without hypnosis, for the first time. If he borrowed from 
von Schubert and Taine, he transformed this material into a 
much larger system of dynamic theory.
The essence of Jahoda's lack of awareness of Freud's 
innovative approach is revealed on page 135 (1977): "Infantile 
sexuality, too, had been identified by many before Freud. 
Mothers and nursemaids must have known about it throughout 
the ages, whatever name they attached to it". This may be so.
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The scientific point is precisely that no one had organized 
infantile sexuality into a causative concept or understood 
its inter-relation to later development before Freud.
There is an ignorance displayed on the subject of infantile 
sexuality as a theoretical concept by most writers prior to 
the nineteenth century. Freud acknowledges two doctors, 
Lindner, who wrote on.sexual thumb-sucking, and Bell who 
collected more general observations of infantile sexuality. 
These ideas were tentatively put forward. Divergence rather 
than convergence characterized the development of Freud's 
ideas.
Freud began his working life as a laboratory scientist, 
but his experiences with patients led him to a study of 
dynamics in the disturbed emotional, individual psychology 
of persons beginning with the relationship of parent and child. 
Initially Freud based explanation of physical factors on 
biology following his medical training. He saw anxiety as 
sexual tension. It .took twenty-five years for Freud to give 
this up for the psychological theory that anxiety is an ego- 
defence to some threat, relative to one's past self-experience. 
This shift from psychological instincts to the ego, or self 
as Freud tended to see it, was important but Freud oscillated 
between seeing the ego as the personal self and seeing it as 
a control system which was only a part of the whole system.
This question is of prime importance to psychology. Bronowski, 
during his work at the Salk Institute of Biology, held that 
man is both a machine and a self. This would allow for two 
qualitatively different kinds of knowledge: the knowledge 
of the machine or physical science and the knowledge of the 
self which Bronowski saw as 'outside' science.
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But how can genuine psychological knowledge be left 
outside science? Sir Cyril Burt (1968) cites Lord Adrian 
as commenting, "For many of us still one thing seems to 
lie outside the tidy and familiar (materialist) framework 
- the 'I' who does the perceiving". Burt (1968) also cites 
Professor Mace: "Freud seems to have been almost the first
to take mental determinism seriously as a basic explanation 
in psychology". Burt (1959) maintains: "A man's conscious 
life forms just one continuous event ... (this) unity and 
continuity strongly suggest that the constituent events are 
related to some permanent and central entity, an entity of 
a special non-material kind, in short a personal self, who 
owns these events (by reflection) and refers to them as my 
conscious experiences or states, and describes himself by 
the proper name* of 'I '".
If one adds to Burt's "conscious mind" the "unconscious" 
of Freud, the field of psychoanalytic investigation becomes 
a mental psychology actually called for within the climate 
of thinking in physical science. Freud's work from 1890 to 
1938 gives one a basis for the study of the psychodynamics 
of the human personality. Psychodynamics as defined by a 
neo-Freudian, Guntrip (1971), is "...the study of the 
motivated and meaningful life of human beings, as persons 
shaped in. the media of personal relationships which constitute 
their lives and determine to so large an extent how their 
innate gifts and possibilities will develop..."
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Salzman (1967) points out that in psychoanalytic 
history there are two coexisting strands. One strand 
concerns the vicissitudes of "a theory of behaviour in 
the then prevailing model of energy mechanics and over­
simplified concepts of causality...". The other history 
of psychoanalysis revolves around efforts to "move 
personality theory closer to a valid statement about man 
and his psychology... The physical models which have been 
offered to date do not adequately encompass man, who 
functions through a system of values as well as physio- 
chemical changes". Freud's ideas fall into two main groups: 
(1) the id plus ego-control apparatus and (2) the Oedipus 
complex of family object-relationship. The first group of 
ideas pictures the psyche as a mechanism for securing homeo­
static organization. The second group tends to a personal 
psychology of parents and children. The Oedipal work led 
Freud beyond the study of sex with its biological basis, to 
aggression with its social concomitants of depression and 
guilt and into the concept of the superego, an aspect of 
psychic life not traced biologically but traced on the basis 
of identification with parents. Freud believed once 
identification with parents occurred, the Oedipus complex 
was largely overcome.
The developments among neo-Freudians relate to the 
superego theory which implies the importance of personal 
object-relationships. H. Hartmann (1964) allowed the super­
ego to decline in importance in his structural theory of 
the ego while Melanie Klein (1948,1952,1957,1961) used it as 
a starting point for the new developments she brought to 
object-relation theory.
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Freud's hydraulic model or the apparatus for the control 
of id-drives is much more impersonal than his Oedipal ideas, 
with the object-relational life of meaningful and motivated 
relations between persons as its basis. Freud tended 
throughout his work to keep these two aspects of his own 
dynamic drives - the biochemical and the psychological - 
in oscillation. On the one hand, he put forward the 
mechanistic theory with the economics and topographical 
points of view. On the other hand, he presented the personal 
dynamic theory worked out on the basis of psychological 
processes within family relationships.
Mechanism had been exemplified in du Bois-Reymond's 
manifesto of 1842: "... No other forces than the common 
physical-chemical ones are active within the organism. In 
those cases which cannot at the time be explained by these 
forces one has either to find the specific way or form of 
their action by means of the physical-mathematical method, 
or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical- 
physical forces inherent in matter, reducible to the force 
of attraction and repulsion". Freud partially rejected this 
mechanistic doctrine of physicalistic physiology and created 
an abstract, hypothetical psychic apparatus in place of the 
nervous system in which the operative quantity was psychic, 
not physical energy. This was not a 'pure' psychology but 
a convenient abstract theory of a psychic apparatus, based 
on the brain as he saw it, and probably intended to be 
eventually reunited with anatomy and physiology,"We must 
recollect that all our provisional ideas on psychology will 
presumably some day be based on an organic substructure" 
(Freud SE 14, 78). In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1959),
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Freud speaks of his views regarding the pleasure principle..
It gives us an example of underlying confusion between the 
mechanistic and the psychological: "The course taken by 
mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure" 
principle ... the course of those events is invariably set 
in motion by an unpleasurable tension ... it takes a 
direction such that its final outcome coincides with a 
lowering of that tension - t h a t  is, with an avoidance of 
unpleasure or a production of pleasure". Here Freud used 
'automatically' as a mechanistic term having an unclear 
psychological meaning. Yet the terms 'pleasure' and 
'unpleasure' may have a psychological significance not fully 
considered by Freud: "We have decided to relate pleasure and 
unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is present in 
the mind... and to relate them in such a manner that unpleasure 
corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation, and 
pleasure to a diminution". These views stem from psycho­
physiology: "The facts which have caused us to believe in 
the dominance of the pleasure principle ... find expression 
in the hypothesis that the mental apparatus endeavours to 
keep the quantity of mental excitation in it as low as 
possible or at least to keep it constant ... the pleasure 
principle flows from the constancy principle". The constancy 
principle is defined as the tendency to maintain intra­
cerebral excitation at a constant level.
Freud's use of 'endeavour' in the phrase "the mental . 
apparatus endeavours" suggests purposive teleological ...r f:. ' _ 
striving. This would need a motivated psychic self and : 
suggests we are not dealing with an apparatus. If there orv :cr 
is an apparatus, on the other hand, this is mechanistic andf rr
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the term 'endeavour' is out of context. The idea of homeo­
stasis, either on the pleasure principle or the constancy 
principle, is troublesome to explain psychologically. If 
a person devoted himself to keeping excitation to as low 
a level as possible, he would be bored. Increasing excita­
tion might not be experienced as unpleasure but as a relief 
from dullness. As Freud in this physiological-quantity 
theory reduced psychological consciousness to just an 
accompaniment of bodily processes, he strayed back into 
scientific materialism. This is valid in itself but it is 
non-psychology. Psychology, by its very name, must be a 
study of mental or psychic life in its own right.
It is a valid criticism of the psychoanalytic energy 
concept that it fluctuates between being Freud's original 
concept of a physical cathartic quantity traversing the 
fibres of a nervous system and then being a more purely 
psychological, non-physiochemical concept. Freud assumed 
physical energy can be transformed into psychic energy (SE 3) 
and also assumed that at the ontological 'gap' there would 
be 'surplus energy' if the psychic was transformed to the 
physical and a 'deficit' if physical energy transformed to 
psychic energy. This interactionism assumed a causal chain, 
e.g.: a physical event (e.g. a pattern of light) causes 
another physical event (a neural current from retina to brain) 
which causes another psychological event (visual perception) 
that causes a further .psychological event (an intention to act) 
which causes a physical event (a movement of the body).
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Lashley and Colby (1957) argue against any evidence 
for such an interactionist, mind-body dualism: "Neural 
activity has been sufficiently well explored to rule out 
such broad assumptions as of the energy of the libido or 
of the id... The energy of nervous systems is that of 
transmitted excitations, with its implied limitations and 
specifications. Energy dissociated from this ... is ruled 
out by definite experimental evidence ... the derivation 
of psychic energy from one or a few 'instincts' finds no 
support in the nature of neural activity ... Where instinctive 
activities have been analysed experimentally, as in studies 
of hunger, mating and maternal behaviour, there is nothing 
that suggests free or transferable energy ... behaviour can 
be explained without assumption of an energy other than the 
interaction of specific neural elements". Whatever one may 
think about the applicability of Lashley's specific experi­
ments to the general human psychological condition to which 
Freud turned his interpretive insights clinically, Freud 
clearly did not adopt any one or consistent stance on the 
mind-body problem. His doctrine of psychic energy is similar 
to vitalism: it is generally dualistic but not clearly so; 
he does not postulate a spatial order for psychical systems, 
only a temporal one: cathexis is called a directional energy 
analogous but not identical with psychic energy and it is 
intrinsically directional as vitalistic processes or forces 
are. Psychoanalysis speaks of psychic energy anthropo-mor- 
phically as if it "does things" autonomously; a mechanistic 
structure is postulated within which psychic energy operates. 
If these parallels exist between psychoanalysis and vitalism, 
Freud would never have identified cathectic energy with
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either 'entelechy' or 'elan vital' nor did he ever refer
in the (Collected Works to the two vitalists nearest to him ~ - -
as contemporaries, Driesch and Bergson.
If, however, psychic energy is almost functionally 
equivalent to a vital-force concept, does this vitalism or 
psychic energy hold up methodologically as a useful scientific 
idea? McDougall's hormic or purposive psychology had a 
doctrine of energies which he linked via purpose as the 
central 'fact' of behaviour to free will, spontaneity and 
a belief in the Lamarchian inheritance of acquired characte­
ristics. Carl Rogers (1961) has more recently supported a 
drive towards self-actualization in a directional sense as 
"...the urge which is evident in all organic and human life 
... the tendency to express and activate all the capacities 
of the organism".
•Vitalism degenerates easily into a mere description of 
events under any label presumed to apply. Is a concept of 
vital energy useless if we do not have a 'practical' operation 
to define life energy? Freudians have tended to use 
theoretical metaphors without rules for expanding them and 
hence there is a danger that 'systematic' meaning is lost. 
Nevertheless there is a fair amount of research started which 
is devoted to measuring psychic energy (D. Rapaport 1960,
F. Schwartz and R.O. Rouse 1961 and Ostow 1962). These 
experiments arouse controversy as to whether they merely 
serve a Freudian language in which to discuss cases or - -
whether they are a test of basic assumptions. M. Schlick '  ^
(1953) defends vitalism because the adaptiveness of organisms-"'--
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suggests an implication of purpose. E. Nagel (1953,1961), 
on the other hand, claims direction (as a system without 
an energy concept) is a matter of structure and information 
only, not requiring an explanation or inclusion of force. 
Causal concepts of natural science are assumed by Nagel as 
sufficient for explanation.
If vitalism is partly dead, so too is mechanism. T.C. 
Schneirla (1945) writes that mechanism went astray by 
"endeavouring to fit all adaptive capacities directly under 
physico-chemical rubrics ... and (vitalism went astray) by 
setting out to bring all cases under a universal supernatural 
causal principle". Both systems have sought for an explana­
tion of the organic event by reducing it to a 'principle' 
or 'category' which 'causes' it. Mainx (1955) points out 
that psychoanalysis keeps to an energy concept that is 
defined as being directed. That means there is a tauto­
logical problem as the concepts tend to be defined only by 
their connection with the processes they are said to cause.
Psychoanalysts today argue that psychic energy can be 
interpreted non-directionally and non-existentially as an 
abstract, quantitative construct with qualities and direction 
contributed by structures (esp. Rapaport 1960). In physics, 
energy is only indirectly measureable unlike time, space and 
mass (Molt 1965) and psychological concepts do not need to 
be operational in any simple sense. Freud argues (CW 14)
"basic concepts __  are not the foundation of science upon
which everything rests: that foundation is observation alone. 
They are not the bottom but the top of the whole structure...'
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Holt insists (1965) that the metapsychological theory of 
Freud could be rewritten without reference to energy and 
still retain explanatory power. Economic considerations 
are written into Freud's theories so extensively one might 
challenge Holt to achieve such a rewrite!
2. Early neo-Freudian contribution towards a self concept
a. Introduction
Harry Stack Sullivan (1953), a neo-Freudian, points 
out the argument against accepting scientific materialism 
as a basis for psychodynamic study: "Biological and neuro- 
physiological terms are utterly inadequate for studying 
everything in life... I hope you will not try to build up 
in your thinking, correlations (...of 'somatic' organization 
with psychiatrically important phenomena) that are purely 
imaginary ... an illusion born out of the failure to recognize 
that what we know comes to us through our experiencing of 
events". Sullivan saw the subjectivity of experiencing as 
the concern for psychodynamic studies which he defined as 
interpersonal relations. This introduces a way to disentangle 
object relations from biology altogether. This has been 
followed by the work of M. Klein, W.R.D. Fairbairn and D.W. 
Winnicott who have traced ego development back to their view 
of its earliest beginnings. Klein kept very little of Freud's 
psychophysical speculation in her psychodynamic work. She 
did perpetuate the terminology of Freud's instinct theory 
and the structural theory of id, ego and superego as well 
as the oral, anal, phallic and genital stage concepts.
Klein saw object-relations as a principle not based on biology 
or physiology or the machinery of personal life, but thought
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its essential quality was the meaningful personal experience 
of the personal self. In contrast, H. Hartmann (1964), in 
his system-ego theory, hoped to correlate this with brain 
physiology and considered social adaptation from a biological 
aspect. He viewed ego function as an organ of adaptation 
to be understood biologically. Adaptation as an ego aim 
ends up, according to Winnicott (1965), as a 'false s e l f  
based on conformity whereas he sees a 'true self as not 
only adaptive but creative within the environment.
Nevertheless it is astonishing how E. Erikson (1964) 
continued to try and tie psychoanalysis to biological 
formation well illustrated by his description of the id:
The 'id' Freud considered to be the oldest province of the 
mind ... he held the young baby to be ^all id' ... the id 
is the deposition in us of the whole of evolutionary history. 
The id is everything that is left in our organization of 
the responses of the amoeba and the impulses of the ape ... 
everything that would make us 'mere creatures'. The name 
'id' designates an assumption that the ego finds itself 
attached to this impersonal, this bestial layer, like the 
Centaur to his equestrian underpinnings; only that the ego 
considers such a combination a danger. Here Erikson is 
assuming human nature to be made up of an evolutionary set 
of layers. He suggests that we are all split-egos, like 
Centaurs, and therefore more or less pathological. By 
attaching the ego to a 'bestial' id, he reaffirms the 
impersonal process of Freud's biological theory, i.e. the 
id drives and the superego controls, and neglects the 
personal object-relational thinking that seems ready to 
break through in Freud but never quite succeeds in so doing.
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Erikson has delineated ego-identities and has studied their 
roots in social organization but he stopped short of whole- 
person egos which the Freudian school tends to see as a 
concept similar to the self. Erikson continues to see a 
strife where self-destruction is avoided only if the ego 
makes compromises between the id and the superego. There 
is no clear delineation of a psychodynamic self or whole 
person. Erikson has only put an inadequate psychic founda­
tion underneath his ego-identities: the bestial under­
pinnings of the Centaur.
b. M. Klein - an object-relative self
Melanie Klein's structural theory developed by inter­
pretation of the internal psychic world of ego-object 
relations. Unlike Erikson she saw these internal struggles 
apart from the broad social environment. They were con­
ceived to be made up of life and death instincts, sex and 
aggression. The inner drama becomes projected onto the outer 
world when the baby begins to be able to discern external 
objects. Klein sees a baby terrorized by his own death 
instinct and therefore having difficulties in perceiving 
real objects in an objective way. She believed that the 
death instinct is projected onto the breast in the first 
instance and is then reintrojected. This would mean the 
baby's outer-world experiences would double anxiety, as the 
death instinct would colour the reintrojection of the breast. 
Klein then claims that envy is an innately determined 
constitutional part of all infants' natures. Between envy 
and the death instinct, Klein leaves one little hope for any
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friendly objectivity in personal relationships and the 
environment is left with little role of its own to play.
The environment is seen as merely 'confirming' the baby's 
primary anxieties and inner conflicts.
The question one must put to the Kleinian school is 
this: if the object-world is of so little primary or 
intrinsic value, how can we speak of genuine object 
relationships? Klein definitely saw the death instinct as 
overshadowing either the love or life instinct and claimed 
it as the ultimate source of anxiety and persecutory feelings. 
In working with children of two, Klein claimed their fantasy 
life supported this theory of innately fundamental conflict. 
This fantasy world of the child contains emotion-laden 
relationships within which a variety of good and bad objects 
become mental images of parts or aspects of parents. Life 
is viewed as totally a matter of ego-object relationships.
At primitive level, part-objects such as the breast or 
penis images develop into whole-objects which the infant 
may experience as good or bad. Bad experience is projected, 
reintrojected and then projected onto parents.
Klein believes instincts are object-seeking. The 
child's first love-object is its own ego in primary 
narcissism. The first hate-object will create the child's 
anxiety and this is postulated to be its own death instinct, 
or Thanatos, which aims to return the organism to an inorganic 
state. On this theory the breast is necessarily the "bad 
breast" as it has received the projection of Thanatos. As 
the baby cannot fully control the breast containing the 
projected Thanatos, he introjects the destructive force and
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changes Thanatos from an instinct into an object both 
literally and in fantasy. On this theory external object- 
relations give concrete expression to Klein's theory of 
primary forces and their hypothesized internal relations.
This curious theoretical route to object-relations 
is accepted only by the Kleinian school. What is much more 
acceptable to the neo-Freudians generally and also to the 
neo-Jungians as we have seen, is that there is in the baby 
a development of an inner world of fantasy; this inner 
world is object-relational and would be a counterpart of 
the ego's relation to the world of real objects, at first 
centred on the mother. The end result of Klein's theory 
is that all therapeutic work would need to centre on the 
patient's winning back the reality and importance of the 
external world which was denied and distorted at the start 
of life.
Kleinian metapsychology rests on the domination of the 
death instinct. It is more philosophical or like a religious 
belief than a scientific theory. What Klein has contributed 
is to go further back than Freud into the beginning of life 
in tiny children. She worked with infants using play and 
dreams for conscious expression of the internal psychic 
life and interpreting symptoms of disturbed behaviour- 
relations as clinical material to support her concepts.
Klein reworked Freud's stages-of-development theories.
Freud saw all libido as sexual and the oral, anal and genital 
zones were regarded as possessing libidinal drive for the 
pleasure of de-tensioning. It would be clinically surprising 
if the small child did not fasten on to these obtrusive
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phenomena in his body as they often attract the disapproving 
attention of anxious parents. Freud saw the oral, anal, 
phallic and genital scheme as a set of stages based on 
instinct maturation. Klein shifted interest to the quality 
of ego-experfences in object relations. She proposed two 
object-relational positions, both seen as problems to the 
child. They are not just transitional stages since they 
may not be left behind psychologically in the adult. Klein 
named the two positions the depressive position and the 
paranoid-schizoid position. Guntrip (1971) argues that the 
schizoid position should be considered separately from the 
paranoid as the infant is withdrawn from all object relations 
if schizoid, rather than being in relationship to objects 
but feeling persecuted by them, as in the paranoid position.
In the depressive position, Klein postulates the baby 
has mostly overcome the paranoid and schizoid positions and 
has whole-object relations. The child then is postulated 
to feel guilt and depression when discovering he can hurt 
those whom he can also love. These schemata are totally 
non-biological. The two positions may oscillate between 
themselves and the oral, anal and genital clinical phenomena 
are seen as symptomatic of conversion hysteria with emotional 
problems fastening on to one body organ or another to find 
psychic discharge.
Klein did not develop ego psychology: rather the id 
and the superego play an important part throughout her 
writing (1932,1946,1948,1952). With her infantile arena 
of Eros and Thanatos in permanent struggle, Klein saw the 
ego as creative and loving, the superego as hating and 
destructive as it contains the internalized parent as a bad
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object. This brings clarity to ego-splitting processes 
and is a fully psychodynamic clinical approach to object 
relations as the basis of internal development in infants. 
Klein realized that clinical work was^ in itself, object- 
relational between analyst and the child being analysed.
Freud had developed his ideas of transference, Oedipal 
problems and his superego concept from clinical work.
Klein left the underpinning of Freud's idea of quantitative 
gratifications of instinctual drives, to be concerned 
with good and bad object-relationships and the concomitant 
guilt, reparation, love and hate.
I wish to point out that Klein's theory in no way 
reflects the baby's mixed good and bad experiences of 
external objects in real life. Instead, even in the womb, 
the baby is seen to have a split personality as its 
constitutional nature has a love or Eros instinct permanently 
threatened by a death or Thanatos instinct. Thus the 
origins of this internal world where the baby is thought 
to live in dread of his own death instinct exist before 
the baby experiences the mother as good or bad. As the 
baby projects the death instinct onto the breast, the mother 
becomes bad as the baby thinks she carries his own innate 
badness.
Klein argues that to counteract this the baby must 
internalize a 'good breast'. But how can the baby ever 
experience a good breast at all On Klein's theory? If 
bad-object experience is primary and the death instinct 
always ruins any projection of the love instinct onto the 
mother, the problem is insoluble and illogical.
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c. W.R.D. Fairbairn - a whole self
The contribution of W.R.D. Fairbairn (1954a) is 
particularly germinal both to psychoanalysis and to this 
paper. Some of the ideas put forward here will influence 
the final model of the self to be proposed (Chapter VI ) .
In proposing the 'id' Freud proposed layers of the mind, 
the id, ego and superego, which were in conflict with each 
other. The archaic layer or id was seen to be in conflict 
with the ego or more recent cortical layers.
Fairbairn totally rejected the id concept as he saw the 
origins-of the concept in Freud's mind as due to a conversion 
hysteria symptom. Freud made an intellectual attempt to 
project the infantile, angry, needy life-urge of an infant 
onto something ("the id") outside the ego or real "I". 
Fairbairn rejected Freud's divorce o^ structure and energy 
seeing this as outmoded Helmholtzian physics. He argued 
against cortical layers as a concept and believed in a 
psychosomatic whole. "Impulses cannot be considered apart 
from either object or ego-structures. Impulses are but 
the dynamic aspect of endopsychic structures and cannot be 
said to exist in the absence of such structures. Ultimately 
'impulses' must be regarded simply as constituting the forms 
of activity in which the life of ego-structure consists" 
(Fairbairn 1954a).
Fairbairn kept to a whole-human-being concept and, like 
Fordham, saw the baby to be a whole psychic self from the 
beginning. He speaks of a "unitary dynamic ego" and rejects 
the idea that the ego is a later synthetic growth.
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He rejects Freud's idea that the baby begins as a bestial 
layer of animal instincts blindly seeking detensioning. 
Fairbairn believed the baby to be a whole dynamic being 
with ego-potential. The baby is a person - not a few 
awkward bits of personality needing fitting together.
This brings a new question forward as to what is 
important in the first weeks of life. It is no longer 
primarily the question of quantification of instincts, 
the reconciliation of independent psychic structures or 
the satisfaction of instincts. Instead preservation or 
restoration (if lost) of the psychic wholeness becomes the 
question of first importance. Fairbairn considered that 
biology studies somatic processes by methods that tell us 
nothing directly about subjective experiences. The opposite 
would be just as true: that subjective experience of a psycho­
somatic whole tells us nothing directly about biological 
processes. Libido is seen by Fairbairn not as a biological 
"per se" which he claimed would be a reification of only one 
element of a more complex process. He thought a "libidinal 
ego" could libidinize any part of the body. Not just mouth, 
anus or genitals but skin, eyes, hands and muscles are 
included in object relationship. Thus "the goal of the 
libidinal ego is the object" for Fairbairn and the self has 
a libido as a basis for its object-seeking drives.
Fairbairn rejects M. Klein's views in an outright manner. 
He sees the mother who is a whole ego as enabling the baby 
to perceive his own whole ego. There is no postulation of 
a death instinct in operation. Ego development depends on 
initially good object-relations or if that does not happen
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therapy may repair this. He sees the baby as only inter­
nalizing a bad mother if she is actually not good enough.
There is no initial projection of death anxiety onto the 
mother's breast. Fairbairn thinks mothers are usually not 
wholly bad, so the baby splits his internalization into a 
'good mother' and a 'bad mother'. The 'good mother' is 
projected back onto the mother to enable an idealization 
that permits the relationship to function for the baby.
The bad internalized objects threaten the good object and 
guilt and depression may occur. Fairbairn hypothesizes 
that the bad internal object is split into an exciting 
object and a rejecting object. Needing the exciting object 
sets up baby to mother dependencies and to control and 
partly relieve this the rejecting object is identified.
With this an "anti-libidinal ego" develops through identifi­
cation with parents when they refuse to meet the baby's 
needs. Fairbairn's system is complex; he sees three basic 
fantasied mother-types: 1) the mother who tantalizes needs 
but does not satisfy them, i.e. the exciting object; 2) the 
authoritarian mother who actively denies satisfaction, i.e. 
the rejecting object; 3) the neutral mother whom the child 
tries to please, i.e. the ideal object.
Object splitting occurs as both the exciting and 
rejecting objects are repressed while the ideal object is 
projected back into the real world by the baby. With this 
splitting goes an ego-splitting into three possible parts:
1 ) mine infantile libidinal ego is always stimulated by the 
exciting object, needing the personal relations for ego growth 
In adults this is manifest as compulsive sexuality, need 
for appreciation and chronic overdependency.
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2) The infantile anti-libidinal ego, which identifies 
with the rejecting object, results in underdeveloped 
conscience, hostility and self-persecution.
3) The central ego, related to the idealized parents and 
conforming to them after disturbing elements of both ego 
and objects have been split off and repressed, may become 
split-off itself.
Splitting processes complicate' every stage of later 
development because there is so much loss of unity between 
self and object. Fairbairn reinterprets Klein and rejects 
the inevitability of the schizoid position while accepting 
the depressive and paranoid positions. He sees the schizoid 
position as only occurring if sufficient fear creates a 
flight from object-relations. This would imply a loss of 
ego-wholeness. Fairbairn's contribution presents an object- 
relations theory with great clarity and fewer assumptions 
than Klein's. The problem of the origins of the ego was 
neglected, however, by both Fairbairn and Klein.
d. H. Hartmann - an adaptive ego
We have pointed to biology and psychodynamics as having 
been confusedly mixed in Freudian theory. H . Hartmann (1964) 
in an essay on ego psychology argued that Freud's theory of 
neurosis was built on biological concepts in that man's 
relationship to the environment should study action as its 
focus, not being. By relationship, Hartmann meant an 
activity-relation or the behavioural viewpoint of biology. 
Psychoanalysis began with a defective realization of the - 
concept of 'person' or 'self'. G. Groddeck (1949) wrote:
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"We should not say 'I live' but 'I am lived by the It".
The 'It' of Groddeck is a hybred of the 'id' concept 
which Hartmann saw as the "personality's central sphere". 
This was thought to include the preconscious apparatus, 
the autonomously developing apparatus and adaptation of 
the ego which he defines as the "organ of adaptation". 
Hartmann developed his ego-theory as having two functions; 
one to solve the conflicts of the id and the superego and 
the other to concern the ego with coming to terms with the 
environment. Hartmann saw the ego as adaptive; either as 
autoplastic, or altering oneself to fit the environment, 
or as alloplastic, altering the environment to fit in with 
oneself.
But here we leave biology, for a human being may refuse 
to adapt to his environment to save a truth, a moral or 
political idea that is more valuable to him than biological 
survival. To speak of an ego, in this context, as only an 
organ of adaptation becomes unsatisfactory. Adaptation 
needs to be replaced by a meaningful relationship under the 
ego's direction, as adaptation can only express a one-sided 
fitting in. Personal relations demand mutual self-fulfil­
ment of two or more persons. Hartmann (1975) struggled to 
confine developing human phenomena within a straightjacket 
of prepersonal biological concepts: "The crucial adaptation 
man has to make is to the social structure and his collabo­
ration in building it". We may describe the fact that the 
social structure determines, at least in part, the adaptive 
chances of a particular form of behaviour by the term 
'social compliance'. This is often coined in analogy to 
'somatic compliance'. Hartmann wants to see psychoanalysis
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as being only about the organism adapting to the external 
structure of the world,- instead of a unique development of 
the psyche's ego-potential in order for a person to relate 
to other persons. Hartmann wants to limit object-relations 
to a study of their relation to biological equilibrium. He 
does not see object-relations as crucial to the maturation 
of the whole-person-ego. He sees the twin aspects of 
environmental compliance as the organism adapting to the 
human environment by both somatic and social compliance in 
a kind of parallel. But Hartmann goes beyond biology when 
he writes, "By adaptation we do not mean only passive sub­
mission to the goals of society but also active collaboration 
on them and attempts to change them". Guntrip (1971') points 
out, "When a human being challenges or opposes his environ­
ment on principle, in defence or pursuit of positive values, 
seeking, to promote more genuine personal relationships, then 
we are dealing not with biological adaptation to secure 
survival but with psychodynamic motivation to safeguard the 
intrinsic quality of personal living". Here the person, the 
quality of selfhood, is more important than survival which 
is hypothesized as not worthwhile without selfhood.
3. Recent neo-Freudian contribution to a self concept
a. D.W. Winnicott - the real self and the false self
In "The maturational processes and the facilitating 
environment" (Winnicott 1965), biology and psychodynamics 
are related in an essentially object-relational analysis.
The biological given are the maturational processes or
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innate constitutional potentialities which unfold through­
out individual life. These potentialities do not exist in 
vacuo. They require an environment that supports and 
permits individual growth. This releases the true or 
latent self. Unsatisfactory environment forces a false 
self to emerge in conformity with, or rebellion against 
the unsatisfactory condition.
Winnicott maintains that it is the beginning of life^ 
and particularly the quality of mothering, that facilitates 
the child's ability to develop his real self. "We notice 
in the expectant mother an increasing identification with 
the infant ... and a willingness as well as an ability on 
the part of the mother to drain interest from her own self
onto the baby... This is the thing that gives the mother
her special ability to do the right thing. She knows what
the baby could be feeling like. No one else knows.
Doctors and nurses may know a lot about psychology ... they 
do not know what a baby feels like from minute to minute 
because they are outside this area of experience" (Winnicott 
1965a). The total physical and emotional dependence of the 
baby at first requires the mother to give him as near a 
perfect security as she can. Gradually the mother must allow 
the baby to gain an increasing measure of independence with­
out basically disturbing the inbuilt sense of relationship 
and security. Dependence and independence should ideally 
be complementary. Where the person one turns to must be the 
person one turns away from neurotic conflict of a schizoid 
nature develops. The origin of this lies in the failure of 
initial mothering to provide both sufficient support and 
freedom.
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Winnicott uses his term 'ego-relatedness' to describe 
the capacity of a child to experience being alone in the 
presence of the mother or a representation of her such as 
a cot or a pram. "Ego-relatedness refers to the relation­
ship between two people, one of whom at any rate is alone; 
perhaps both are alone yet the presence of each is important 
to the other" (Winnicott 1965b). This is the sharing of 
"a solitude that is relatively free from the property that 
we call 'withdrawal'". Winnicott describes the building up 
of the toleration of the mother's absence by the child in 
a useful formula: the baby comes to bear the mother's 
absence for X minutes, but then the baby feels he has lost 
her unless she comes back. If the mother is away X+Y 
minutes she must restore her image by special spoiling and 
mothering. But if she is away X+Y+Z minutes, the baby sees 
her as a stranger because his ego has begun to disintegrate. 
Acute anxiety of this kind leads to the schizoid state.
This Winnicott relates to adults who, if they have acute 
feelings of isolation, unreality and non-entity, are re- 
experiencing basic ego-unrelatedness caused by maternal 
failure in infancy. A depersonalized person is hard to 
reach because this schizoid core is "(1 ) withdrawn and 
regressed in fear, (2 ) repressed because the weak infant is 
unacceptable to consciousness, (3) disintegrated in the 
beginnings of its ego-structure, thus feeling unreal and 
not a proper person, and (4) ... unevoked in its potentialities,
never fully called to life in the unfacilitating environment" 
(Guntrip 1971).
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We have already discussed Winnicott's transitional 
object (often the first toy) that the child experiences 
as standing for the reliability of the mother. As the 
first symbol of relationship, Winnicott sees this object 
as the beginning of culture. This requires us to see 
culture as an expanding elaboration of symbols for 
representing our life as persons. We have seen that this 
was Jung's viewpoint exactly. Ego-relatedness would be 
the foundation of selfhood, the feeling of 'inbeingness' 
as a definite self. Winnicott distinguishes between two 
types of experience, orgiastic, i.e. the satisfaction of 
tension-reducing instinct as in Freud, and non-orgiastic 
which is a reliable ego-experience. For example, Winnicott 
observed that a baby will stay at the breast after feeding, 
not for food or instinct-satisfaction, but for relationship.
He specifically distinguished "this field of the bodily 
relationship between baby and mother" from the biological 
idea of "oral eroticism with satisfaction". In "The location 
of cultural experience" (1967), Winnicott states: "The 
phenomena 1 am describing (that is, basic, secure personal 
relations) have no climax. This distinguishes them from 
phenomena that have instinctual backing where the orgiastic 
element plays an essential part and where satisfactions are 
closely linked with climax ... Psychoanalysts who have rightly 
emphasized the significance of instinctual experience and 
reaction to frustration have failed to Èbate with comparable 
clearness or conviction the tremendous intensity of the 
nonclimajtic experiences of relating to objects". And 
again, "We now see that it is not instinctive satisfaction 
that makes a baby begin to be, to feel that life is
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real, to find life worth living ... the self must precede 
the self's use of instinct. The rider must ride the horse, 
not be run away with it".
Winnicott thus creates a new and revolutionary position 
beyond the classical view of psychoanalysis: that instinct 
phenomena are to be seen as subordinate partial experiences 
relative to the whole of the person-ego growing as a result 
of 'good enough' experience of personal-relations. The 
human infant becomes a self, or person-ego from his original 
state of mergence or fusion with the mother and identification 
with her in varying degrees in the period when he mentally 
separates out from her. Later, individuality would be built 
upon a basic self of ego-relatedness which enables an adult 
to experience isolation, suitable self-abnegation or self- 
devotion within a mature context of giving love without loss 
of ego-identity and an ability to defer gratification. 
Obviously this involves the dissolving of the earliest ego 
identifications into a real object-relations with a strong 
self-identity and capacity for self-development.
A theoretical position can now be summarized: no longer 
can one think that psychic life originates in physiological 
processes which are purely internal. As the fertilized cell 
results from two adult psychosomatic whole persons, the 
psyche and the soma are taken to develop together from the 
start. The first dim environment of the child is inside 
the uterus. There the,birth 'trauma' can cause anxiety. 
Good-enough mothering can allay this and help facilitate 
object-relations experience. Subject and object relations 
probably begin with the baby's in utero response to noise, 
temperature of the uterus, etc. This suggests that libido
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may be one basic psychophysiological drive towards the 
object world. It is here that Winnicott links to Jung, 
who saw libido as the sum total of all drive. The ego 
is in control of a part of this and develops a structural 
identity by organizing experience as it 'goes along'.
Here we are reminded of Fordham's neo-Jungian contribution 
of deintegration as an ego-development theory. The self, 
in a Freudian setting, comes into its own with Winnicott. 
Aggression is seen as one part of drive that develops in 
the service of the libidinal ego, which in turn is part of 
the whole psychesoma whose fundamental energy is libido.
b. H. Kohut's psychology of the self 
b-1 Erotogenic zones and self
H. Kohut (1977) has been the greatest Freudian champion 
of a "nuclear" self within "neo-psychoanalytical framework". 
His reconsideration of orality and anality well illustrates 
his theoretical approach. In the Freudian school, orality 
was considered, if fixated at an early level of development, 
to be related to an ego-infantilism. Kohut believes that 
neither drive fixation nor ego defects are the primary or' 
central locus of the problem. Kohut argues that if the 
self of the child has not been Securely established because 
of disturbed,empathie responses by the parents, the enfeebled 
self turns to stimulation of the erotogenic zones and these 
drive-aims of the self, or following Fordham, its deinte- 
grates, attempt to assure itself that it is alive, by.over- 
deintegrating into fragmentation. This forces the self to
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turn definitely to the erotogenic zones for ego-support 
secondarily bringing about oral or anal drive orientation. 
The ego becomes enslaved to drive aims that correlate to 
the stimulated body zones.
In anality, Kohut maintains it is not enough to say 
that because there is an anal fixation, a penuriousness 
develops. Rather one should look at the early stages of 
consolidation of the self which occur during the anal period 
Kohut believes the child is seeking confirmation of his 
forming self through a mirroring self-object, the fecal gift 
The child feels this "fecal-gift acceptance or rejection" 
of his tentative .and vulnerable "creative-productive-active" 
self (Kohut 1977) as confirming or non-confirming to his 
self-image. If the fecal-gift is rejected, pathogenic and 
unempathic personalities may develop or a fragmentation- 
producing preoccupation with feces may occur. Kohut would • 
go so far as to suggest that a child will abandon his joy 
of self-assertion and turn to the pleasure of fragments of 
the body-self when cohesion during the early feces-producing 
period is deterred. This loss of cohesion affects the 
learning. Controlling and maturing of the total child.
Anality on Kohut's theory is not just a reference to 
anal fixation or retentiveness but requires a.genetic 
reconstruction: a child that feels his self to be empty or 
crumbling tries to obtain reassuring pleasure from stimu­
lation of a fragment of his body-self. This indicates 
that Kohut does not see libidinal drive as just attaining
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momentum in the child but that drive experience is sub­
ordinated to the child's experience of the relation 
between the self and self-objects.
Obesity, for an oral example, was seen by earlier 
Freudians as either a flight from castration fears or from 
oral indulgence. This was believed to lead towards a primary 
drive-fixation at the oral level. Kohut believes it is not 
the child's wish for food that is the primal configuration. 
The psychology of the self as developed by Kohut asserts 
that the child from the beginning shows a need for a food- 
giving self-object. Empathically modulated food-giving is 
what is needed, not food as such. If this is unfulfilled, 
then the broader experience of being a whole, or an 
appropriately responded-to self disintegrates and the 
child retreats to a fragment of the larger unit, to an 
erotogenic zone causing depressive eating. Kohut argues 
that the basis of movement towards renewed health must be 
an awareness of this depressive-disintegrative reaction to 
an unempathetic self-object milieu, not an increasing 
awareness of drive (via education). Drive fixations and 
ego correlations to erotogenic zones occur when the self is 
enfeebled. The unresponded-to-self has not been able to 
transform its archaic grandiosity and its archaic wish to 
merge with an omnipotent self-object into self-esteem, 
realistic ambition and attainable ideals.
Kohut does not see oral and anal problems as a conflict- 
of-forces, i.e. drives and defences, with defences that 
achieve a "secondary autonomy" from drives. He sees the 
problem conceptually as a constituent of the self that
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has become reconsolidated because of specific relations 
between self and self-object. The decisive issue is not 
that functions expressing the pattern of self are autonomous, 
but "that a self that had been threatened in its cohesion 
and functioning in one sector has managed to survive by 
shifting its psychological point of gravity towards another 
one". A child will shift from a frustrating self-object 
to a less frustrating one.
b-2 Oedipus complex and self
Freud saw the Oedipal conflict in terms of drives and 
defences involving compromise formations or psychoneurotic 
symptoms within the hypothetical space of the psychic 
apparatus. Kohut (1977) believes that this classical theory 
fails to do justice to experiences that relate to the task 
of building and maintaining a cohesive nuclear self. The 
results of this process - whether triumph or dejection - are 
not described by the Oedipal theory.
Are Oedipal neuroses and self-disturbances related?
There are two theoretical possibilities:
1) An emotional retreat from Oedipal conflicts may lead 
to a chronic defensively-held narcissistic position.
2 ) If the self fragments, the mortification experienced 
by the child may lead to defensively held Oedipal 
positions.
The classical Freudian theory stated that sexual desire 
for the heterogenital parent occurs concomitantly with 
rivalrous and murderous wishes toward the homogenital parent. 
Although with Fairbairn we have considered the id concept
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unsatisfactory, in. classical theory the id was changed by 
the repression of the Oedipal conflict into it, and the 
superego was influenced by an internalized imago of the hated 
homogenital rival. No explanation was ever given by Freud 
as to why the superego should not contain an imago of the 
loved heterogenital figure as well. This walling off of the 
id and superego from .the ego was to prevent an infantile 
Oedipal neurosis. The unsolvable aspects of such a theory -- 
are many. The energy required to wall off Oedipal neurosis 
would take an enormous amount of libido away from intellectual 
and social learning. The ego could only function independently 
from infantile sexuality and aggression if the id and super­
ego barriers are • sufficient and permeable to any inter­
calated helpful structures. This suggests the self as a 
cqndidate for the precondition to the Oedipus complex. The 
child‘would have to see himself as an independent centre of 
initiative before he could experience the object-instinctual 
desires that lead to conflict and secondary adaptations of
s
the Oedipal period. If the child has a cohesive, continuous 
self he can experience assertive-possessive, affectionate- 
sexual desires for the heterogenital parent along with - 
assertive, self-confident, competitive feelings towards the 
parent of the same sex.
Parental response *to the Oedipal stage has been neg­
lected prior to Kohut's contribution. He points out the 
parent may become counteraggressive from sexual stimulation 
or may respond with joy to the child's developing vigour 
and assertiveness. Where parental responses appropriately 
inhibit the child's unconscious aim, he is helped to modulate
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his Oedipal drive expression. If a father allows an 
Oedipal son to merge in being, he helps the child to self- • 
consolidation and pattern-firming. Where there is no 
parental echo in response to an Oedipal child, the Oedipal 
nature becomes more malignant. Where joy at the child's 
development is well-echoed by the parents, it facilitates 
the child's inner awareness of a forward move to new 
experience from his parental self-objects. Kohut defines 
the Oedipal complex within a self-psychology as a matrix 
that influences the firming of the independent self.
Kohut sees both the growth-promoting aspects of the period 
and its pathogenic dangers as equally important. If the 
end of libidinal strivings is to secure a 'self' (see Jung's 
individuation), then the loss of self breaks up his body- 
mind in space, thus also breaking up the sense of continuity 
in time. Another danger to the self from Oedipal strivings 
is aggression which is a topic in itself.
b-3 Aggression and self
The classical Freudian position places aggression 
within drive theory. The oral-sadistic drives are tamed 
to using utensils to eat cooked food instead of tearing 
the flesh apart. Destructiveness is postulated as the 
primary given and the overcoming of killing is seen as a 
secondary aspect to tame or overcome destructiveness. What 
the grandiose fantasies of the self may have -been when 
tearing apart and devouring and how they relàte to using 
cutlery and remaining upright as food is lifted to the mouth 
is open to speculation. Although Kohut acknowledges the
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force of aggression, he sees it as a disintegration product 
related to the psychopathology of self-objects in childhood. 
He sees man's destructiveness as a secondary phenomenon 
arising from the failure of the environment to meet the 
child's need for optimal empathie responses. Aggression 
is thus considered a psychological phenomenon rather than 
an elemental one. Like the inorganic constituents of the 
organic molecule, aggression is a part of a child's 
assertiveness and usually remains "alloyed to the assertive­
ness of the adult's mature self".
The real danger to the cohesion of the nuclear self is 
inability to overcome narcissistic injury, a threat argued 
by Kohut to be more serious than that of physical danger, 
male dominance or penis survival. Narcissistic injuries 
would be described in self-theory as occurring if in child­
hood the self-objects' selective responses have not laid 
down the usual nuclear self. This leads to an acquisition 
of nuclear ambitions and ideals not characterized by a 
primacy of phallic-exhibitionistic physical survival or an 
active dominance. The result is a toleration of death and 
martyred passivity as fulfillment seen in Buddhist self- 
immolations and the mass suicide of religious groups.
Another variant reaction can be the appearance of a 
victorious survival and social dominance at the price of 
abandoning the core of self with a resultant sense of 
despair and meaninglessness (e.g. the problem behind the 
suicide of Marilyn Monroe).
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Aggression is incorporated into self theory as a 
constituent of the broader self configuration, not as a - 
primary instinct striving for outlet as Freud thought.
The baseline in a baby's aggressive behaviour is not the 
raging-destructive baby but the .assertive baby whose 
aggressions are a part of the firmness with which he makes 
demands on his self-objects. When empathie responses are 
delayed, rage is not seen as primary. Leboyer's (1975) 
films of births provides evidence that the raging cry of 
the newborn baby is not an unalterable given. He demon­
strates that if the baby is responded to with empathy from 
the beginning, aggression is initially absent.
The primary configuration is assertiveness. This soon 
gives way to a larger configuration isolating the assertive 
component and transforming it secondarily to rage. In utero, 
the baby has had nine successful months via assertive develop­
ment not via rage. The baby re-establishes his confidence, 
innately developed in utero, by -healthily and assertively 
announcing his wants. There is no primal scream, it would 
be entirely secondary already at birth. This non-destructive 
assertiveness serves the*maintenance of the rudimentary self. 
Over time, more mature forms of assertiveness develop in which 
aggression is subordinated to the performance of tasks and 
can subside when goals are reached. •
When the child is frustrated in his phase- appropriate 
need for omnipotent control over the self-object, a chronic 
narcissistic.rage leads to Klein's 'paranoid position' 
discussed earlier. A 'conviction environment' is missing
- 119 -
and a lifetime of disintegration products may occur.
Kohut (1977) is anti-Kleinian in that he sees rage as 
a regressive phenomenon: a fragment isolated from a more :
comprehensive configuration of assertiveness and arising 
from a deficiency of empathy on the part of the self-object. 
When the child's assertiveness - as healthy merger-wishes 
with the self-object - has remained unresponded to, the 
idealized self-imago breaks up into fragments and the merger 
needs are sexualized and directed only to the fragments.
This lost merger is accompanied by a chronic narcissistic 
rage of sado-masochism in fantasy and action. This type of 
aggression may be held throughout life, e.g. Hitler's 
followers, Kleist's Michael Kohlhaus and Melville's Moby 
Dick. Lessening of narcissistic rage can be accomplished 
therapeutically by a reactivation of the original need for 
the self-objects' responses and the meeting of those responses 
to a better extent. Governments are parental self-objects; 
self-cohesion can be stimulated through competitiveTsport 
and increasing self-esteem within group activities.
A child's healthy exhibitionism will be affirmed by a 
self-object mirroring his self-assertion. Normal exhibitionism 
represents the whole self and the whole body. Single 
"greatness symbols" take over: urinary stream, feces or 
phallus. Where parental admiration fails, isolated sexualized 
voyeuristic preoccupations concerning adult power take over
e.g. penis or breast. The original self-object constellation 
includes fragments both of the grandiose self (exhibition 
of one's own body) and of the fragments of the
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idealized object (voyeuristic interest in others' body 
parts). The sado-masochistic forms of aggression develop 
where this constellation becomes pathological.
b-4. A self psychology
1 would like now to turn to the broader thesis of 
Kohut's psychology of the self. He fully supports the 
position that self/self-object relations are precursors 
of psychological structures. This postulates that it is 
a transmuting internalization of the self-objects which 
leads gradually to a consolidation of the self.
Kohut analyzes why a patient becomes angry if there 
is an attack on his resistances. Freud (1938) called this 
"resistance against the uncovering of resistances".
Hartmann (1950) described this anger in another way:
"... metapsychologically speaking ... reaggressivized energy 
of the countercathexes, mobilized as a consequence of our 
attack on the patient's resistance". Kohut points out that 
Freudians have tended to think of this anger occurring 
because a correct interpretation by the analyst has loosened 
defences activating the aggressive energy bound up in them. 
With this Kohut disagrees. He feels the anger is a 
narcissistic rage caused by a repeat that is occurring of 
the patient's early experience of faulty, nonempathic 
responses by the self-object. The precarious self-of-the- 
child as revived in the analytic situation depends for 
maintenance on adequate empathie responses of the self-object 
so the patient experiences the analyst as a nonempathic 
attacker of the inferiority of his self. Any break-up of
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the primary self-experience, in which the merger of the 
child and his empathie self-object are seen by him to be 
one, is felt to be threatening.
Kohut points out that within a context of self­
psychology, a psychology that differentiates objects that 
are experienced as part of the self from those that are 
experienced as independent centres of initiative or true 
objects, there is a secure vantage point from which to 
control anger. Kohut here shifts emphasis from a mental 
apparatus as framework to a social psychology.
There is an important link to omnipotence, a feature 
of the etymology of the term 'self' as presented in the 
Preface. Kohut assumes that just as the respiratory 
apparatus of the newborn infant may be said to 'expect' 
oxygen to be contained in the atmosphere so, too, psycho­
logical survival depends on a human milieu of self-objects 
that is responsive to his psychological "need-wishes".
If the child's psychological balances are disturbed by 
under-adequate mothering, this will be empathically 
perceived and responded to by the child. The mother, or 
surrogate, as the earliest self-object will try to remedy 
the child's need through action to restore the infant's 
homeostatic imbalance. The child's anxiety, drive needs 
and rage are reinterpreted by Kohut to be the child's 
experience of disintegration of the preceding broader and 
more complex psychological unit of unquestioning assertiveness 
This brings about empathie resonances within the maternal 
self-object. The normal child moves in phase with experiences 
of merger with the omnipotent self-object, or mother.
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if she gives him appropriate vocal and tactile contact 
and she holds, carries and talks with the child. The 
child experiences the feeling states of the maternal 
self-object as if they were his own and Kohut (1977) 
believes the child and mother or self/self-object unit 
experiences these feelings in the following order:
1 . mounting anxiety in the self
2 . stablized mild anxiety in the self
3. a 'signal' from self-object not to panic
4. a following calm and absence of anxiety in the
self-object.
Following these stages the rudimentary self is re-established 
over the disintegration products. Defects in these procedures 
are believed to occur mainly as a result of empathy failures
- from the part of the self-objeCts. This would be caused by
the self-object's narcissistic disturbances or a- latent 
psychosis. Kohut believes that, if the environment is other­
wise responding to the child with a full range of empathie 
responses, serious deprivation such as food shortage or war 
do not affect the possibility of a full development of the 
self in childhood. He does not defend such a controversial 
statement adequately however.
Kohut's ideas can be reduced to a two-step sequence;
A) The self-object responds to the child's affect signal 
(not an affect spread) enabling an empathie merger of the 
infant's self with the more mature psychic organization of 
the self-object. B) This need-satisfying action is per­
formed by the self-object.
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When this merger with the omnipotent self-object is 
deprived, the child cannot experience the sequence of 
spreading anxiety, anxiety signal and calmness. This means 
he is deprived of building structures capable of dealing 
with anxiety which is itself a normal tension-regulating 
structure. On the other hand, if the self-object over­
responds with hypochondriacal attitudes, the child noxiously 
merges with this, causing himself panic or the attempt to 
wall himself off from panic. Then a weakness in the ability 
to curb affects of anxiety results. This aligns the patho­
genesis of anxiety proneness and affective disorders with 
the merger of the nascent self with the self-object's 
depressive and/or manic responses.
Kohut argues convincingly that the affective disorders 
were not well-enough formulated by the earlier Freudians on 
the basis of drives and structures, e.g. either depression, 
seen as neutralized aggression turned away from the object 
to the self, or as the superego sadistically attacking the 
ego. Kohut restates the precursor of psychological structure 
to be the merger of self with the omnipotent self-object 
considering this theory to be a better and more parsimonious 
framework for the affective disorders than earlier Freudians 
achieved.
Problems remain for psychoanalysis and its new inclusion 
of a self-concept. As the adult environment reacts to the 
baby as if it had formed a self, there may be a danger of 
"adultomorphic" distortion since the baby's rudimentary self 
is seen to be the juncture where the baby's innate potentialities 
and the self-object's expectations converge.
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This raises practical problems of when a mother should 
first see her baby: should the baby be cleaned up from 
the delivery first?
b-5. Conclusions
We may conclude from this review of the major Freudian 
contributions to a psychology of the self that the self- 
concept is needed to explain the pathology of the fragmented 
self (autism and personality disorder) and of the depleted 
self (depression). Freud's omission of a definite self- 
cofi^ept is definitely repudiated. Determinism may be 
adequate to explain that part of a man's psychological 
activities which are performed in reactive analogy to external 
world processes and the laws of physics may be an aid to this 
conception. Some phenomena, however, require for their 
explanation a self, or posited configuration, which is a 
centre of initiative, whatever its history, that as a unit 
tries to follow its own course.
It is generally thought that the newborn infant does 
not have a reflective awareness of himself as a cohesive 
unit in space and time. The baby is instead fused to an 
environment that does experience him as possessing a self 
and anticipates, causing a channelling of the later self- 
awareness of the child to occur. The mother or surrogate 
responds to some but not to other of the baby's idealized 
images and the different ways the baby mediates his ambitions. 
The baby's nuclear self is based on the responsiveness of 
the nuclear selves of the self-objects. The damage of the 
parental generation is mirrored in the baby.
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Chapter III Autism: the childhood self in disorder
1. Introduction to autism as a clinical concept
We have now seen a theory of the self as put forward 
by the neo-Jungians. In childhood, a particular disorder 
of the self is infantile autism and the ground needs to be 
laid on which to consider autism theoretically. The general 
pioneer work on the syndromes of infantile autism which 
particularly relates to this study of the self has been 
done by Bender (1953, 1959), Despert (1938, 1951), Kanner 
(1948, 1954) and Rimland (1964) . The psychological structure 
and origins of autism have been studied by Freudian and 
Kleinian analysts: Bettelheim (1956, 1967), Isaacs (1948), 
Klein (1932), Mahler (1955, 1969, 1975), Tustin (1972) and 
Meltzer (1975). It is the thesis of Part 11 that a Freudian 
and Kleinian foundation can now be extended and modified to 
include a neo-Jungian concept of the self.
Despert, in summing up his early work with autistic 
children in 1938, described twenty-nine children over a 
period of seven years who had infantile autism. In all cases 
he noticed a failure to achieve emotional relatedness to 
reality. One symptom of this was their use of words echoi- 
cally as signs, but never as direct communication with others 
The autistic language had too little ongoing function or 
external feedback to engender its normal development.
Bender (1959) has pointed out that this lagging maturation 
occurs in all patterned behaviour of autistic children be 
it autonomic, perceptual, motor, intellectual, emotional or 
social. Rimland (1964) agrees with this and describes autism 
as a 'total integrative failure'.
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Anthony (1958) has grouped the various syndromes of 
infantile autism into a workable schema:
Primary
Norm 
neonatal 
solipsism
)ry,
deprived child, 
gross brain 
damage, extreme 
idiocy
Normal la 
of attent 
and conce 
tration
Lon
Neurotic 
retreat 
into fantasy
Idiopathic
primary
autism of Kanner
Psychotic withdrawal
Idiopathic 
secondary 
autism of 
Mahler and 
Bender
(childhood
schizophrenia)
Superimposed 
on deficiency, 
organic damage, 
neurosis or 
psychopathy, 
traumatic 
psychosis
To grasp an overview of the field it is necessary to 
define primary and secondary autism in dynamic terms and 
then to define primary and secondary narcissism. This 
classification relates primary and secondary autism to 
primary and secondary narcissism. In considering primary 
autism it is useful to remember that in general the primal 
cavity in the infant's early experience is his mouth and 
that he interprets his mother's significant caring parts 
through his own most significant body zone. That is, hands, 
breasts or face can be experienced in autistic affect as a 
mouth. In primary autism these 'mouth' feelings prolong 
into a mouth-experienced 'hole' type of depression. Bowlby 
(1969) has emphasized that infants need more than available 
food. They require "bearable sensory stimulation from without.
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and the relief of excitements arising from stimulation from 
both internal and external sources" (Tustin 1972). Clinical 
material from Spitz (1955) and Shevrin and Toussieng (1965) 
has brought clear evidence that too little or too much 
tactile stimulation in institutionalized infants prevented 
them from diverting their attention from sensations in their 
own bodies (either unrelieved irritation at deprivation or 
excessive reactive stimulation to over-handling) and this 
often led to marasmic states and death before the age of three
Secondary autism develops where waiting for the nurturing 
person becomes intolerable to the child. This over-reaction 
is made comfortable by the autistic process which produces 
a pseudo self-satisfaction. Clinical material (Tustin 1972) 
indicates that the beating of a child's heart may sustain 
him when the mother is absent. It is not known if this is 
because the nipple in the mouth is associated with the 
beating of the heart or whether the infant has an inborn 
awareness of the mother's heart and may think that if his 
own heart beats mother must be present. The heart beat is 
predictable whereas the mother's presence is not.
The defence against the panic of unbearable physical 
separateness causes secondary autism. The distinction 
between living and non-living objects is blotted out in an 
anxiety against the fright of losing the bridge between 
mother and child, or nipple and mouth, and avoiding any 
repetition of this painful experience by repressing feelings 
about the (tactile) loss of the mother.
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Primary narcissism is the Freudian designation for 
the ego's original store or share of libido with the 
unconscious. When libido begins to be cathected onto 
objects and ideas about objects, the ego takes hold of 
part of this libido, trying to retain it, as a secondary 
narcissism. It is helpful that Anthony's classification 
relates autism to narcissism. For example, the pathological 
form of 'psychotic withdrawal' is related by Anthony both 
to normal states (e.g. 'normal lapses of attention and
concentration' in secondary autism), as well as to abnormal 
states such as neurosis and organic brain disease. Anthony 
claims that each entity in his system can combine with 
another so that a case of childhood autism presents a 
continuous spectrum rather than a number of discrete disease 
entities. Although the distinction between primary and 
secondary autism has been accepted by Fordham (1976),
Mahler (1969) and Tustin (1972), these workers all mention 
cases that do not fit in easily to either type of autistic 
disorder, primary or secondary.
In the 'idiopathic primary autism' of Kanner (1948) the 
differential diagnoses are between brain damage and mental 
defect. Kanner maintains that the less serious secondary 
autism is different from obsessional disorders although Bion 
(1955) and Meltzer (1975) see obsessional states as more 
like autism. Kanner's (1954) overall criteria for autism, 
however, retain the 'obsessive maintenance of sameness' as 
a major aspect of the syndrome.
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Prognosis in autism is poorest when mutism exists. 
Children who never speak or who never do so beyond a few 
words are less likely to recover than those who have 
started to speak but regress in response to a traumatic 
event such as the birth of a sibling. Mutism as a symptom 
suggests that the core of the disorder stems from the very 
early life of the infant (Fordham 1976).
Autism tends to interfere with normal language develop­
ment because processes of identification with speaking objects 
are stunted. Identification through the autistic child's 
narcissism encourages him to deal with the bodily features 
of objects rather than the mental function required in 
inter-relationship with objects. Meltzer (1975) claims that 
even where there is some speech these language events occur 
within the autistic state and are essentially meaningless 
(as in equivalent epileptic states). Gestures and signals 
are sufficient to control objects which, as they are de­
humanized through poor identifications, is all the autistic 
child desires to do.
In general the inner mental activity of verbalization 
and its manifestation outwards, vocalization, is not so 
clearly conceptualized by science that clinicians can know 
how to frame it theoretically when severe disturbances occur. 
Clinical research is heavily based on an analytical approach 
to speech. The formulation of language in clinical settings 
tends to rest on the clinician's view of B. Russell's 
conception of meta-languages at varying levels of abstraction, 
on Wittgenstein's view of language as part of the natural 
history of human beings and Bion's. conception that the
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employment of projective identification is the primal mode 
for communicating states of mind. This is taken to be the 
content of L. Wittgenstein's 'deep' language (1945),
N. Chomsky's 'deep grammar' (1966) and can refer to S.K.
Langer's ideas on a musical basis of language (1942) which 
is interpreted to apply to 'deep' rather than 'surface' 
structure.
The child obviously requires a deep grammar for 
representing states of mind and to order thoughts in a 
way suitable for communication by some means, not just to 
evacuate thoughts easily or blindly. Presumably inner 
speech "must find an object in the outside world which has 
sufficient psychic reality and adequate differentiation 
from the self, to require the vocalization of this inner 
process in order for communication to take place" (Meltzer
1975). Desire for communication with others at this level 
must be sufficiently maintained or autism develops.
The influence of the mother on the infant is another 
important aspect in the literature on autism. Both Anthony 
(1958) and Mahler (1969) argue the mother is less signifi­
cant in the primary group than in the secondary group and 
they would not find the mother's influence absolutely 
decisive in either. The designation of 'idiopathic' 
infantile autism is thus justified. On the other hand, 
Winnicott (1955, 1958, 1965b, 1971a) definitely considers 
that there has been an environmental defect which must 
include the mother's role and Bettelheim (1967) contends 
that autism occurs because the children so afflicted came
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into the world only to confront mothers who wished for 
their death. Tustin (1972) sees the mother-infant inter­
action as the basis and fulcrum of the therapeutic repair 
necessary in the treatment of autism.
2. The genetic hypothesis of autism
For the development of the thesis of autism as a dis­
order of the self, we shall confine ourselves to a study 
of characteristic features of idiopathic autism, i.e. the 
full-blown clinical-pathological disease. There are two 
types of hypotheses postulating a 'barrier' between the 
child and the external world. ■
Anthony (1958) presupposes that an autistic child is 
born with a 'constitutional stimulus barrier' which may be 
insufficiently reliable or grossly defective through 
insufficient maternal care or which-may be both strong and 
sensitive and yet becomes pathological as a defence against 
defective mothering.
The majority of workers e.g. Mahler (1969), Winnicott 
(1955), Bettelheim (1967), Tustin (1972), Rimland (1964), 
Bender (1953) do not presuppose a barrier from the beginning, 
though it may become established later on. Mahler, for 
example, believes autism arises from two stages of infant 
development that may not have been outgrown. Each stage is 
believed to lie at the root of two kinds of psychosis she 
distinguishes. In primary autistic psychosis the infant has 
no awareness of his self as distinct from the inanimate.
'Symbiotic' psychosis' presupposes a separate mother and 
baby who fuse into a unity "which is characterized by - . .
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delusional, omnipotent symbiotic fusion with the need- 
satisfying object" (Mahler 1969). As an insecure boundary 
between mother and baby is assumed in symbiotic psychosis, 
a rigid and separate classification other than primary 
autism (where no self-object boundaries exist at all) may 
be difficult to sustain without resorting to a barrier 
concept where both types of illness can be included, the 
barrier postulated as variable.
How a barrier comes into existence has different 
explanations among workers in the field. Rimland (1965) 
speaks of organic failure of the arousal system in the 
centrencephalic system; Bender (1953) places the origin 
in some disorder of intrauterine life; Tustin (1972) argues 
the barrier develops out of very early psychotic depression; 
Bettelheim (1967) ascribes it to a death wish on the part 
of the mother and Winnicott (1965b) thinks it is wholly due 
to environmental failure. In the present state of knowledge, 
it would appear that any one of these explanations, alone 
or in combination could describe most aspects of the global 
integrative failure, with its arrests and regression, that 
autism contains, but that no sufficient explanation or proof 
of a barrier has been empirically put forward definitively 
by any of these experts.
3. Object relations in autism
The child's relation to the 'external' object is 
arguably the most elementary of all characteristics of 
autism in that mothers are quoted who detect the disorder 
as originating during breast feeding (Fordham 1976).
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With an hypothesis of such an early origin, the core of 
the disorder is unlikely to be completely understood merely 
in terms of a child's retreat to an 'inner world'. The 
literature agrees that autistic children manipulate any 
object that engages them and that the child's interest must 
comply with what he wants to do with the object, be it a 
toy or a hand or arm of a person. Failing this, the autistic 
child will rage or panic, treat the object as without
existence or cease to be interested. Fordham (1976), Kanner 
(1948) and Diatkine (1960) have separately argued against 
a lack of perception of objects on the part of the autistic 
child but they maintain that there is a close inspection of 
reality. Diatkine (1960) said of one child: "He lived in
a perfectly perceived world, but one devoid of meaning as 
an abstract painting composed without inspiration". The 
child, because of the world's apparent meaninglessness to 
him, does not investigate what he perceives.
Another feature of autistic children is their passive 
compliance when adult intervention changes their activity. 
This curious detachment affects the child's own choices.
When the autistic child "aims to use part of a person or 
object for his own purpose, should that object not fit in 
with his scheme of activities, he simply desists" (Fordham
1976).
These descriptions of autistic behaviour suggest that 
if autistic children live in an 'inner world' it may well 
not feel so to them; rather they live with an object world 
that may be precise and organized but not in terms of what 
is inner or outer. We have noted that a firm distinction
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between what is internal and external requires a child to 
reach a stage where the ego is strong enough to distinguish 
between inner and outer after the state of fusion with the 
object has been lived through and superseded. If this 
hasn't happened, a barrier is set up, not against parents 
as external objects or to protect an inner object of the 
child, but against any not-self object.
There is, however, a type of autism where secondary 
fantasy systems may work as unreal world-systems. Symbolic 
representation occurs in these less ill children and they 
develop object-relation systems but observation of real 
objects is not precise and is exaggeratedly determined by 
affective processes. With such children the adult must enter 
the child's world-system so that the child's self can fuse 
with him and continue in maturational development. Meltzer 
(1975) points out that the obsessional quality of the 
autistic child can lead to total withdrawal of attention in 
an effort to manage massive depressive anxiety. Containment 
of the object is not possible and mental life disappears. 
Objects seem to be 'paper thin' lacking three dimensional 
quality. "Only isolated motor and sensory modalities remain, 
so that the child presents the pattern of a ruin which the 
therapist can handle like an archaeologist who confines his 
activities to observing bits and pieces which he can grow 
to recognize as isolated bits of a structure that is no more", 
However it must be said that the dismantling and re-operation 
of single sensory motor modalities and the surface nature of 
object relations may express an attempt of the self, even if
- 135 -
a distorted one, to arrive at a simple operational unit 
so as to begin development and correct the fault.
The obsessionality which characterizes autism arises 
from two factors in self/object relations; it depends on 
omnipotent control by the self over the objects and it 
relies on attacks by the self against the linking of objects 
to separate them so they may be better controlled. This 
attack on the linkage of sensory modalities seems to be an 
essential operation for the autistic state proper (Meltzer 
1975). It is directed against the ego in a passive and non- 
sadistic mode. "The ego-function of attention is manipulated 
in a way that simply allows the experience of objects to 
fall into bits and to spring back together". There is, 
therefore, a spectrum of sadism. At one end of this spectrum 
would be the cruel pleasure with which objects are held in 
a state of suspended animation. At the other end of this 
spectrum would be the non-sadistic dismantling of the self 
which Fordham sees as an attempt to reconstruct a healthy 
self from one simple sensory modality upward. Interference 
with emotional responsiveness in the autistic seems to refer 
to a 'cerebral' oversimplification when obsessive thought 
obtrudes upon distorted object experience.
This may relate to Winnicott's 'transitional object' 
discussed in Chapter 1, section 3, in that the dismantling 
mechanism so evident in autism is thought to be the basis 
(in normal development) of the formation of the transitional 
object. If external objects are not correctly or normally 
perceived, a strong narcissistic organization, a factor in 
autism, may develop an essentially perverse or fetishistic 
tendency and the transitional object then is focussed upon
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to reinforce narcissistic isolation. If transitional 
objects are rigidly adhered to or substituted in lieu 
of human relationships this can be a first reliable sign 
of pathology (Mahler 1969) . Winnicott (1953) describes 
the overall psychological claims of these arguments about 
autism as "the perceptual human task of keeping inner and 
outer realities separate yet inter-related".
Rodrigue (1955) sees the idealized first object - the 
breast - as an object stimulating defensive observation 
because any alteration of it would be terrifying. This is 
theoretically argued because the breast, as an idealized 
'internal' object and possessing characteristics of onmi- 
potence, is invulnerable to destructive drives ejected into 
the external world. Thus the infant erects autistic 
defences against a potentially "terrifying world". Pre­
serving the 'good object' projection can reinforce defences. 
Rodrigue proposes that a 'bad object' is dealt with by 
negative hallucination. The 'bad object' is actively 
removed from relation to the ego by denial. This would 
suggest a triple process in the autistic system: 1) projection,
2) a negative hallucination to eliminate the projection, and
3) idealization of the 'internal' object. Freud (1924, 1938) 
originated this idea of eliminating projection and argued 
that the object is made non-existent by affective processes 
which prevent it from having any effect on the ego. Freud 
considers the ego's alienation from reality to be the pivotal 
disturbance in adult and adolescent psychoses. In infantile 
psychosis the fact is that the baby has to become acquainted
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with reality gradually via the mother. The psychotic 
child has an inability to use his mother to arrive at a 
primitive or core-sense of her as a need-satisfying object.
In this case a solid sense of external reality is never 
attained.
Rodrigue's theory suggests that the acute observation 
of reality should be interpreted as a continuous scrutiny 
of the object (the breast-mother) should defences fail at 
any point in the autistic child. He sees this as a primary 
feature of autism.
4. The self and autism
Fordham (1976) has attempted to bring together the 
ideas discussed above into one theory resting on his concept 
of deintegration. This neo-Jungian theory, drawing on 
Freudian and Kleinian studies already discussed, is based 
on the idea that a healthy baby is a psychosomatic unity or 
self and that the self will contribute by deintegration to 
the differentiation of all psychic structures in the course 
of growth. Deintegration differs from the release mechanism 
of the ethologists in being conceived of as a psychic process 
as well as a physiological process. Deintegrates derive 
from the primal self and they carry the attribute of whole­
ness and treat the 'external object' as a part of this 
wholeness. In breast feeding "if the child's mother does 
not match the infant's need closely, she, or any part of 
her not provided, is deemed by the infant not to exist" 
(Fordham 1976).
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At first all structures developed by deintegration 
conform to the criteria of the self, i.e. self-objects.
Before ego-development, the infant cannot distinguish 
'not-self'. In autistic children, where no capacity for 
symbolization exists, the postulation of a basic catastrophe 
in the relation between baby and 'breast-mother' is useful. 
Bettelheim believes the baby despairs when the feeding 
experience provides no communication because the baby 
cannot participate in it and becomes defensive.
To create a barrier theory, defence systems would need 
to exist in the self to respond to impingement. Stein (1967) 
has postulated that the self has defence-systems which 
preserve identity and establish and maintain the difference 
between self and not-self. Stein points out that immuno­
logical research suggests a theory that immunological reaction 
is aimed at rejecting or annihilating not-self objects such 
as bacteria and alien tissues. Bio-chemical processes are 
only furthered in a healthy way by objects that can be 
assimilated to the self. (See Chapter IV for full discussion 
of this theory). A barrier in autism may be constructed if 
the baby has noxious stimuli in utero, during or after birth, 
which are pathogenic. A persistent reaction of the defence 
system would take place which through the baby's projective 
identification would become compounded to parts of the self. 
Not-self objects would hold great danger and would be felt 
to be the principal focus so that no inner world would 
develop, deintegration would not proceed normally and the 
primal-self integrate would persist against maturational 
pressures. This would lead to disintegration and the defence
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system would build up to violence and hostility split-off 
from the natural libidinal communication with the object.
Empirical evidence of the mother's and baby's inter­
actions is hard to obtain in the earliest period. Feeding 
schedules are useful for too great an ease in feeding may lead 
to the compliance symptoms of autism later on. Deintegration 
seems to have become split-off from the soma by the time 
breast feeding begins in idiopathic autism. The baby shows 
no effort to relate to the mother, no smiles, friendly looks 
or play during feeding. If this pathology of integration 
is formed, the organism will be damaged whether before or 
at birth, or the mother may damage the baby in such.a way 
as may not be recognized by her through an unconscious wish 
for the baby's psychic or even physical death.
Whatever the degree of integrative pathology in various 
autistic children (and personal behaviour patterns are 
reported to vary enormously), it is postulated that none of 
their behaviour patterns are built into the "main body of 
the self" (Fordham 1976). This prevents a coherent ego-self 
relation which in turn prevents a continuing self-identity 
and self-esteem. A system develops which makes 'external' 
objects conform and be treated, along with parts of the 
body-image, as the primal self or else the autistic child 
may annihilate them altogether. Deintegration either does 
not operate at all or only partially. If in breast feeding 
the neurophysiological apparatus operates without its 
psychic counterpart integration is too rigid and negative.
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Autism suggests that an infant cannot shut out or 
organize the continual flood of perceptual stimuli received 
into the self. The autistic child does not relate as a 
whole either to internal or external objects. This 
obstructs his growth. The component parts of the self 
in relation to the whole organism cannot develop.
Fordham (1976) states his resultant theory of idio­
pathic autism as a disorder of the self in infancy in this way 
"It is assumed that the essential core of autism represents 
in distorted form the primary integrate of infancy, and 
that idiopathic autism is a disordered state of integration, 
owing its persistence to failure of the self to deintegrate". 
The autism theory strongly supports Fordham's general theory 
of deintegration_within a theory of the self in early child­
hood. It .is parsimonious in combining aspects of Freudian, 
Kleinian and Jungian concepts.into an integrated self-theory 
which can explain what is now known about self and infantile 
autism*. The fact that autism does so distort the development 
of the infant self provides evidence that there is a self 
that can be distorted and that the self is an essential 
concept in the theory of very early human life.
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Chapter IV. Self and physiology 
1. The infant self and physiology
The facts known regarding the physiology and maturation 
of the brain provide a basis for the claim that the infant 
has a considerable brain function at term and that the 
correlation of physical state with self/not-self is a 
justified study.
Cortical brain function (Herrick 1963) is arguably 
different in kind from subcortical brain function. Quali­
tative differences in morphological organization show up 
especially in reflex responses. "Reflex responses usually 
follow immediately upon presentation of their adequate 
stimuli and their central adjusting mechanisms are elaborated 
within the relatively direct lines of conduction employed 
(medulla oblongata, midbrain, thalamus, corpus straitum, 
etc.) ... cortical functions are in larger measure delayed 
reactions and individually acquired controls redirecting 
and recombining the innate reflex..." (Herrick 1963). •
"The introduction of large masses of higher correlation 
tissue concerned with delayed reactions within the innate 
reflex apparatus would tend to distort the reflex patterns 
and interfere with their prompt and efficient independent 
action when this is desirable" (Herrick 1926, reprinted 1963).
The neurophysiology of attention-mediating systems in 
mammals involves feedback networks between nuclei of the 
thalamic reticular system and the neocortex. Bronson (1965) 
contrasts the global-alerting capacity that takes place if
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brain-stern activation of the neocortex occurs with the 
rapid and focal alerting mechanisms of the thalamic 
reticular system which allow for attention either to 
specific sensory modes or to particular input patterns 
within these modes. Bronson (1965) firmly believes that 
thalamic nuclei activate parietal, occipital and temporal 
areas just adjacent to primary sensory-reception areas.
The control which the neocortex has over the thalamic 
reticular system would enable the neocortex to modulate 
its excitation level enabling selective attention to 
'significant' aspects of immediate input to occur. This 
is believed to allow the infant a chance for 'exploratory 
behaviour' if other dominant motivational systems are not 
turning attention to 'needs-relevant' objects only.
The option to delay responses by an inhibitory process 
is important for learning from experience. If several 
immediate possible responses are not made there is additional 
time to consider the nature of the stimulus and select a 
response appropriate to the context of previous similar 
responses held in memory. Brain lesions that interfere with 
the option to delay responses usually impair recent memory 
functions (subfrontal, temporal, anterior limbic or hippo­
campal lesions).
A selected behavioural response could lead to a response 
involving a symbolic withdrawal from the stimulus, with or 
without a physical withdrawal from it. On the other hand, 
if responses are made without regard to internal state and 
the impingement of painful external stimuli, a sufficient 
condition exists for the development of a dual consciousness 
or 'unreal self. The human cortex allows a very young child
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to respond to environmental stimuli with a lower threshold 
than the normal response to visceral stimuli. Cortical 
function is sufficient to mediate responses with a 
relative disregard of visceral imperatives. Thus young 
children "have the sufficient neurological capacity to eat 
when they are not hungry, to "potty" when there is no need, 
to use a spoon at mealtimes when fingers are preferred, to 
"shush" when they would otherwise cry or scream ... ad 
infinitum" (Janov and Holden 1975).
When external stimuli are very intense the disregard 
of visceral imperative may occur to extreme degrees, e.g. 
primary anorexia, extreme obesity, drug abuse, alcoholism. 
These clinical illnesses suggest that human cortical ability 
to symbolize the relation to external stimuli may mediate 
responses with no observable relevance to the personal, 
visceral relevance. It should be pointed out that "the 
organization of the human cortex does not present a necessary 
organization for this dual consciousness only a sufficient 
one" (Janov and Holden 1975).
The study of body memory has led to the development of 
a new logic or dialectic regarding the adequacy of specific 
parts of the brain at a given time of early development 
and what portion of the body and brain might code early 
preverbal memory. An example would be the memory of a 
painful stimulus in a three-month-old child. The infant 
would not represent a painful reaction by an overcontraction 
of his lumbosacral muscles or facial frowning because 
the muscles of the face and body wall.
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i.e. the sacrospinal, truncal and proximal limb muscles, 
are mediated by a portion of the brain not yet adequate 
in either afferent or efferent function to do so. One 
would look to the median zone where trauma could be 
represented: in stomach pain, oversecretion of hydrochloric 
acid, spasm of the colon, anemia or cardiac arrhythmia.
Myelination is the process whereby nerves obtain the 
white fatty covering named myelin which enables the nerves 
to conduct impulses more rapidly. Myelination of the brain, 
even in adults^ is sparse in the median zone so the paucity 
of myelin in this zone in infancy cannot be a basis for 
rejecting functional adequacy of a newborn's brain. Neuro­
logical function is not all-or-nothing. It represents 
degrees of reactivity. The median zone is made up of multi- 
synaptic nerves interconnected ablaterally like a three- 
dimensional spider's web. Median zone nerves are not 
connected serially or in parallel. Little is known about 
all that such a median system can do at three months. What 
is known is that with increasing age the mediation of the 
stimulus-response relationship increases functionally. The 
difficulty in precise statements about this is that, using 
our capacity to move the fingers as an example, simple 
finger movement is represented at spinal cord level, 
rerepresented in the medulla, pons, the relay systems in 
the mesencephalon and has extensive elaboration by the basal 
ganglia. At the level of the cortex, further modification, 
fragmentation and selective inhibition are known to occur.
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The relationship between the development of myelination 
and the onset of functioning in nerve pathways is now 
documented with some accuracy (Yakovlev 1962). This' is 
important because adequacy of the brain system in the visual 
and vestibular systems, correlates behaviourally in an 
almost one-to-one manner with the thickness and distance 
of myelination in a given pathway. Yakovlev (1962) shows 
that body and limb posture extension occurs at five to eight 
months when myelination of requisite vestibular pathways 
occurs and underlies the adequate relationship to gravity, 
helping to mediate the ability to roll over, sit up and 
finally to stand.
The brain has three concentric layers: an inner matrix 
zone which is never well myelinated but starts to become so 
first, a middle mantle zone which is next to myelinate and 
an outer marginal zone which myelinates last. "The pro­
gressive myelination of the meuraxis is the most readily 
observable morphological criterion of maturation... In the 
central nervous system, myelination until term is confined 
almost exclusively to the fibre systems of the mantle zone 
in the wall of the neuraxis... It spreads from within out, 
toward the marginal zone, but the fibre systems which develop 
in this outermost or cortical zone of the neuraxis, or are 
derived from this zone, do not begin to myelinate until the 
end of gestation is reached and the infant is about to face 
extrauterine life" (Yakovlev 1962).
In the normal infant, at term, the observed facts 
support the argument that the inner brain is mature enough 
to mediate visceral responses and that the central nervous 
system is myelinated in the mantle zone. For concepts of :
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a self/not-self awareness it would be important to find out 
if the mantle zone of the brain could contain a system of 
fibres which can register pain as protection of the self 
from anti-self. French et al (1953) argue for two pain 
systems in the brain: a lateral one and a medial or middle 
one in the reticular core of the neuraxis. The latter 
system is most susceptible to general (Xh<lesthetics which 
suggests a dominant quality or capacity. Hilgard (1973) 
and Liebeskind et al (1973) agree that, in cats, the 
electrical stimulation of cells surrounding the middle of 
the midbrain abolishes pain reaction for the duration of the 
stimulus. This supports the idea that there may be a gate 
to pain from the periphery in the middle of the midbrain. 
Critchley et al (1972) and Janov and Holden (1975) also 
support this thesis.
From the work cited it can be argued that the brain of 
a newborn child is mature enough to register and transmit 
pain along the course of a medial reticular pain system and 
that depth psychology, in its concern with early experience, 
is supported by these findings. This is fundamental to the 
idea that the self is functionally whole enough at birth to 
be subject to attack (pain) from not-self, or that which is 
outside itself via environmental stimuli. The midline pain 
experiments also support the idea that the quality of early 
handling of the child by the mother or caretaker is important 
to pain relief. It also supports psychosomatic indications 
that adults when stressed will, if they have had pain-filled 
infancies, emit visceral dysfunction which reflects an 
obligatory learning of maladaptive visceromotor reactivity 
in relation to a painful infancy or birth.
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The neurophysiology of attention supports the idea of 
a sensory gating function residing in the rostral pons and 
midbrain. Hernandez-Peon (1969) argues for a gating con­
tribution not only from the neuraxis below this-site but 
to all cerebral sensory analysis. This would include early 
body-memory. The principle upon which argument is based 
is that the midbrain reticular formation via reciprocal 
relationships with the neocortex and the limbic system is 
serving a 'strategic' function of directing attention to 
particular sensory inputs, rather than to all, and thereby 
diminishing attention to 'irrelevant', or less important 
sensory input. This is documented by Hernandez-Peon (1969) 
in electro-physiological data supporting selective enhance­
ment/inhibition of neuronal activity as the basis for 
directed attention. Different biochemical neurotransmitter 
substances are claimed for general vigilance as opposed to 
focused attention. A midbrain gating function can be 
electrophysiologically demonstrated during REM sleep 
according to Hernandez-Peon.
If one views neurosis as a disorder which limits one's 
consciousness, gating operations to pain stimuli and selective 
impulse occlusion in the brainstem reticular formation 
provide pertinent support that traumatic early painful 
experience establishes patterns of neuronal interaction 
which may partially occlude awareness of the entire visceral 
and extra-personal environment. Where perception and response 
bear an obligatory relationship to earlier pain or trauma 
there is a limitation of options and an impoverishment of 
consciousness. All levels of the neuraxis may be affected:
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at the level of visceral function it is a consciousness of 
feeling state; at the functional level of the body wall, 
outward expression of the internal state is postulated; 
beyond the body wall, relation to ideas, sensory environment 
and interpersonal relationship may be affected. These 
discrete levels of consciousness, if gated, would become 
'unconscious' but not biologically so. Long lasting changes 
in the central nervous system would produce neurosis. Gate 
theory (Janov and Holden 1975) proposes that pain may be 
biased upward or downward within the levels of the neuraxis 
for long periods of time. The pain system is seen as 
dualistic with a lateral component mediating knowledge and 
a medial component mediating the suffering of pain. The 
locus of a third gate has been proposed by Holden as the 
orbitofrental hypothalamic projection. This locus is based 
on evidence from studies of hypnotic analgesia and the co­
consciousness in some temporal lobe epileptic patients that 
gating is occurring in the telencephalon as well as in the 
brainstem reticular formation and the spinal cord.
These gating systems represent three protective control 
systems which the self would experience both as facilitating 
and as warning devices and also as pain controls. The 
interfaces between the environment and gate one as well 
as between gate one and two are believed to exist in the 
dorsolateral grey of the spinal cord and brainstem, in the 
medial rostral mesencephalon and in .the orbitofrental cortex. 
The orbitofrontal-hypothalamic projection is seen as the 
highest third gate.
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Although the work cited supports a thesis of a three- 
level gating system, more empirical proof must be found for 
certainty in this area of theory. Putting the gating system 
aside as a proposition needing further proof, there is 
sufficient empirical evidence of myelination and medial 
brain development to support the hypothesis of the existence 
of a self/not-self with or very soon after birth.
2. Self, immunology and psychosomatics
A self/not-self awareness may in the first place be 
concerned with or about defence. If one accepts Jung's 
archetypal theory' and considers the archetypes as inter­
related constituents of the self which would have a teleo- 
logical aspect of serving the individual as a whole, then 
the self would have a defensive or protective- role towards 
itself at a more basic level and definitely so in the infant 
in advance of full ego development. A weak ego would be 
overwhelmed both by powerful archetypal unconscious material 
and by the impinging outer world of objects.
To recognize not-self, the self would need to possess 
a great number of items of information referred to in biology 
as 'the message'. The message on present knowledge is encoded 
in the structure of genes made up of desoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) in a folded double spiral shape. The messengers that 
carry the message are believed to be a type of ribonucleic
I
acid (RNA) in a chain shape determined by the pattern of DNA. 
Psychologists and biologists tend to agree that these 
messengers may be in the form of templates, enzymes, hormones, 
genes, catalysts or pheromones.
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These diverse messengers are described in relevant theories 
by appropriate or acceptable terminology. "The psychological 
message concerns: 1) a diversity of specific responses to 
stimuli from what is not-self; 2) it must be all-pervasive 
so as to reach all defence outposts; 3) it enables the 
individual to recognize what is imposed not-self even if the 
self shares with the not-self certain features; 4)... it 
prohibits the wrecking of elements of the system as if they 
were extraneous" (Stein 1967) .
In biology the defence system is a somatic system with 
four characteristics analogous to the four psychological 
aspects of messages described above (Burch and Burwell 1965):
1) the somatic defence system shows a wide range of 
specificity; 2) its agents are ubiquitous or pervasively 
present; 3) this system recognizes the not-self; 4) in pre­
disposed persons, the agents can attack self-tissue in a 
'misguided' way which is presumed to be at the root of auto­
immune disease.
As neither the nervous nor the endocrine systems are 
able to fulfill all these functions, Burch and Burwell (1965) 
assume that the biological analogue of the self would be the 
lymphoid stem cells and/or the undifferentiated mesenchyme 
cells of the reticulo-endothelial system (Gell 1957). There 
is data that is consistent with such a postulation of some 
psychosomatic equivalence between stem cells and self without 
giving any intention of indicating that there is a lateral 
psychophysical parallelism between the self archetypes and 
endothelial system which is autonomous and free from total 
nerve control (as the self is also thought to be in terms of
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its superordinate function). Neither hormonal nor nervous 
systems store or carry information that allows a secondary 
response, e.g. antibody production can go on months or even 
years after the first immunization. Stein (1967) points 
out that this reminds one of belated psychological reactions 
to trauma /H early childhood. However even if deposited 
patterns in the nervous and endocrine systems are not 
thought to be paralleled by those borne by the self, this 
would not prevent functions like conscious acts or symboli­
zation from being delegated to the former systems.
Anatomically the lymphatic system is described by 
Burch and Burwell (1965) as correctly qualified to serve 
a3#defence against not-self. Random disordering due to 
the enormous complexity of the genetic message could be 
found in the stem cells. Medawar (1957) points out that 
evidence supports the theory that the antigenic substance 
which stimulates antibody formation is DNA from which 
chromosomes are made. If innoculated, DNA can bring about 
genetic transformation and behave as if it were a gene.
The idea of immunological mistakes is important to 
these general considerations. For example, in mammals the 
unborn offspring gets necessary nutriment by sharing the 
mother's blood circulation in the womb. But if cells from 
the embryo's blood pass the barrier of the placenta and enter 
the mother's bloodstream antibody function can be induced.
If these re-enter the baby's blood haemolytic disease or 
damaged red blood corpuscles can result. Another example
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would be chronic inflammation of the thyroid gland where 
autoimmune disease sets in, the condition where the organism 
erroneously or to its detriment destroys a needed con­
stituent as if it were not needed. In thyroid inflammation 
as described by Burnett (1962) the gland has been invaded 
by lymphocytes which release antibodies and ultimately 
render the thyroid useless.
The distinction which enables the organism to recognize 
self and distinguish it from not-self may depend on the 
stereo-chemical fit of the "mirror image" with which the 
organism is confronted. Steric shape refers to the different 
positions in space which atoms occupy within molecules of 
the same chemical constitution. Differences of steric shape 
are characteristic of amino-acids on which life depends 
(Libby 1965) . An identity of stereo-chemical fit could be 
schematically assumed when an object characterized by troughs 
and peaks is turned to its mirror image so that its troughs 
and peaks correspond. Complementarity would reverse the 
object and mirror image so that peaks face troughs and vice 
versa. This idea of two types of fit would account schemati­
cally for the maintenance of biological identity and when 
either the self archetype or the lymphocyte encounters a 
not-self pattern of either type of fit in mirror-image.
In the identity-type fit, Fordham's deintegration theory 
involving quick reintegration of an object when there is a 
good fit would be the archetypal self theory in analogy; 
psychosomatically, the process whereby the original whole 
or self becomes structured into interrelated elements (or 
messengers) occupying certain postulated preferred stations 
(statistically) would be an identity-type fit.
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Fordham describes the second or complementarity type of 
steric fit when the correspondence between object and 
deintegrate of self is not exact. At first the object 
will not be perceived at all but a tolerance develops so 
that the object later is perceived when not fitting the 
deintegrate (Fordham 1957). In view of the examples given 
in autoimmune disease with their disastrous consequences 
it must be said that in immunity theory the non-fitting 
object is an antigen or toxin. A toxin is toxic because 
its structure is in some sense a complementary fit to a 
genetically predetermined one.
Burnett (1962) assumes that the function of the antigen 
is to stimulate a pre-existent pattern into activity. In 
Fordham's theory of deintegration this is precisely what the 
object does to the self as a pre-existent structure at birth. 
Just as at first a foreign substance may be accepted by the 
organism, the repeated injection stimulates an antibody into 
action and when injected, antibodies provoke an immuno­
logical response. It is not surprising that the steric fit 
necessary for genetic stability can become pathological if 
changes develop from an identity to a complementary relation. 
This happens if an immature organism (the infant) is 
presented with a foreign substance as if it were a part of 
the self. When the self knows the object stands in a 
relation of complementarity to the archetypal image then 
the host will not tolerate the object.
An example of complementary opposites and their possible 
incompatibility is Parrish's (1966) work on sperms and ovum 
in infertile women. In four out of forty-eight infertile 
women, destructive antibodies specific to the plasma coating
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of their husbands' sperm was produced. Biologically, 
complementarity can lead to a violent reaction.
An important example of this is reported by Turnbull 
and Hawk (1966) in the study of regional ileitis in the colon 
Unlike chronic ulcerative colitis, the mucous membrane is 
not primarily involved in colonic ileitis. Rather the self 
appears to be destroying the colon as not-self via the 
lymphatic and reticuloendothelial systems. Acheson and 
Truelove (1961) found the disease often came to patients 
suffering from a conflict between the need for dependence 
and the family's ideal of independence and that a period of 
immaturity unduly shortens the time for digested (or intro- 
jected) not-self material to be accepted and psychoimmuno­
logical tolerance is not developed. Twice as many patients 
who had destructive diseases of the digestive tract were 
weaned from the breast during the first month of life as in 
the control group who had later weaning, in Acheson and 
Truelove's study.
Physiological, pathological and experimental findings 
in the field of immunity and autoimmunity have been pre­
sented as analogous to unconscious processes concerned with 
the recognition of self and not-self in Jungian theory and 
the related processes of self-defence and self-destruction 
described. Types of psychosomatic illnesses have been used 
as illustrations.
3. A defence of the analogical act
Analogy if presented in rigorous scientific and 
theoretical discussion is useful heuristically. In the 
New Oxford Dictionary, one definition describes analogy as
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"the resemblance of form or function between organs which 
are essentially different". Where analogy is noticed, 
especially in medicine and biology it rarely is carried 
out by logical argument in the step by step fashion of the 
philosopher. Much of the philosophy of science comprises 
theoretical situations that rarely happen in the real life 
of the laboratory or the clinic and the term ^analogical 
act' is considered more germaine to this paper. Analogical 
acts are an aid to discovery by suggesting clues and hypo­
theses. They concern resemblances between the relationship 
of things, rather than between the things themselves. The 
value of even erroneously described analogues can be pro­
fitable as it was with Malpighi: encountering insuperable 
difficulties in his anatomical studies of animals, he looked 
instead at their analogues, the plants, and founded the 
science of plant anatomy. In biology and medicine the 
examples of how analogies have helped new discoveries are 
legion. In neurophysiology these would include nervous 
transmission and electric current; the brain and the electronic 
calculating machine; the eye and the photographic plate; and 
the study of memory which employs many analogies in its 
understanding. The ancient Greeks (fifth century BC) who 
did not allow autopsies used analogy in their attempts to 
understand the movement of body fluids, conception, respira­
tion, nutrition, congestion and the formation of bladder 
stones. Descartes was concerned with the analogy between 
mechanical and physiological action and analogy became the 
cornerstone of comparative anatomy.
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As analogies have a long history in generating hypo­
theses to inspire ensuing further investigation and develop­
ment, it is scientifically justifiable to include the care-- 
fully argued analogues between the self archetype and certain 
aspects of immunology. The analogical act never proves; 
it may however bring revolutionary advances if scientists 
detect certain analogies not seen by others and thus give 
a-new basis for further development of a science.
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Chapter V. Theory in psychology ■ i
1. Theory as imposition upon observation
The identity of self is a basic awareness of sameness
across time and space. Through breaks in this self-awareness
during sleep or when unconscious, we are made aware of self
as a continuity in its personal distinctness from other
selves and objects. Hume argued in his Treatise, (see 1896
edition), that we cannot have an idea of self as we know
nothing but sense impression. In Book II of the Treatise
Hume wrote, however, " Tis evident that ... we are at all
times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and
passions..." Hume saw self as just the sum total of
experiences but if the self is linked to what is commonly
named the individual differentiated personality, it itself
must change as it is both partially .dependent on physical
development and intellectual development and partially .
independent via its inventive initiative.
«
The polarity between self and environment is the subject 
of most self studies. Knowledge, including culturally 
acquired knowledge, may affect interpretation of this polarity 
As Ryle (1949) suggests it may be almost impossible to 
observe oneself as one is at a given instant, but one can 
reflect on oneself an instant later. We can develop theories 
about ourselves through posing problems and testing our 
conjectures. This is an ongoing learning process.
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Fantz's experiments (1963) with babies at five days 
of age show they fixate on a schematic drawing of a face 
for longer periods than on a similar non-face pictorial 
arrangement. Dependence on caretakers makes persons very 
important within the objects of a baby's environment.
Through other's interest in him and through body discovery 
the baby learns he is also a person. To be a self, 
expectancy over time of one's self extending to past and 
future involves a theory of expectation. However many ways 
of acting that being a self for the baby may include, 
social experience will add to the sum of self-awareness.
What can be said to be individual about an organism that 
is an open system or group of systems with atoms joining 
and leaving the system very often? The material particles 
and energy are in constant exchange through metabolism 
with the environment. To the extent that this is self­
controlling the organism is a centre of control. A baby is 
a developing organism as a body before it becomes a person 
in the sense of a consciously perceived unity of body and 
mind or psyche-soma. The baby's knowledge of his mother or 
principal caretaker leads on to his need to learn what is 
part of his body and what is not. In time the baby dis­
tinguishes between persons and things. This knowledge is 
needed prior to his discovery that he is a separate self.
Underlying this idea is a principle of social cognition: 
that any knowledge gained about the other also must be gained 
about the self. Bannister and Agnew (1977) in a chapter on 
the child's construction of self maintain; "The ways in which 
we elaborate our construing of self must be essentially those
- 159 -
ways in which we elaborate our construing of others, for 
we have not a concept of self but a bipolar construct of 
self-not self or self-others".
Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) divide the first two years 
of development in the baby into four periods :
1) Birth to three months: Infants are particularly interested 
in other babies as social objects. Single action-outcome 
pairings are seen regularly enough to postulate these primary 
circular reactions to be differentiated.
2) Three months to eight months: Means and ends relation­
ships are established. Mirror contingency becomes of interest 
to the .baby within an action-outcome behavioural unit. The 
self-other distinction is not consolidated prior to the 
notion of permanence.
3) Eight to twelve months: The critical development is the 
permanent establishment of the permanence notion that 
enables the infant to have a self-other distinction. Plans, 
intentionality, self-recognition, independence from some 
contingencies all appear.
4) Twelve to twenty-four months: The representational 
behaviour-of-self begins and self-recognition is more 
dependent on feature analysis than on contingency in 
experimentation. (The child can recognize self in pictures 
as well as mirrors). A categorical self-knowledge begins 
with gender and age. In his language the child uses complex 
means-ends and symbolic representation occurs.
There are sentences we use once and never construct 
again. Understanding such a sentence is more than under­
standing the sequence of words at which one might initially 
fail. A unique experience is suggested, not a learned
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response to a former stimulus, which may probably have a 
brain process that is also necessarily unique. Brown (1965) 
in describing processes involved with the child's acquisition 
of language syntax mentions the induction of latent structure 
as the most complex and finds this more reminiscent of the 
biological development of an embryo than of the acquisition 
of a conditioned response.
In general the self seems both to observe and to take 
action at the same time. "It (the self) is acting and 
suffering, recalling the past and planning and programming 
the future; expecting and disposing. It contains ... a 
vivid consciousness of being an acting self, a centre of 
action" (Popper and Ecoles 1977) . Adaptation to the external 
world may be inherited and learned. Both forms of knowledge - 
can have complex informative capacity. Inherited knowledge, 
in the unconscious and found in the genes (the genome of 
the organism), provides the background from which to acquire 
new knowledge. The idea that sense data are the only 
entrance to the intellect ignores the selection of evolution: 
ten thousand million neurones live together in the cerebral 
cortex. Ecoles (1964) estimates some of these neurones may 
have ten thousand synaptic links which suggests a huge 
potential including genetic read-out in the inherited back­
ground of the baby. Critical ability, in the sense of 
knowledge as the object of knowing or that "which is known 
or made known" (Oxford English Dictionary), leads to 
hypothesis and conjectural knowledge. Looking at an object 
causes an experience of sensation but one then queries the 
problem of what it is. Man is constantly required to infer
- 161 -
that other higher vertebrates have achieved conscious 
awareness in their decisions about interpersonal behaviour 
towards himself. Husserl (1948) argued that the one 
indubitable fact in human psychology is that of conscious­
ness. Knowing demands a knower. Just as there is' no 
consciousness without an object so is there also none 
without a subject. "All knowing is consciousness of knowing" 
(Sartre 1956). There are three knowings which is the normal 
extent of regressive comprehension; e.g. 'I knew that I 
knew that I knew!'
The first knowing is the phenomenological knowing of 
whatever the object is (realization). The second knowing 
follows in the knowing of the first knowing (memory via 
recovery and recall). The third knowing is a reflexive 
consciousness of-consciousness or knowing that one knows 
the first knowing. Sartre (1956) argues: "Consciousness 
of self is not dual. If we wish to avoid an infinite regress, 
there must be an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the 
self to itself". In my view this is a fourth knowing or 
a consciousness^in which knowing is not known or transformed 
to cognitive knowing. If behaviour does not become an 
object of another behaviour by the same actor, it is less 
than conscious or unconscious. Beloff (1964) points out 
that sense perception can be dependent on unconscious 
processes. In vision, "... all those reflex processes on 
which successful vision depends: lens accommodation, 
pupillary contraction, binocular convergence, eye movement 
etc., all take place at an unconscious level".
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Medawar (1957) reminds- us that problem solving may be 
unconscious as the immune system ideally solves the constant 
stream of its new problems unconsciously.
Instead of a hypothesis that our mind is a stream of 
experience and the self only a summation of these as a 
functionally unified system of responses (Skinner 1953), 
we would argue that our minds focus active attention 
incorporating a selection programme which is adjusted to 
the repertoire of behavioural responses available.
Penfield's (1958) stimulation of the cortex in his patients 
enabled them to re-experience past experience while they 
fully retained awareness of their body localization as 
they lay on an operating table. The patients reported that 
they maintained a conscious awareness of self while the 
perceptual experience of the past was re-stimulated. The 
central nervous system steers the organism in an attempt 
both to relate to biologically relevant environmental aspects 
and to devolve some tasks to a hierarchically lower uncon­
scious integration.
The individual organism, unique genetically and experi- 
entially, with a long evolution of the central nervous 
system contained within it, must, in a unified or self- 
conscious and self-reflective way, use its own germ plasm 
linked to its own brain and its own descriptive function of 
language. This is the uniqueness or self of individuals 
built up through the long evolution of human individuation.
Dispositions to recall to consciousness give continuity 
to the self via memory and dispositions to behave uncon­
sciously contain inbuilt expectations (Jung's archetypal 
theory) as well as inborn reactions and responses such as
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the newborn baby's expectation of being fed. Psychologi­
cally and genetically this knowledge is a priori, i.e. 
prior to all observational experience. Observation tends 
to be selective and presupposes similarity or its opposite.
It also tends toward classification. This leads to an 
adoption of a frame of reference, to expectations and to 
formulations within theory. The idea that science proceeds 
from observation to theory, rather than testing theory 
against observation, is questioned because although it is 
true that a particular hypothesis is designed to explain 
some preceding observations, the need for explanation invents 
new hypotheses, and expecting to find regularities, imposes 
them onto experience. Theoretical framework needs constant 
reassessment. Conjecture and refutation, rather than the 
preservation of current dogma, can be traced back as a 
method to Hellenic tradition and to Thales. A principle 
that emerges in Popper's work (1959,1963,1966,1977) is that 
the criteria of demarcation for scientific theories are 
test-ability and falsifiability. The logical validity in 
repetition based upon similarity, or the.inductive method 
has been successfully refuted by Hume; instances of which 
we have no experience cannot logically be claimed to have 
to resemble those of which we have had experience. This 
questions reliance on statistical probability as an all 
inclusive proof of any behavioural tendency. Habit does 
not originate in repetition: walking or speaking begin 
independently of repetition before it can take part.
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Repetition is not perfect sameness for several interpreters; 
each is repetition-for-us if it is based on similarity-for- 
us. A giraffe might not experience a repdition as the 
sameness I do because each would have a certain point of 
viewl If logically a point of view must precede the decision 
that a repetition has been made (such as a system of 
interests, assumptions, anticipations and expectations) 
then the point of view is not merely the result of repetition 
because it existed independently before the repetition.
So induction or a passive waiting for repetitions to impose 
regularities on us is replaced by a theory of trial and 
error and the search for 'similarities-for-us' which means 
that scientific theories are inventions rather than a 
digest of observations, put forward for trial to learn if 
they oppose observations in a decisive way. This critical 
attitude enables the survival of the fittest theory at a 
given period in scientific history and, if an inadequate 
hypothesis is eliminated, the survival of science as such, 
as it can classify all theory as conjecture or tentative 
hypothesis. Empirical test and evidence can falsify by 
deductive inference, but not by inductive interference since 
no observation or experiment can give more than a finite 
number of repetitions. Statements of laws, e.g. B depends 
on A, always transcend possible empirical evidence. In 
general science accepts a theory as long as it-stands up 
to the severest test that has yet been designed to refute it.
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2. Behaviourism: a refutation
Can the theory of unconditioned and conditioned 
reflexes survive severe test?
Behaviourism, based on the reflex theory of behaviour' 
and the association theory connected with it, has used 
the concept of the tonditior^reflex'. It is historically 
associated with Descartes, Locke, Hume, Loeb, Bechterev,
Pavlov, Watson and initially Sherrington, although he 
repudiated the reflex theory in the preface to the second 
edition of his 'Integrative action of the nervous system' 
(Sherrington 1906) .
Epistemological problems arose concerning the concept 
of the 'conditioned reflex'. Within the suppositions of 
mechanistic materialism which caused biologists to refrain 
from admitting concepts of consciousness or volition to 
science, Descartes (see Haldane and Ross translation, 1911) 
formulated the concept of 'reflex' in 1649*. He thought 
animal nerves were comparable to statues that were plumbed 
for water. Sensory nerve stimuli were thought to give 
rise to inborn automatic involuntary reactions. This 
idea has persisted. Pavlov (1927) wrote that "...psychologists 
...are studying at the present time these ... inevitable 
reactions of the organism ... due ... to the inherent organi­
zation of the nervous system". Neural connections between 
receptor and effector organs were seen in contrast to 
conscious action or volition. Reflexes .are automatic and 
a consequence of stimulation of a sensory receptor initiating 
a nervous impulse transmitted along a specific neuroanatomical
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pathway to an effector organ. This is the conceptual 
'reflex arc'. The use of 'automatic' and 'involuntary' 
in this definition and the notion of a sensory trigger 
for a type of response implies the existence of a class 
of non-automatic actions. There are also actions, 
although fully automatic and involuntary, that are not 
due to the mechanisms of the reflex arc, or its specific 
naming would be superfluous. Efron (1966) gives examples: 
the "reticulocyte response to chronic anemia, the con­
traction of a muscle following a mechanical blow, and the 
movements of muscles during convulsive seizures" which are 
examples of automatic and involuntary actions not involving 
a reflex arc. Chemical action in the effector link of a 
response to afferent stimulation is illustrated by milk 
ejection in lactating animals. The stimulation of the 
nipple, giving an afferent neural release of pituitary 
hormone, is followed by an effector response of the hormone's 
chemical influence on the mammary gland.
Voluntary movement presupposes a concept of conscious­
ness. Its purpose, initiation and regulation to insure its 
goal is consciously established. Walking would be an 
example. Stretch receptors, if stimulated, will activate 
the alpha motor neurones causing muscles /to contract.
These are initiated by mental action - the desire to move 
to a goal - so the automatic mechanism involved would not 
by themselves lead to a classification of walking as non­
voluntary action. As there has never been a purely-anatomical 
physiological definition of a reflex mechanismiyphysiologists 
have instead asked if all involuntary actions'ate reflexes.
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Sherrington (1951) thought the reflex innate and inherited 
but Pavlov argued for habits based on training, education 
and discipline as a chain of conditioned reflexes. By 
1927, Pavlov used the concept of the reflex as encompassing 
every action of the organism that was mediated by the 
central nervous system. Sherrington held out for a definition 
which excluded any behaviour dependent on a faculty of 
consciousness. By 1931, Skinner declared the concept of 
reflex free of any differentiae and called it any "observed 
correlation of stimulus and response". Sherrington argued 
that a 'simple' reflex did not actually exist as any motor 
neurone in the anterior horn received too many connections 
from neurones elsewhere in the spinal cord to be considered 
as having only one input. All parts of the nervous system's 
concurrent input to the motor neurone would be present, 
not just the input from a particular afferent pathway.
If the pure reflex is not a physiologically definable 
mechanism nor a definably exact structure anatomically it 
can only be defined by reference to the concept of 
voluntarily initiated action. Skinner (1931) recognizes, 
this problem by stating, "We have been proceeding ... upon 
an unnecessary assumption ... that there is a flexion reflex 
...such an assumption is wholly gratuitous ... our knowledge 
of ... the arc is ... derived wholly from the observation 
of a correlation...'".
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In general the epistemological chaos surrounding the 
reflex concept was caused by the underlying premise of 
mechanistic materialism which claims that all phenomena 
will be reduced to physics and chemistry one day. A 
problem arises as all the laws of physics and chemistry 
are not yet known. Reductionists, if failing to 'reduce' 
all consciousness to physics and chemistry, point out the 
inadequate state of present knowledge but rarely include 
themselves in this condition when claiming that reductionism 
will succeed. Skinner maintains that any differentiae 
that isolate reflex activity from all other activity as 
responses are "negative" and "unscientific", e.g. the reflex 
as unlearned, unconscious, involuntary or restricted to 
special neural paths. If reflex means nothing but a response 
the term need not be retained if it is no longer synonymous 
with involuntary behaviour. The materialists seemed to 
hope that consciousness might be biologically irrelevant 
and that all behaviour, is determined by physical forces 
beyond one's conscious control. If all behaviour is a chain 
of reflexes then the mechanistic thesis would be maintained. 
But the complexity of the central nervous system indicates 
that one cannot isolate a reflex arc, so the theory is not 
testable or refutable.
Acquired responses to stimuli, on Pavlov's view, needed 
"new reflex mechanisms" or "temporary connections" as innate 
motor and glandular responses to stimuli. But this'does-not 
explain acquired responses sufficiently. No anatomical or' - 
physiological evidence has been found to support the--postulate 
of temporary connections. No histological or physiological^'
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discoveries have brought forward any facts to prove-any 
altered state between neurones as a consequence of previous 
experience. Eccles (1964) discounts known changes in 
synaptic efficiency, such as in tetanus or following pro­
longed disuse of monosynaptic transmission, by pointing 
out that "... the demonstrated changes in synaptic 
efficiency are that long periods of excess use or disuse 
are required in order to produce detectable synaptic change". 
Thus the concept of an acquired reflex or a conditioned 
reflex may be meaningless in normal health or organisms 
without synaptic trauma. None of the physiological responses 
described by Pavlov as 'conditioned reflexes' or responses 
(striate muscles or glands) are found in unconscious animals. 
This observation demonstrates that the concept of conscious­
ness is needed to explain both the study of the reflex and 
the study of acquired behaviour. But Pavlov maintained he 
could scientifically "ignore the mental state of the animal" 
and this violates the logical assertion that the facts of 
consciousness cannot be ignored. Pavlov did in fact consider 
the mental state of his animals by 1) referring to 'alert­
ness', 'irritability', 'somnolence'; 2) by choosing to work- 
on conscious animals; 3) by showing that conditioned reflexes 
disappear during sleep, but unconditioned responses do not;
4) by choosing an experimental chamber without "distractions" 
for the animals. Pavlov apparently was unaware of this 
discrepancy between theory, description and methodology.
- 170 -
3. Physics and the psychological theory of self
Both materialism and depth psychology have tended to 
lean on the classical Newtonian conceptualization where 
persons and objects move through a Euclidean space main­
taining substance as they do so. Historically observation 
may have been contaminated by such conventions. If the 
world is not as atomistic as supposed but more 'continuous', 
it will be of interest to psychologists to become aware of 
the emerging 'field theories' in physics where any absolute 
distinction between matter or void is increasingly questioned. 
Weyl (1949) in discussing electrons, as waves rather than 
as substance maintains: "... a material particle is merely
a small domain of the electrical field within which the 
field strength assumes enormously high values ... an energy 
knot, by no means clearly delineated against the remaining 
field, (which) propogates through empty space like a water 
wave across the surface of a lake; there is no such thing 
as one and the same substance of which the electrons consist 
at all times". In the metaphor of the 'wave' as 'moving 
across a lake' the wave is not independent but construed 
as a particular mode of behaviour of the entire lake. The 
swell of the whole volume of the lake would cause the surface 
phenomenon. This reminds one of the unconscious as being 
partly causative of conscious behaviour.
Learned tendencies to perceive in an atomistic fashion 
supported by the sharpening properties of the central 
nervous system in interpreting visual gradients have been;’ 
reviewed (Marr 1976). Campbell and Robson (1968), for ■:example,
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suggest that the visual system's 'modus operandi' analyses 
contours and objects in continuous components (sine waves) 
by Fourier analysis. Perception of the environment is seen 
both to imply a nervous system and to be implied by a 
nervous system. Following Einstein, the most recent 
theories in physics indicate that all properties of any 
parts of matter reflect their interaction with other parts. 
Thus self theory, as the interaction of ego and environment 
as the 'waves of the water' plus the archetypes as 'under 
the water' in Jung's conceptual framework is one of the 
psychological theories most alligned to recent development 
in physics.
Field theory illustrates a possible analogy between 
emerging physical concepts and Jung's self theory. The 
field^ (self) plus (environment)^ is .held to contain pertur­
bations (ego's reception of environment) which propagate 
through the field (see Fordham's deintegration theory in 
Chapter I, section 3 as the ego matches to archetypal form- 
tendencies of the unconscious) to gain 'conscious inter­
pretation'. Structures in field theory are the interacting 
and interfering of the perturbations or the self's assimi­
lation of the ego plus the environment plus the archetypes 
in my analogue. As the structure needs accounting for 
(the self theory of the person) not only the interaction 
as 'continuous' (the ego continuously analyzing environmental 
input), the analogy between physics and aspects of Jungian 
self theory is quite powerful. If a person 'adopts' stable 
patterns of process, he is taking 'properties of the field' 
that are relatively localized in space and time.' , J L
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This is the self's psychological role. It is the contention 
of this writer that a structural theory of self, reappraised 
and combining elements of Jung's and Freud's conceptual 
theories, enables a parsimonious, wholistic psychological 
hypothesis of this 'field' or experience of self in conscious­
ness. The self is the pilot of one's relative being (unique 
consciousness), in a localization of space and time, and 
within the continuous 'universal mind' or 'perceptual field'.
Before presenting my new theory of the self-ego I wish 
to point out the scientific problems in using depth psychology 
as its perspective. Behaviourism as a possible mode of 
presentation has been negated on logical grounds. However, 
specific experimental studies are vital to learning about 
the self provided they are not based on inductive reasoning 
only and are not so 'subatomic' in nature as to be too 
hierarchically removed from a wholistic view of the 'self­
field'. Psychology's advance requires that a body of workers 
think in terms large enough to see a self-theory as a part 
of all the environment in continuous relation to one's own 
'energy knot'. This is the psycho-physical sense of self­
unity in individual mind-beingness.
4. Assessing falsifiability in depth psychology
Popper (1966) suggests that "clinical observations... 
are interpretations in the light of theories... criteria of 
refutation have to be laid down beforehand...but what kind 
of clinical responses would refute, to the satisfaction of 
the analyst, not merely a particular diagnosis but psycho­
analysis itself?" This question is misleading.
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Suppose a critic of psychoanalysis were to produce incon­
testable evidence that all psychological conclusions based 
on psychoanalytic theory were false. Would this refute 
psychoanalysis? Many hypotheses would have been refuted 
and need rewriting, but the vast amount of psychological 
data needing explanation would remain and the general 
hypothesis that the unconscious influences conscious 
behaviour and can be linked by a series of interconnected 
psychoanalytical postulates would not be falsified as an 
approach. Assumptions would be modified but aspects of 
methodology and the groundwork might survive. Psychoanalysis 
itself would not be refuted. Disciplines involving 
systematic research cannot be refuted: hypotheses can be 
refuted. Even if hypotheses are inadequate in psychoanalysis, 
the discoveries made about behaviour in special conditions 
would remain and need explanation. Revision of a discipline 
doesn't demolish the fresh observations it continues to make. 
Revision of psychoanalysis would itself be psychoanalysis.
The questions it asks would remain.
Another problem in falsifying theories and scientific 
statements has come forward through experimental work in 
physics. The work with individual paths of photons has 
shown that a precisely identical series of experiments will 
give differing results. When solitary photons are shot 
consecutively at the same point of a half-silvered mirror, 
half of the photons will pass through and half will not pass 
through the mirror. But no detectable variations in experi­
mental conditions can determine which individual photon will 
pass through and which will not. Like causes may not produce
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like effects. Some scientists are therefore abandoning 
the principle of the uniformity of nature. Jeans (1942) 
sums up the combined theories of Heisenberg, de Broglie 
and Schrodinger in discussing Dirac's theory which states: 
"...that events in the phenomenal world are not uniquely 
associated with events in the substratum (sub-atomic physics, 
etc.); different events in the substratum may result in 
phenomena which are precisely similar, at least to our 
observation". This view of physics is described by M.
Johnson (1948) as "pattern without demand to know of what 
thing we discover the structure".
Scientific criticism may be said to be moving away from 
the need for models in the mechanical sense, although 
retaining form or structure for expressing functional 
dependence and keeping measurement, abstraction and trans­
formation as ways of description. Patterns are not falsi- 
fiable, but statements are. In Einstein's (1933) relativity 
theory, electric and magnetic forces are not real. They are, 
rather, mental constructs resulting from an effort to 
understand the motion of particles. Gravity is a similar 
concept in this respect. These concepts are révisable 
rather than refutable when terms like 'energy' or 'momentum'
in the Newtonian theory of gravitation have been used.
2
Einstein's mass-energy equation E = MC is not falsifiable 
in the sense that a prediction from the equation could be 
falsified, e.g. 'Star J will appear to Observer E at space­
time s-t'. If this imaginary prediction were falsified, 
the mass-energy equation is not false as it is still 
applicable to the general class of phenomena from which it
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has been abstracted. When Newton's 'myth' is rewritten 
in terms of Einstein's relativity theory there is a 
temptation, as relativity theory claims to fit the 'facts', 
to suppose that relativity theory will never be revised 
enough so that its original form will be considered a 
'myth'. Facts are not independent of the form of theoretical 
statement subsumed and statements based on observations 
are not independent of prevailing theory and chosen paradigm. 
Factual aspects of theory are its observation statements 
and specific lawlike hypotheses which at a given time are 
thought to be factual. Reports about the scope of a law 
and applications of a law to particular cases are falsi­
fiable or at least révisable. When reports and applications 
are confirmed, however, the question remains whether the 
methods of representation and techniques from which 
inferences are drawn are sound. Toulmin (1953) suggests 
that abstract scientific statements of a law or principle 
and conclusions of inferences drawn in accordance with a 
law are not actually empirical statements and are not clearly 
falsifiable or refutable. Popper has put forward falsi- 
fiability as a necessary inbuilt requisite for scientific 
theory/hypothesis formation. I wish to discuss whether 
psychoanalytic hypotheses and those of Jung's analytical 
psychology are falsifiable.
9 L .  Falsifiability in psychoanalysis
Jeans (1942) has pointed out that in physics every 
observation in quanta theory involves "the passage of a 
complete quantum from the observed object to the observing 
subject, and a complete quantum constitutes a not negligible
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coupling between observer and the observed". The sharp 
division between observer and observed is thus questioned 
and the relation between subject-object rather than the 
object of the subject-object relationship is what is 
perceived. In psychoanalysis agreement between trained 
observers using tape-recorded sessions of an analysis - 
about interpretive effectiveness and the falsification of 
specific predictions - is an objective forward step within 
depth psychology concerning subject-object relation as a 
psychological interaction. It is the relationship of 
subject-object itself with which psychoanalysis deals. 
Prediction hypotheses about an analyst's interpretations 
and their effects can be verified or falsified by several 
observers. Lawlike hypotheses drawn from predictions are 
not conclusively falsifiable but may be fruitfully updated 
and made more heuristic by superseding earlier hypotheses. 
These hypotheses about the psychic development of individuals 
(or of groups) are stated in the form: 'X's, if assumed to
be ' Y are more intelligible to the patient', not in the 
form, 'all X's are Y '. Derivative assumptions, prevalent 
across psychology, need to be considered closely. Is it 
scientifically important for them to be falsifiable in 
Popper's sense? Seaborn Jones (1968) in analyzing this 
problem asserts that scientific judgment should deal with 
sound but untestable derivative assumptions because, 
"hypotheses and unformulated assumptions which are derived 
from, and not formally deducible from, theories and high- 
level hypotheses play a very important part in determining 
attitudes and expectations". Seaborn Jones has divided 
psychoanalytic hypotheses into a large number of classes.
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Nine will be considered here. Seaborn Jones finds that 
retrospective hypotheses about interpretations are falsi­
fiable as they can be confirmed or not by a number of 
observers. Predictive hypothesis, if specified so that 
"interpretations p,q,r...will be followed within 24 hours 
by changes a,b,c...in the analysand's behaviour", are 
conclusively falsifiable. There is a second group of 
hypotheses that while not conclusively falsifiable are 
directly or indirectly testable and are of theoretical and 
practical importance: these would be anomaly hypotheses 
(p is inconsistent with q) and observer agreement would at 
least be a starting point for their consideration-;- inter­
pretive or focussing hypotheses, which are frequently 
confirmed and are modifiable (they are influential to the 
patient's behaviour); ^historical hypotheses about the 
subject's unconscious fears are not directly falsifiable, 
but the analyst revises his hypothesis when interpretations 
based on ahistorical hypotheses fail and thus modifies such 
an hypothesis; psychodynamic laws, like any scientific laws 
are indirectly testable by testing predictions taken from 
them, e.g. "If...the hypothesis 'Obsessional symptoms are 
a defence against phobias' yields the prediction 'As the 
obsessional symptoms disappear during analysis the phobias 
will appear', the appearance or non-appearance of the 
phobias constitutes a test of both hypotheses: a direct 
test of the second, an indirect test of the first" (Seaborn 
Jones 1968); historical hypotheses such as 'he probably 
suffered from phobias m,n,o...in his second and third years' 
are more speculative than decisively testable; hypotheses
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about communities as a unit of psychoanalytic behaviour 
are not conclusively falsifiable or testable but the 
pragmatic value from prima facia statistical or experimental 
confirmation could be considerable; finally, heuristic 
hypotheses within analytical techniques are not privately 
conclusively falsifiable as they are often based on the 
analyst's unspoken and therefore unprovable interpretations 
during analytic sessions. Carl Rogers (1967) has pioneered 
the making of private therapy public through recording and 
filming techniques. Obviously if the unspoken hypotheses 
of the analyst were written down by him during the session 
being filmed, this would be timed to the spoken word as it 
is taped, and would supply independent observers with 
predictive material that is falsifiable.
Ideas spread across science from hypotheses and often 
make inadequate the criterion that science should be 
reduced to a collection of hypotheses. Freud's idea 
concerning the unconscious need for punishment has updated 
views about delinquency and crime; ideas about connections 
between breast feeding, sphincter training and its concep­
tualization and the character and mythology of primitive 
tribes has affected approaches in anthropological, socio­
logical and psychological investigation. Of course, to 
produce sweeping social hypotheses from these scientific 
ideas is unscientific.
There is the problem for all psychologists concerning 
their own freedom from the enactive element in choosing 
various modes of theory presentation. Where there are 
conscious and unconscious motives for distorting or dis-
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trusting a theory, the psychologist's own psychology is 
being projected into the discussions. Demarcation applied 
to people as scientists may be heuristically as important 
for the formulation of scientific hypotheses as Popper's 
falsifiability criteria. Seaborn Jones defines this theory 
of demarcation as applied to people in this way; "A person 
is scientific to the extent that 1) he is prepared to 
modify, reformulate or abandon his beliefs, either in the 
light of new evidence or in the light of philosophical 
criticism; 2) he uses deductive methods to form his 
hypotheses; 3) his predictions are not enactive in such a 
way that they change the situation they describe or predict; 
and 4) he is free from motives for distortion". It would 
follow that to revise a theory using the above demarcation 
of persons, one necessarily needs a detailed knowledge of 
the purpose and the method of the theorist. As my self­
theory is a revision and conjunction of elements in Jung's 
and Freud's formulations, using Fordham's extension of Jung's 
theory, their work and the work of the Freudian and Jungian 
schools (to the extent that these can be clearly defined) 
has been extensively reviewed and considered where relevant 
to our subject, the self in childhood.
1). Falsif iability in projective techniques within Jung's 
analytical psychology
Symbol and myth as it appears in dreams has been a 
tool of interpretation in all of depth psychology as has 
the use of projective techniques in analysis such as 
spontaneous painting, building sand pictures, active
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imagination (a specific Jungian technique), clay modelling, 
etc.. Classically, projective techniques have been 
criticized for being on so broad a level that the material 
is not classifiable in any narrow sense. Many responses 
may arise from recent or past experiences at a superficial 
level as well as at deeper motivational levels connected 
to unconscious contents. Because analysts are trained to 
analyze on these various levels shifting quickly from and 
between levels, it is extremely difficult to quantify these 
procedures into standardized tests. The layman or the 
unanalyzed psychologist may think there is too much danger 
of the analyst projecting onto the projected material of 
the patient, the analyst's own projections! Attempts to 
make published projective tests valid have partially failed 
although the success of the individual therapist's use of 
projective techniques where patients often express great 
appreciation and benefit from the analysis of projective 
material is well known. Especially with children, but also 
with adults, difficulties with questionnaires and oral 
interviews are avoided and play-like projective techniques 
are in wide use. Where psychologists draw on depth 
constructs in designing their hypotheses and testing 
procedures or activities an enrichment from analysts' 
insights is widely reported. Fantasy, as a release of 
overt and covert levels, is widely accepted by Jungian and 
Freudian analysts but a sufficiently objective description 
of this work is still lacking in the field. The incremental 
validity, in that these tests add to other diagnostic 
techniques to round out a fuller clinical picture of a 
patient, is an important contribution from the use of
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projective methods. Experienced givers of the Rorschach 
test, provided their theoretical orientation is acceptable 
(Freudians use this widely, but Rorschach was a Jungian), 
claim very effective interpretive and diagnostic results.
As projective techniques each have their own language and 
orientation, judgment by the untrained observer leads to 
confusion and misunderstanding. The information yielded 
from covert levels is distinctively useful in the clinical 
setting provided a team of workers understand the language 
being used, the techniques themselves, whether the setting 
is more public psychiatry or more private analysis.
The hypotheses derived from Jungian projective techni­
ques (e.g. D. Kalff's sand-play or Jung's use of 'active 
imagination') would lead to the same classes of hypotheses 
as discussed for the main body of psychoanalysis and analy­
tical psychology. It is assumed that theoretical validity 
would have the same problems and stimulus value for 
scientific advance from Jung's work as would that set forth 
by Freud and his followers.
Kant's (1788) decision concerning synthetic a priori 
judgments, so often claimed to be a fallacy in the inter­
pretation of projective techniques, is that synthetic 
a priori knowledge is possible because the mind always reads 
certain things into the world of appearances in constructing 
it. Kant held that a priori concepts were read into 
experience both by the mind as well as by intuition (which 
Jung defined as largely an unconscious function).
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Where these genuinely belong to the construction, they are 
empirical and they force themselves on us through the forms 
of judgment in which our thought is expressed. Interpretation, 
or knowledge, is held to be a kind of synthesis: there is an 
active interpretation of sense-data received (such as that 
produced in projective techniques) and one finds new 
connections not always at first obvious such as the 
different representations of a single changing object.
Alternative theories in various projective interpreta­
tions might serve too, but if a method works and gives results 
it is heuristic to retain it where it is at least indirectly 
testable, observable (the advantage of creative painting, 
sand and clay techniques) and even falsifiable. In using 
'world pictures' constructed in sand-trays, the patient is 
projecting and constructing an objective picture using 
objects from life in the sand topography such as people, 
buildings, vegetation, symbolic figures, animals, vehicles, 
water, landscape, etc. The patient is using the world of 
appearances and constructing his own best guess of the real 
world or of the world of his inner experience of the moment. 
There can be no certain test that his projection is accurate 
to his inner world but what right have we to suppose it is 
definitely not accurate? The only way we can, as selves, 
conceive of others' selves, is by drawing an analogy to our 
own self introspectively and by using.empathy to the others' 
self. There is more to oneself than the appearance of one 
as object, or there would be nothing for one's self to 
appear to inwardly. One's consciousness must exist in
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order to carry out this phenomenological construction:
'I am myself'. The possibility of such experience depends 
on the self knowing itself as an object of experience. If 
one were only an item in the phenomenal world there would 
be no subject for experiencing. But self as subject need 
not be enduring and independent substance; synthesis is 
what the self is continuously doing through reflective, 
adjusting, insightful learning. Psychodynamics develops 
from theory based on many classes of hypotheses. These may 
have testable or indirectly testable assumptions, many of 
which have predictive value. Both psychoanalysis and analy­
tical psychology need a more formal scientific grounding
both in theory and technique. The essential dimensions of 
depth psychology are its historical discovery and study of 
the theory of symbol. Other aspects are its study of 
intersubjective logic and the temporality of the subject, 
mythology, the psychology of religion and a specific and 
unique use of language in the 'interpretation of resistances 
and transferences or even to differentiate the effects proper 
to repression and the structure of the individual myth in 
obsessional neuroses' (Lacan 1966). The problem of inter- 
subjective time has been further secured in depth psychology 
through the theory of games.
C. Falsifiability in series of theories
Experimental results giving counterinstances to a 
theory may not kill it. An auxiliary hypothesis or a 
suitable reinterpretation of its terms may save it ; 
Falsification at any price can be modified by setting
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standards to demarcate scientific from pseudo-scientific 
changes within theory. As the thorough appraisal of a 
theory must include an assessment of its auxiliary hypotheses, 
its initial conditions and its preceding theories to ascertain 
what change brought it about in the first place, a methodo­
logical falsificationism needs to consider series of theories. 
If problem shifts are theoretically progressive, they are 
scientific. If new empirical content is corroborated-with 
a new theory, the emerging fact makes it empirically pro­
gressive. Thus a series of theories must produce new facts 
not just be in agreement with the observed facts. Lakatos 
(1970) believes this shifts the ground of what falsification 
is. In dealing with one theory, scientists have tended to 
lean on the results of experiments; if they confirm the theory 
it is acceptable and if they contradict the theory it is 
rejected. In the context of a series of theories falsifi­
cation "depends on the emergence of better theories, on the 
invention of theories which anticipate new facts..." (Lakatos 
1970). The relation of falsification is not just between 
theory and the empirical basis, but becomes a multiple 
relation between competing theories, the empirical basis 
and the empirical growth resulting from the competition 
between theories. Here the urgency is upon replacing any 
.hypothesis by a better one. There is no falsification before 
the emergence of a better theory. "Refutation without an 
alternative shows nothing but the poverty of our imagination 
in providing a rescue hypothesis" (Lakatos 1970) . A theory 
is acceptably scientific according to the argument, only if
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it has corroborated excess empirical content over its rival 
and leads to the discovery of novel facts. This gives 
theory then explanatory power as it represents growth. It 
is empirical and takes the activist approach from Kant.
Lakatos calls this approach that of the "sophisticated 
falsificationalist" and it implies that learning about a 
theory is learning which new facts it anticipated. Leibnitz 
(1717) anticipated these theoretical concepts when he wrote 
to Conring: "It is the greatest commendation of an hypo­
thesis (next to proven truth) if by its help predictions 
can be made even about phenomena or experiments not tried".
5. Cognitive experimental psychology, neo-Kantfan humanism 
and the self theory
Experimental science is defined by bringing measurement 
into the reality perhaps more than by what quantity it 
approaches. W. Mischel, a cognitive psychologist, has 
retained a self-concept. In doing so he opposes B.F. Skinner 
(1975) who attributes control of behaviour to the individual's 
environmental and genetic history alone. Mischel (1973) 
thinks Skinner ignores the individual's capacity to process 
information selectively in terms of the person's own psycho­
logical state and his constructs. The continuous interaction 
between person and conditions is emphasized by Mischel. In 
the analysis of the covariations between behaviour and 
conditions, the problem of environmental contingencies arises 
for often this is partly determined by human beings in society 
Environmental contingencies also cannot be divorced in their 
effects from the varying interpretations and psychological
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transformations imposed by persons perceiving these con­
tingencies. Reciprocity between self and complete social 
environment suggests a complexity where both the personal 
variables and the environmental variables are so very 
numerous that one wonders if in the name of clarity or 
parsimony it is possible to make heuristic hypotheses 
amjdst this multiplicity of person-situation interactions.
The manipulation of such variables suggests an oversimplifi­
cation of actual human situations. Life is not lived under 
control for a third-person observer's data. The person as 
'self' comes at life with the same ability to align premises
•just as the experimenter does (by his judgments of 'order'
made on the evidence 'order', his statistical assumptions
and his experimental design).
'Variable' as a term in science is used as a methodo­
logical .construct. Theory defines variables to see if they 
hold up to testing. Person variables and situation variables 
suggests an impossible dichotomy as any situation demands 
that a self would additionally put meaning into the equation. 
If self-directed purpose comes into the events under 
experimental observation, can it be non-parsimonious to 
include it as a cause? Control and prediction of an 
'independent' variable, or the experimenter's own teleo- 
logical framework, suggests what theory is actually being 
supported in advance.
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Classical mediation theory and self theory run into 
problems: both Tolman and the sign gestaltists as well as 
Woodworth's S-O-R (subject-organism-response) ideas are 
built on a theory that mediators (signs, rules, models) 
are input and 'past' responses rather than simultaneously 
'present' responses of the self within the organism. This 
eliminates the effect of possible arbitrariness in behaviour 
An exclusive demonstrative explanation for behavioural 
description results. No place is allowed for dialectical 
reasoning in early mediation theory. Miller, Galanter and 
Pribram (1960) in applying the concept of the feedback loop 
as a fundamental building block called by them the TOTE 
(test-operate-te#t-exit), imply a simultaneous comparison, 
using feedback, of what stage a plan or intention has come 
to. The operational stage of the organism's response to 
that comparison could be new, not only repeated responses 
of the organism.
Mischel (1973) however updates these traditional 
mediational views and claims his objective is a "theoretical 
framework that recognizes the constructive^ (generative 
nature of information processing, the active cognitive 
operations through which stimulus meanings may be trans­
formed, the goal-directed, self-regulation and planning 
through which the individual may avoid 'stimulus control', 
and the anticipatory quality of human expectations". And 
again, "Each person is potentially his or her own best 
assessor, engaged in evaluation and interpretation of 
behaviour as well as its enactment".
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Thus such a cognitive social learning theory seems 
more concerned with self-theory which has primarily been 
the province of humanists and Jung's analytical psycho­
logy until the last decades of cognitive experimental work 
The tendency for psychologists to ask if antecedent 
factors 'caused' this self to form is beginning to be 
left behind. The newer view of self moves from a concept 
of 'change' to a concept of 'identity'. Phenomenological 
empiricism increasingly attests that the term 'self 
should be a fixed or unchanging (theoretical) contribution 
(as dynamic structure) which the reasoning organism makes 
to the sequence of events within which it behaves. This 
self premise changes over time, but is giving a fixed 
contribution of 'self to an isolated behavioural event 
(assuming one could be isolated 'exactly for now'). This 
implies a stable framework within a given event. G. 
Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory and T. Kuhn's 
(1963) paradigms suggest a 'self' operating either via 
self-regulated assumptions within statistics or the fixing 
of parameters in paradigms to lend a series of events 
'order'. Where the self takes a premise, this beginning 
or fixed point is named by Rychlak (1976) as the "proto­
point". Rychlak's definition of self is as a construct: 
"...a construct enabling the theorist to conceptualize 
the contribution made to behaviour by an organism which 
brings meaningful premises to bear from a protopoint.
The term 'self captures the impact of 'logical weight' 
of a precedent meaning (premise) conveying sequacious 
implications for the sake of which behaviour to follow is 
at least partially determined". This is an introspective
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formulation. It does not deny a contribution from the 
unconscious as well as from the conscious and reflects 
that sense of orientation and identity in behaviour 
everywhere "for this unit of time". Premises can be 
several or changed as the organism 'comes at' any one 
life situation. The multiplicity of premises possible 
to the self at a given moment is an area psychology has 
yet to peruse and study. Unconfirmed premises do not 
'go away' but, as Jung (1954) discussed, these 'shadow' 
or repressed premises come back through dreams and into 
complexes where self-definition is poorly functioning and 
not under the individual's fuller self-control. The 
psychological uncomfortableness of a multiplicity of 
premises gives both cognitive, phenomenological and depth 
psychologists much to think about.
Rychlak insists that until a child knows the meaning 
of 'left' he will not know the meaning of 'right'. This 
is a conceptualization around which perceived or phenomenal 
reality becomes a meaningful dimension for comprehension; 
e.g. long-short? unity-plurality, possibility-impossibility, 
etc. Meanings, if bipolar, give meaning to the 'other'.
The idea waits on experience. "Kant was not saying that 
individuals were born with the meaning of words put into 
them by the environment but with innate 'formal causes ' 
like bipolar comprehension around which meaning can become 
organized by the self. Affective assessment of dialectical 
judgments along bipolar spectrums are idiographic assess-, 
ments" (Rychlak 1976).
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Reinforcement, on this view, is not only from the 
environment or tissue needs of the body, but is also 
positive or negative through the affectively assessing 
human being contributing as he 'comes at life' with his 
self. These affective states depend on our unique 
judgments. The self as a continuing 'actor', constantly 
evaluating, is everywhere described in the literature of 
the world. This is the neo-Kantian concept of self as a 
prexedently-sequaciously behaving organism. But we must 
not reify the self. In the self model proposed it is only 
claimed that a reappraised self-concept is sufficiently 
instructive and not inconsistent with general psychological 
experimental data (see Chapter VII) and that it is 
heuristically essential in analytical psychology (Chapter I), 
in the neo-Freudian work of Kohut (Chapter II), to the 
theory of autism (Chapter III), valuable to physiological 
analogues of the self (Chapter IV) and centrally important 
to neo-Kantian humanism, to Mischel's cognitive models and 
to several of the dynamic construct models (Chapter V ) .
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Chapter VI. A new model of the self
In the intense object-seeking of the infant I propose CAcutT 
there are seven con-integrates which are like storage bins 
for growingly recognizable areas of psychological experience 
which the ego develops as it separates out partially from 
the self. The seven con-integrates introduced here are 
speech, the shadow, the ego-ideal, the aesthetic, play, the 
persona and defence-of-the-self. In section 3 of Chapter I,
I have suggested that the con-integrates can be thought of 
as "huge, unifying. Gestalt-like complexes of de-integrates, 
conjoined to insure survival through effective performance 
and perception". It is argued that the con-integrates help 
clarify a "group of very large de-integrated aggregates 
which re-integrate in special systems of great biological 
significance".
1. The theory of con-integrates
In this section a new contribution to the theory of the 
self in early childhood is proposed. I wish to underpin 
further Fordham's theory of the de-integrates which has 
stated that as the self de-integrates outward to the object 
the re-integration gives a tendency of unity as re-inte- 
grates are a derivative of a wholeness or an original self.
This postulates a global theory without any hierarchical 
postulates or more testable lower levels to consider. In 
proposing seven con-integrates which develop very early 
during the first two or three years of the child's development,
I am proposing to clarify further what happens when de-inte­
gration is re-integrated back after the first ego differentia­
tion from self begins. It is my contention that the seven
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con-integrates support not only overall psychic wholeness 
but specifically serve the most urgent developmental needs 
of the ego.
Why seven con-integrates? I believe the seven discussed 
below give the best illustration of what a con-integrate is, 
of what purpose or aim it serves and it restricts the number 
to be considered to the most essential for an introduction 
to the theory. There may be more and other theorists may 
wish to bring arguments forward for others, or extend the 
hierarchical levels of the theory further than I shall attempt
The con-integrates are closely allied in dynamics and 
structure to ego development; there are seven a priori 
psychological areas seen very early in childhood which are 
designated as con-integrates. They are universally present 
in Western children and take precedence over lesser complexes 
as a linking and supporting part of ego-orientation. The 
boundaries of con-integrates are permeable to the ego as it 
re-integrates its de-integrates back for placement within 
psychological structure. The boundaries of the con-inte­
grates are not permeable to one another. There is no reason 
to assume that over time brain cellular patterns cannot 
develop upon these a priori conglomerates provided they 
develop normally, but it is postulated that the con-inte­
grates are basically a priori in type and within the structure 
and process I shall postulate for the self/ego. The shadow, 
the ego-ideal and aspects of speech involve structurally 
unconscious components. The other con-integrates are 
'conscious. Where a con-integrate has unconscious structure 
they have permeable boundaries both to ego consciousness
3. DlAl^RAN OF SELF/Ego CofJ^H^EaATE-S
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and to the personal unconscious; the shadow, technically, 
also reaches to the collective unconscious (see Diagram 3).
Multi-integrates are cognitive developments exclusively 
dependent on adaptation and reaction including physiological 
motility and are thought to be consciously built up. In 
the self-hierarchy multi-integrates stand underneath the 
con-integrate and are less ego-dependent and ego-related 
although all the integrates rely to some relative extent on 
the ego for their function.
Non-integrates are fragmented bits of cognitive material 
that the self stores in case a match to later input may 
require their use. If this seems unlikely, non-integrates 
are pushed out of the self entirely. Thus in this theory 1 
believe there is some material processed through the self 
that is not retained in memory. Two kinds of memory stores 
are proposed, the first directly related to the acceptance 
of material by the ego as it de-integrates out to find a 
match either in archetypal images from the collective 
unconscious or in a highly differentiated memory store 
available to recall and to recognition. The second memory 
store is a non-differentiated storage of non-integrate 
material which may be available upon recognition of related 
bits or aspects of its material. This is not available to 
immediate recall, at least initially in the first months of 
life, but is more easily available to recognition.
The psychological areas put forward as con-integrates 
represent differing structural types in existing theory.
They may be archetypes themselves, complexes or functions 
in existing Jungian theory. But in view of the self/ego
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re-integrating back distinctive and definite de-integrates, 
it is maintained theoretically that it is unclear to allow 
no further differentiation than Fordham's theory does as to 
possible systems developing around the gradually differen­
tiating ego and essential to its growth. Before proceeding 
further the ego-self relationship should be redefined.
The term ego is being used here as the seat of conscious­
ness. This concept is based on the theory of the ego's 
original state as being unconscious at birth or contained 
within the self as the original totality. Neumann (1954) 
symbolically describes the original psychic state before 
the birth of ego consciousness as the Uroborus or the 
circular image of the tail-eating serpent as a representation 
of the self or totality out of which the individual ego is 
born. During the first stages of life the separation of 
ego from self and their constant re-union shows an emerging 
ego which retains its primary identity with the self or 
self-system. The ego processes all incoming input as the 
free centre of the psyche which can differentiate, store 
or reject incoming perception either out of the self entirely 
or into the personal unconscious as repressed material.
The ego orders and focusses capacities of awareness 
as the presiding seat of consciousness. This process 
illustrated in a flow-diagram below is a process which 
enlarges its own structure as it develops. In elaborating 
the ego ' s surrounding structures into a new model^ an attempt 
is made to clarify theoretically the process and its 
structure of the ego itself^ as it separates out from the 
self. Because the ego can split or be destroyed, it must 
have a protective system around it, metaphorically like a
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'cluster' of con-integrates which separate out and unite 
incoming stimuli received by the ego into at least seven 
categories. Where stimuli do not fit these con-integrates 
a lower hierarchical level of multi-integrates is proposed 
and discussed further below. Beyond these postulations 
one could propose that incoming stimuli not interpreted 
as con-integrates or multi-integrates would simply re­
integrate to the less differentiated portion of the self 
named as a less differentiated store of non-integrates.
Operationally, the con-integrate has permeable boundaries 
to the ego but not to other con-integrates except via the 
ego. Where ego development is noticeably weak or undifferen­
tiated in the child it is postulated that part of the problem 
is a too-slow development of con-integrates which defend, 
delineate and strengthen the ego and clarify areas of 
awareness necessary to performance and perception. Con- 
integrates are both adaptive and interpretive. They coagu­
late or bring together, via their permeable boundaries to 
the ego, the re-integrates of their specific 'area' which 
are fundamental to the early ego growth and its participation 
in infancy and childhood. It is proposed that with the 
exception of the play con-integrate which merges into a 
play-work content over time, the other con-integrates
remain throughout life in their original focus and have in 
this regard the closest access to ego material and ego 
process.
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2. The flow-diagram of the self-ego system
In the following flow diagram a basic conceptual sketch 
of the con-integrate system within the self, including the 
multi-integrate and non-integrate levels, is attempted.
The flow-diagram gives a binary and conjectural formulation 
of how input material may be processed through the archives 
of the self and its integrates' system of allocation (see 
Diagram 4).
The self/ego system has an Input Control Centre (A) in 
which initial registration of ectophysic and endophysic 
input occurs. As the ego's task is to focus the capacities 
of consciousness, the facts and data of the outer ecto­
physic environment are processed through the same system as 
the inner endophysic input from the matrix of inner psychic 
life, e.g. memories and recollections, affective emotions 
and the subjective components of conscious functions (thinking, 
feeling, sensation and intuition) and invasions from the 
unconscious. All incoming material passes the Threatening- 
to-Ego Test Centre (B) where contents which are threatening 
to the function of the self/ego system may be taken from 
processing into the personal unconscious for enforced storage 
in the Personal Unconscious Repression Storage (B').
ci. Repression
Repression occurs to make contents inoperative which 
threaten the ego. The ego gives more strength avoiding 
pain via repression than to accepting it. This rejection 
implies that ego development must be sufficiently conscious 
to resist that which is dangerous to itself and to keep it 
out of consciousness by relegating it to the personal unconscious
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"... (ego) is the mental agency which supervises all its 
own constituent process..." (Freud 1914). As the ego 
begins to de-integrate and re-integrate the conscious 
begins to emerge. "...repression is not a defence mechanism 
present from the very beginning ... it cannot occur until 
a sharp distinction has been established between what is 
conscious and what is unconscious" (Freud 1925) . The ego, 
which is in direct contact with the external world during 
de-integration/re-integration, is adapted to the reception 
and exclusion of stimuli and is governed by considerations 
of self-preservation and safety. The ego must also defend 
itself against overwhelming demands of the internal input 
such as threatening instinctual contents of great power from 
the collective unconscious. The weak and immature ego of 
the child is particularly vulnerable to external dangers; 
parents ideally create a security for the child's ego but 
the child pays for this security by a fear of the loss of 
love from caretakers which would render him helpless to some 
of the dangers of the external world. Repression of these 
security fears often occurs and if ego development lags 
behind libidinal development generally, the precondition 
for neurosis occurs. The phylogenetic influences also act 
on the ego and if very intensified can become intolerably 
painful and repression is attempted. It is assumed that 
associative material to the repressed will also be repressed 
but the present state of knowledge is less than clear about 
this. Unpleasant mental content probably covers a wide 
field but repression itself is initiated by anxiety that 
arises from interference with conscience or other means of
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preserving the parents' love, or interference with the 
maintenance of self-esteem. Internalization of the 
primitive threat from parents influences the repression 
sequence. Culture influences parents' opinions as to what 
behaviour in the child should be punished. Ideas or 
memories relating to motives that are punished would be what 
Freud considered unpleasant content that might be repressed.
Early experiments have been full of methodological 
defects (Sears 1942) but Kline (1972) argues there are some 
significant exceptions. Wilkinson and Carghill (1955) 
studied the recall of two stories from dream sequences, one 
neutral and one containing symbolic Oedipal material. Recall 
for the Oedipal story was significantly worse. Levinger and 
Clark (1961) took reaction times and galvanic skin responses 
to emotive words and to neutral words. Rotated factor 
analysis of all variables makes this experiment strong 
evidence for repression theory. The multivariate statistical 
check ruled out response competition as the determining 
factor of the results although its influence must be estimated, 
and failure to recall was shown to be related to the emotionality 
of words. Jung's Word-Association studies (1918) give impressive 
clinical evidence for the return of the repressed. Subjects 
when asked to repeat a list of word associations sometimes 
responded with difficulty, were reduced to silence, changed 
responses or were unable to associate again to certain words. 
Galvanic skin responses were higher for disturbed responses 
than for undisturbed response. These indicators of emotion­
ality can be regarded as evidence for the return of the repressed.
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Problems with testing repression lie with what the 
criteria for normal can be; an apparently neutral stimulus 
might be related, for some persons, to repressed material. 
Anxiety, as studied in experiments, has not been related 
to Freud's concept of the specific areas discussed above, 
which constitute unpleasant content for the ego in relation 
to repression thresholds. Virtually no repression experi­
ments have been devised for very young children nor does 
it appear likely that the laboratory can concoct Oedipal 
or castration wishes or other profound anxieties.
b. De-integrates and archetypes
If the Input (A) is not sent to Repression (B‘) it moves 
to the De-integration Matches (C and D). De-integrates are 
like islands of consciousness in the sea of the self; they 
are archetypal predispositions for objects and experiences 
that activate bits of ego consciousness when they meet and 
link up. The de-integration process refers to cognitive and 
conative processes and applies to the entire development of 
infant, child and adult. Through the self-ego process 
system, de-integration and re-integration continually take 
place and the re-integrated parts of the self-ego become 
more realized "in terms of flesh and blood, space and time 
and also have more consciousness attached to them" (Lambert 
1981). The ego 0 » ^ g e s , through the coming together of the 
initial pieces of ego consciousness, into a whole ego 
capacity. The ego,can link the archetypal potentialities 
tested in the model by a match of the archetypal image (C) 
to a conscious reality and this forms the internal archetypal
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self-objects spontaneously. "If we were to ask what the 
difference is between the original self-integrate and the 
re-integrated self, after an appropriate series of de­
integrations, at the level of maturity suitable for the 
stage of life that has been reached, we could describe it 
in terms of content" (Lambert 1981). At birth, the infant's 
primary self-integrate is a conglomerate restricted to 
archetypal potentiality and nothing else. But at later 
developmental stages the ego-centre makes coherent arche­
typal images not yet fully experienced as well as arche­
typal internal objects fully identified by the ego.
Re-integration begins to occur if an archetypal m^tch 
is made at (C) and the content moves to (E), the Re-inte­
gration Locus of Control for further processing. Where a 
direct archetypal match is not made, the Differentiated 
Memory Store (D) is searched in case associated differen­
tiated material be stored there and indicate that integration 
to the ego-integrates is possible. If the content is less- 
than-ready for the integrates, it remains stored (D'); 
otherwise the differentiated material is sent for re-inte­
gration (E). If the content does not find any match at (D) 
at all, it is sent to the Match to Undifferentiated Memory 
Store (H) where it is matched to any fragmented ego-bits 
that may be contained in the Undifferentiated Memory Store (H') 
If it does match the Undifferentiated Memory Store it is 
stored there. If not it is sent back through the whole system
for rechecking if at (I) the identified ego-bits demand
reprocessing. If no ego-bits are identified the content is
pushed out of the self-ego system (J).
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Before discussing the integrate-system (E,, F, F ' , G, G ' , H, H ' )■ 
further, I wish to elucidate the difference between the 
two memory stores of the system, the differentiated (D')
•and undifferentiated (H') stores.
C0T. Memory stores
The critical difference between the differentiated 
memory store and the undifferentiated store is that the 
latter only stores non-integral ego-bits of information, 
not yet in a form suitable for recall but readily available 
to recognition where the original stimulus is present.
In the absence of the original stimulus, recall involves 
an ego-orientated process in order to generate recon­
struction within memory search and its verbal correlates. 
Recall develops much later in infants than recognition 
which Friedman (1972) tested at only a few days of age in 
babies. As quite substantial development is required for 
the ego's role in recall and the differentiated memory • 
storage (available also to recognition, but recall from the 
non-integrate undifferentiated storage would be expected to
be poor or even non-existent) it comes as a support for the
self-ego model that recall is present only after one year 
of age (Piaget and Inhelder 1973). It is only then that 
the ego-orientated differentiated memory store could develop 
as a function and as a growing structure. Here I lean on 
Gottlieb's (1970) model for recall which assumes that there 
are "reciprocal effects in the relationship between structure 
and function whereby function can significantly modify the 
development of the structures that are involved in the events" 
Gottlieb admits structural development is probabilistic
against a norm but argues it is unique to each child's
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endogenous and exogenous stimulation. For fostering and 
channelling prenatal physio-anatomical growth, the - 
stimulative events that determine the sequence and outcome 
of prenatal behaviour are: 1) presensory mechanical agita­
tion, 2) interoceptive stimulation, 3) proprioceptive 
stimulation, 4) exteroceptive stimulation, 5) neurochemical 
stimulation and 6) musculoskeletal effects of use or 
exercise.
Gottlieb (1970) reports supporting experimental 
evidence from chick and duck embryo studies and from 
experiments on unborn kittens and guinea pigs. In 
chicks, movements are required from the embryo's own 
skeletal muscles to create articulated cavity formation 
and the sculpturing of cartilaginous surfaces. In duck 
embryos prenatal responses to strong flickering light 
enhances electrical responses at the retina, telence­
phalon and the optic lobe. Hormones injected prenatally 
can alter the sex direction of male chicks and guinea pigs. 
If structure were unidirectional, the structure would 
continue.to determine function blindly and simply throw 
off these manipulative exogenous stimulations. Gottlieb's 
bidirectional structure-function hypothesis assumes 
reciprocal effects: that function can modify development 
of both peripheral and central structures.
Ego development is not an invariant course of develop­
ment but is reactive to stimulational developmental factors 
at all of its stages. This tallies with the integrate- 
theory in that recall would be available as ego^growth
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permits a wider scope of differentiated storage to occur 
and be accessible. Both recognition and recall depend on 
acquisition and retention of information and both involve 
a match-decision process. Recall needs additional pro­
cessing such as complex encoding skills, linking stimulus 
items, elaboration, generative representation, verbali­
zations, etc. These, processes are facilitated in the 
self-ego model in that the check with the differentiated 
memory store comes first before integrate-matches and the 
secondary non-integrate store are reached. Of course, the 
process remains slower in recall than recognition because 
of its complexity and later partly because of the huge 
storage in the differentiated store.
Recognition failure of recallable words (Tulving and 
Thomson 1973) has been claimed: however superior recall was 
only found in testing recall in the presence of contextual . 
clues, but recognition was not so tested. This experiment 
is really a test of recognition more than a test of recall 
as contextual clues contain the presence of partial stimulus 
Tulving admits that his free- and forced-choice experimental 
designs bring problems underlying his procedure that are 
unknown. Light and Carter-Sobell (1970) argue that recogni­
tion tests should include a control of the semantic aspect; 
retrieval would need to be tagged the exact way a noun is 
used. 'Squash', for example, would be tagged in several 
ways; squash, the noun, as sport or as a drink and as the 
verb, 'to squash'.
In the self/ego model recognition would take perceptual 
input directly to each memory store; with recall^it is 
assumed that self-generated representations requiring an
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independent ego integration are matched with memory 
representation and that this is principally linked to 
the differentiated store under normal circumstances.
In psychopathology the unidifferentiated store of 
non-ego material may flood verbalization as in the 'word- - 
salad' of full-blown schizophrenia. The differentiated 
store where recall may evoke a full impression - in the 
absence of a model - that an object or event has been 
experienced or perceived at a prior moment in time, 
requires symbolic representation. Such internalized images 
are dependent on a healthy ego for the correct mnemonic 
process of recall involving figurative knowledge under a 
mnemonic referent. Obviously ego-damage seriously impairs 
the control of mental imagery and language, so here too a 
'word-salad' may develop in psychopathology from the 
differentiated store.
The original healthy ego re-integrates a sufficiently 
w*hole image or clear mnemonic referent to differentiate 
integrate-memory back into language in the process of recall 
I would argue that it is the role of the ego and its memory 
storage as an integrate (differentiated store) or a non- 
integrate (undifferentiated store) that is the initial 
criterion for the structure and function of storage.
Perlmutter and Lange (1978) report that two-year-olds, 
are sometimes better than adults in recognizing old items 
presented again. Recognition involves, on the self/ego 
model, the quick scan of both memory stores. In the two- 
year-olds' life the differentiated store is still rather - 
empty which could explain their speed in recognition scan.
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Later the differentiated store is very full but improvement 
in encoding strategy via rehearsal would enable test results 
almost to equal out up to middle age. Recognition rarely 
improves much with age; that points significantly to the 
early availability in the first year of non-integrate memory 
- bits which the self/ego system scans as strategy and 
practice during the gradual tuning-in of the ego-integrate 
differentiated storage which becomes active at about one year 
This postulation of memory stores within the self/ego model 
can assimilate the theoretical dual-process information 
models (see Kintsch 1970, Klatzky 1975) and Piaget's intelli­
gence-dependent developmental memory model.
j. Re-integration and the integrates
If contact reaches the re-integration (E) centre it is 
first matched to the con-integrate prototypes (discussed at 
length in the next section). The seven con-integrates are 
closest to ego-identity and process and they have first 
choice of assimilating the material which the self-ego de- 
integrate accepts into re-integration. The con-integrates 
build up residues and implications from ego-direction as it 
balances, directs and processes the inner and outer impinge­
ment which re-integrates into the con-integrates' nature of 
function. All con-integrates are intrinsic to the infant's 
need to interpret experience and they incorporate the 
infant's most ego-related needs.
Ego re-integrates that do not belong to the con-inte­
grates move to the Multi-Integrate Match (G). These are 
conscious bits of self which fall outside the con-integrates 
but which the self-ego can use progressively and develop- 
mentally. They cohere in the principal sensory, perceptual
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and motility systems. ' Multi-integrates might be the 
cognitively and conatively developed areas when very 
complex, like the learning of a second language and other 
skills requiring combinations of integrates secondary to 
the con-integrates and beneath them hierarchically among 
the integrates. It is outside the task of theory at the 
level of the con-integrates to comment further on multi- 
integrates. They deserve separate empirical study.
Where no multi-integrate match is made, content is 
matched to the Undifferentiated Memory Store (H). It remains 
there should it contain sufficient ego-bits for retention.
If not it is checked at (I) for a repeat processing through 
the self/ego system if any ego-bits are identified in the 
content at this last check point; if not sent back for 
reprocessing, the content is pushed out of the self/ego 
system altogether (J).
The binary-process scheme is an efficient descriptive 
method for imaging these processes and was introduced to 
clarify my model of the self-ego and its integrate system.
The entire system is dependent on the ego as a growing locus 
of control within and relative to a self that integrates its 
a priori archetypal configurations against the. endophysic 
and ectophysic real ties of the infant's psychic life.
This model has the advantage of being suitable for all 
developmental stages in the life of the self-ego and its 
emerging consciousness through its match-storage system.
It has parsimony in its model-construction of great economy
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and I could, not discover a simpler conceptual framework 
that will integrate the extraordinarily complex data, 
i.e. everything a person can relate to and integrate into 
himself at any stage of life.
3. Description of the con-integrates
The seven con-integrates will be defined and described 
with reference to the self-ego relationship that begins in 
infancy.
Speech
With the influx of tape recording and video taping^ the 
analysis of linguistics and acoustics has assumed vast pro­
portions. Details of the infant's approach to speech has 
never before been so fully documented. Much of this work 
is reported for its own sake; some of it is related to theory 
The overall quality of experimental work in the last two 
decades emphasizes the sense of utterances as more important 
than their form to the infant child. Work has often centred 
on distinguishing speech sounds in terms of phones, phonemes, 
distinctive features, phonological rules and intonation.
These are the elements usually classified in the scores 
of recent publications on language development in children.
Some of the valuable discoveries in this literature 
relate to the development of speech perception in the very 
young baby. In work by Eimas et al (1971) one month-olds 
were discovered to have categorical perception of phonemes. 
This is well before the child begins to approximate speech 
sounds in babbling usually placed at three to four months.
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By ten to fifteen months some words are intelligible and 
after age two there is more evidence reported by the de 
Villiers (1978) that the correct reproduction of distinctive 
features on their own as a learning device becomes important 
to children at this time. Studies of deletion and sub­
stitution which are based on later babbling suggest that 
in its last stages babbling is already partially governed 
by restrictions similar to those of the phonological develop­
ment in early words. Between two and four the child learns 
a rather limited scope of grammatical rules using agent, 
possessive and locative. Simple two- or three-term pro­
positions are first mastered and then shades of meaning, 
signalled by grammatical morphemes, are added in a relatively 
stable order.
The relationship between a child's world-knowledge, 
intentions to communicate and early word-strings is a 
difficult study. The boundary line between the sense in 
which the child may have an idiosyncratic linguistic 
category in his head and its similarity/dis-similarity to 
the generally accepted system of the category is difficult 
to judge or delineate. Experts argue over early semantics 
in child language. Bloom (1973) believes the child's 
correct use of words like 'this', 'more' and 'allgone' 
means children understand the semantic relations involved 
(nomination or existence, recurrence and nonexistence).
On the other hand, Braine (1976) believes the semantic status 
of such terms is narrower in child's grammar than in adults.
He points to the groping patterns of early speech and suggests
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children express a meaning before they learn word position 
in linguistic strings. Both Nelson (1976) and Rosch (1973) 
point out that the exemplars of nouns such as 'cat' or 
'chair' may share some physical features but a search for 
common features among all proper exemplars fails and leads 
to null sets. This suggests that the child searches for 
semantic meanings, not physical elements of syntax, and that 
core meanings, feeling, function and experience combine into 
prototypically organized experiences in which core meaning 
is lodged. Further experience then elaborates this.
Language enables the child to demand, to question, to blame 
and to deny. The de Villiers (1978) believe the child 
comprehends more information than he can express in language 
at first, and that he uses conceptions of events that are 
based on stored information as to what is likely in a 
situation and what is expected of him.
Condon and Sander (1974) report the results of a decade 
of films of neonate and caretaker taken during the first 
hours of life. T M f  interest is the connection between 
linguistics and kinesic body movement. Condon hypothesizes 
that the neonate moves synchronously with adult speech as 
early as the second day of life. Body motility is seen as 
partly growing out of sound patterns around the child as 
well as its well documented relation to touch. Film was 
analysed in l/6th of a second 'units' and a self-synchronous 
rhythm-hierarchy in babies' motility characteristic of human 
speech behaviour was discovered. The unit is a segment in 
which several body parts will sustain whatever direction or 
speed in which they are moving for brief duration.
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This reveals a behavioural 'mode' that contrasts with 
previous and following 'bundles' of speech-movement. This 
may be characteristic of all nervous systems. A listener 
moves synchronously with a speaker in an 'entrainment'.
In videotaping infants from twelve hours to two weeks of 
age, the stimuli used were an adult speaker and audio tapes 
of English, Chinese, vowel sounds and tapping sounds.
Precise synchrony of infant movement with the articulatory 
structure of adult speech was discovered.
The infant, by moving into the organization of his 
cultural speech structure, gains a huge number of repetitions 
of linguistic forms before he uses them in speech. The 
neonate participates immediately in communication from the 
first day of life through entrainment of body movement to 
environmental speech patterns. This behavioural evidence 
suggests that entrainment to speech may be innate and that 
a con-integrate is developing within the self/ego from the 
first or second day of life. It could only become delineated 
with the ego's own development.
The use of continuity in early child language suggests 
the early participation of the ego. 'She came it over there' 
was a sample from a child's use of 'come' while watching a 
dog take a piece of food into the next room (Bowerman 1974) . 
This child had always used 'come' with the meaning 'move'.
She thought it could also mean 'cause to move' by hypothe­
sizing that it might operate as 'walk' in 'the dog walked' 
and 'the man walked the dog'. Children tend to build on 
what they already know. Early objects are usually named 
only after they are noticed, picked up and studied.
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This choice of objects suggests the ego is involved in 
naming objects and that language has the formation of a 
con-integrate in close relation to ego-object delineation 
from the first weeks of life.
E. Clark (1978) has traced the use of continuity and 
hypotheses in the development of deictic terms which in 
person-deixis involves 'I', 'we', 'you' or 'they'. Deixis
relates to objects with locatives or demonstratives like 
'here' or 'that'. The study of deixis also includes place, 
movement and cause. Gestures start off and are built into 
directives in language by children in a series of develop­
mental stages. The learning of 'here' or 'there' is 
dependent on the ego's separation from the outer object or 
speaker in order to comprehend where the point of view 
originates. This is essential Within deictic language.
Personal interaction and the shyness of a child dynami­
cally effect the way linguistic ability develops. Language 
is closely related in its idiosyncratic development to the 
complexity of ego-needs and the way these are met in the 
child linguistically. The speech con-integrate develops in 
the early weeks of life and continues as a principal mode 
of expression throughout life. The speech con-integrate is 
postulated as indispensable, important to ego-object separation 
and as taking to itself all the linguistic signals for 
cognitive development that it can. The large area of the 
left hemisphere usually used for much of speech development 
shows its great biological significance. For the self to 
utilize its complete sphere of ego-consciousness, speech 
becomes enormously important to the self-expression of ideas 
as information and as theory.
- 212 -
Ego-Shadow
C.G. Jung designated the shadow generally as a principal 
archetype in the collective unconscious and also as the 
repressed material in the personal unconscious. To avoid 
confusion, my term Ego-Shadow relates not to all repressed 
material but to repression intimately connected to the ego 
itself and particularly to the birth of the ego. On the flow- 
diagram model above, this material would be automatically 
repressed by the Threatening-to-Ego repression centre and 
then that material most closely related to the stage which 
ego-development had reached would be filtered into thé Ego- 
Shadow con-integrate for unconscious storage of ego material. 
This process which is unconscious is not shown in the model 
diagram itself. I insinuate it here. The ego would control 
release of Ego-Shadow material in projection as it becomes 
tolerable to the ego from its conscious standpoint.
I put the Ego-shadow.into self theory as a con-integrate 
because repression is present in the baby as he de-integrates 
out from the ego to incoming phenomena, tries a match to the 
archetypal level to achieve re-integration into the self and 
may quite early on begin to project the repressed material of 
the personal unconscious which is specifically relegated to 
the Ego-Shadow con-integrate onto his growing conscious 
ability to tolerate a mismatch between ego/self and de-inte­
grates. This toleration prevents disintegration and I 
believe all babies would experience disintegration without a 
repression system for ego protection. For example, we can 
consider that at the moment the mother stops a breast feed.
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the infant may cry in rage having no cognition that he will 
get another feed later. Eventually he may be able to repress 
the anxious feeling as the nipple is withdrawn, or as he spits 
it out, and this repression into the Ego-Shadow con-integrate 
may enable him to tolerate the wait between feeds prior to a 
cognition that he is in a secure feeding schedule. In this 
way the Ego-Shadow would be serving the need of ego-development 
and preventing disintegration from the first days of life. 
Repression can initially serve a positive role to increase 
the child's toleration of delay in meeting immediate ego-needs 
and to help delineate the curious or de-integrating 'I' from 
a fearful and anxiously repressed nature. The shadow as an 
overall term contains all the non-conscious aspects of per­
sonality over, time from both collective and personal levels 
of the unconscious and can only be measured in its projections. 
When a child begins to play, he can project good and bad 
repressions onto toys or the play situation enabling child 
therapists to catch glimpses of unconscious material.
Where there is a birth trauma through late or difficult 
delivery, oxygen problems or surgery directly after parturi­
tion, the shadow itself as a whole and the Ego-Shadow as a 
préfiguration in the con-integrate system can protect the 
birth of the ego out of the self by repressing and containing 
birth traumata so that something like normal ego development 
can begin. There may be a birth-archetype which would co­
ordinate other elements of the fight-for-life outside the 
womb in the baby. Birth traumata bear a relationship to 
psychic life whether they remain unconscious or are later 
raised to consciousness.
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The ego separates out gradually from the self until-the 
child no longer refrains from saying 'I', drawing 'me' or 
acting out 'myself' in play. However difficult a problem 
the general shadow may be in the personality of adult life, 
the Ego-Shadow as a con-integrate is indispensibly helpful 
to the initial survival of the ego-complex in infancy as it 
begins to separate out from its initial fusion with the self.
As the child's ego gains in stability and range the Ego- •
Shadow con-integrate functions when inhibitions and repressions, 
especially close to the ego', occur.
C  The Ego-Ideal
The Ego-Ideal con-integrate is conceptually based on 
Freud's super-ego but it is argued, takes effect earlier in 
the child's life than Freud postulated. Freud believed the 
super-ego to be the residues of the earliest object choices 
of the unconscious and not formed .until the resolution of 
the Oedipus Complex in the child. It was derived from a 
transformation of the child's earliest object-cathexis by 
identification with the object and introjection with it.
Freud did not realize that it could be formed before the 
resolution of the Oedipal Complex because he conceived of the 
super-ego as partly a reaction formation against the Oedipal 
Complex. But an earlier formation of ego-ideals in infancy 
is in no way dependent on a reaction formation to Oedipal or 
Elektra Complexes. The existence of narcissism in infants 
before the ego is differentiated enough to risk non-narcissism 
suggests an early identification with the lengthy childhood 
helplessness and dependence of self/ego upon parents or
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caretaker and the beginning of a permanent expression to 
the influence of the parents. The Ego-Ideal even if it 
does begin with the mother and her nutritive role normally 
includes the father at a very early stage. There is no 
reason to assume that the feminine and masculine side of 
environmental influence on the infant does not begin almost 
at once in the infant from the atmosphere of the caring 
situation forward. This is particularly true now that 
fathers are tending to take a more active role with babies 
from their birth (Parke 1979).
The Ego-Ideal gives a "...permanent expression of the 
influence of the parents..." (Freud 1927). In the young 
child this spreads to include the influence of siblings and 
older relatives and friends of the household. Whatever 
personal evocation of the parents archetypal development 
enables a child to have, much happens psychologically as 
this influence moves into the development of external 
personality traits. "We know that the loss of the mother 
(without adequate substitute) during the first year of the 
child's life can lead to death, severe deteriorization and 
psychotic disturbances, whereas if the loss occurs after a 
normal primary relationship in the earliest developmental 
period the chances cf the child's healthy development are 
much more promising even if he becomes ill" (Neumann 1959) .
Jung maintained that the real mother evokes the mother 
archetype in the psychic structure of the child and that 
this can function independently of the mother's reality as a 
compensating psychic reality. The same would be true for the 
instigation of a father archetype. Both archetypes would 
make secure the ego-self relationship achieved in a successful
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primary relationship (usually to the mother, but possibly 
to a maternal father). If the primary relationship is the 
basis for security, nourishment and containment in the 
long dependency of the baby on its caretaker, then the 
Ego-Ideal has ample time to develop as a con-integrate.
It would influence the regulation of development within 
the child's psyche, between him and other individuals and 
later between him and society. In childhood, the overall 
intrapsychic development can be described as an initial 
"... interdependence of ego and self, conflict between ego 
and self, growth of ego and consciousness out of the 
unconscious and conflict between ego consciousness and the 
unconscious as a result of increasing independence" (Neumann 
1959).
At every stage the Ego-Ideal must be developing in its 
hierarchical, conservative and authoritative influence on 
the ego. Freud was very defensive in his arguments about 
the Oedipal situation and the super-ego and he overlooked 
the realization that ego-ideals were developing much earlier 
and that this influences the child's ego in the first year 
of life.
It is proposed that the con-integrate of the Ego-Ideal 
begins its long development early in the infant's develop­
ment through the discipline and learned strictures of 
behaviour from the parents or caretakers and continues to 
operate, with modification, throughout life. -
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j. The Aesthetic
The aesthetic appreciation of the beautiful has been 
documented by C.W. Valentine in 'The Experimental Psychology 
of Beauty' (1962). The bulk of the statistical summaries 
referred to children over the age of four and is just outside 
the age-range considered here, although the individual case 
material involving Valentine's children is very helpful.
It is a part of common experience to hear children of two, 
three and four years of age show a recurrent use of the 
word 'pretty' when referring to flowers and pictures. This 
showed up in Valentine's child "Y" who took Binet's Faces 
Test (see Burt 1921) and always showed preference for 'pretty' 
faces. Burt found when using the Binet test that 33% of 
three-year-olds chose the 'pretty' face in each of three 
pair-choices presented, 67% of four-year-olds did so and 
91% of the five-year-olds. The criteria for 'prettiness' 
would be widely debated today. Was Binet simply measuring 
'average' types of faces against 'non-average' which the 
children responded to as 'like' or 'unlike' their normal 
daily environment? Was Binet measuring evenness of photo­
genic facial features as against unevenness?
Spontaneous verbal description showing feeling for 
aspects of the aesthetic may be a truer indication of the 
aesthetic in the very young. Wilhelm Stern in his 
Psychology of Early Childhood (1924) reported that his 
daughter "L.E." at four years and four months said: "Who 
has made the dish so beautiful - just like a picture?
How nice it looks - apples and vine leaves, you see yellow 
below and green above".
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It is important in arguing that the development of
aesthetic discernment should be a con-integrate to establish
that the aesthetic dynamic is closely related to the growth
of ego-consciousness. To get to the stage where the child
can abstract himself from his .needs and experience pure will
and self-control while making aesthetic choices involves
previous developmental processes (Abenheimer 1968). In the
early oral phase of development, related to needs for being '
fed, protected, touched, comforted and brought into some
sort of dialogue with caretakers (in vision, sound, holding
and playing), the less good responses the baby experiences
makes him exhibit defences. Self-awareness begins as the
need for survival and help. ' In the anal phase that follows,
the Freudian school believes that in the conscious expulsion
of faeces the infant be-comes aware of his own power. The
omnipotence that'results is neurotic. • It becomes non-neurotic
when the infant can show aggressive power without needing to
feel omnipotent and achieves another development of flexible 
%
self-awareness. A third level of self-awareness, essential 
to aesthetic experience, comes out of the oral and anal phases 
It occurs when a child_can abstract himself under pressure of 
needs or dangers with self-control, in an authentic self, as 
the agent of controlled will.
An ultimate essence of all aesthetic experience has been 
described by Worringer (1908) as the need for self-alienation. 
He means this in the sense that the contemplation of the 
aesthetic takes the self away for a time from the problems 
of existence and its dangers. At the same time, there is a
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bi-polar quality in aesthetic experience. It requires 
empathy which can objectify self-enjoyment and is a self- 
affirmation as well as requiring the capacity of self­
alienation. In empathizing our will into another object 
(art, music, nature, etc.) we absorb ourself into the 
outer object with our urge to know it and accept, momen­
tarily, its fixed boundaries. These boundaries limit the 
usual ongoing differentiation of individual needs and a 
self-alienation occurs. "In empathy ... I am not the real 
I, but am inwardly liberated from the latter ..." (Lipps 
1903).
As the ego builds itself through the de-integration - 
re-integration process it reaches a level of function where 
it can afford to fuse temporarily with an object of aesthetic 
pleasure and thereby gain distance through alienation not 
only from the ego but from the self-defences. In what is 
felt as an empathetic ego fusion to the object, we are wit­
nessing an ego-choice which is a self-affirmation in terms 
of need or taste, but a technical self-alienation in terms 
of the intensity with which the ego merges 'into' the chosen 
aesthetic object. In the development of ego-consciousness 
the child seems to experience two directions simultaneously. 
"On the conscious level he goes on developing even finer 
differentiations among the appearances of the real things 
around him, while in his unconscious fantasy life he undoes 
even the most fundamental differentiation of commonsense 
reality and so creates images that cannot have any possible 
correlate in rational thought" (Ehrenzweig 1967).
- 220 -
Both of these developmental aspects, conscious and unconscious, 
play into the aesthetic experience which involves a fine 
conscious choice and differentiation as well as the pro­
jection of unconscious image.
Aesthetic experience is paradoxical in its combination 
of objectified self-enjoyment and a temporary self-alienation 
in the urge to abstraction and fusion outside the self and 
its normally fixed ego boundaries. The aesthetic experience 
is a con-integrate because of the accumulation of these 
experiences which begin in early childhood and because of 
the particular relationship the aesthetic has to ego develop­
ment and temporary separation from total control of the self. 
The feedback of the aesthetic can reflect upon the signifi­
cance of the self and facilitate its authentic realization.
The aesthetic builds ego-consciousness which contains 
"... its enabling awareness and consciousness, its focus of 
perception and its factor of mediation between itself and 
the environment within and without" (Lambert 1981) .
g. Play
Play is a universal element of childhood. Play is a 
concept on its own not reducible to any one socio-psycho- 
logical view of the universe or to any one stage of civili­
zation. The play element has existed in all cultures and 
in all known historical periods. It may be described as a 
supra-biological form through which society expresses its 
interpretation of life and the world (Luria 1966). Why is 
play civilizing? The play element introduces certain rules 
and the concept of fair play into civilization.
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This enables civilization to presuppose limitation and 
some mastery of the self which gives persons the ability 
to understand that personal conduct within any civilization 
must remain within certain freely accepted bounds. A 
general characteristic of play is tension and uncertainty.
'Will we win? Will it come off?' ay-E conditions of uncertainty 
fulfilled in card games or football, in crosswords or 
archery, in shaking a rattle or reaching for one's toes.
In the play world if the rules are transgressed, the whole 
play world collapses. In the same way, nations go to war 
if the currently accepted lawful rights of national sovereignty 
are overstepped.
Play has been considered both as a physiological 
phenomenon and a psychological reflex. These approaches 
overlook an aspect of "at playness" in play that imparts 
meaning to action. The fun of playing is rarely measured 
when experimenters view play as quantitative. In some types 
of play, biological functions are to be seen. A biological 
approach assumes play must serve something which is not play. 
Theories about this mention the need for abreaction, for 
outlets of harmful impulses, for wish-fulfillment and for 
a means to bolster the feeling of personal value. This may 
involve the release of extra energy through imitation, 
experimentation, assimilation and competition.
The contrast between play and seriousness is a fluid 
one. For the very young child, serious play was thought 
by Vygotsky to mean that the child was not separating the 
imaginary situation from the real one. In this way aspects 
of play are irrational. Tension and its solution are often
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present in play. A game can represent a contest or it may 
become a contest for the best representation of something.
Both Luria (1966) and Piaget (1951) agree that play is the 
leading source of development during pre-school years.
In viewing play as a con-integrate it is important to 
note how useful play is to early ego-strengthening. The 
child both pretends and tries to master adult situations 
through accommodation to the external situation and assimi­
lation of experience into meaning. Play is an activity 
occurring before a behaviour is fully organized suggesting 
that aspects of ego-development are at an under-developed 
stage. Play can be a preparation for life both via the 
realization of the environment that it can demonstrate, as 
a repetition of experience and as the communication of 
symbolic fantasy. Symbolic play is assimilative in that it 
organizes thinking in terms of symbols and images already 
partly mastered. The child's ego-centric position during
symbolic play enables him to make a transition over time to 
«
a more and more accurate representation of reality. As the 
child is more adapted, play becomes constructive and eventually 
the child very gradually.plays less by himself after he enters 
the arena of school life (Millar 1968).
The idea that play may be an antidote to under-stimu­
lation or boredom suggests that the building of more ego- 
experience is needed within an optimal amount of stimulation. 
But the concept of optimal stimulation has a wide application 
given the great variation in individual babies' metabolic and 
environmental stimulation levels. Both in its inner and outer 
reality for the child, play constantly challenges the ego
- 223 -
through its directedness, concentration.and release of 
another form of play or non-play activity. Play is very 
much the child's own private ego-directed world and as such 
a strong conglomerate integrated very early around the ego.
As the child grows he learns through play's zone of 
proximal development: the imaginary is often near to the 
memory of the real and voluntary intentions may combine 
with the formation of real-life plans and volitional motives. 
In creating imaginary situations abstract thought develops. 
These abstractions, when expressed as rules, lead to the 
understanding of rules and the later division between work 
and play at school age. Play is a preamble to work.
In the young child there are many unrealizable tendencies 
and desires. Under age three, the infant wants immediate 
gratification. Play can be said to be invented at the point 
when the unrealizable tendencies appear in development.
What interested the infant no longer interests the toddler.
The transitional nature^ of play is described by Piaget as an 
intermediary between the situational constraints of early 
childhood and play ideas free of an actual situation. In 
game rules, the child can set the rules by himself free of 
the one-sided influence of an adult or make rules he jointly 
establishes with his parents. Freely chosen game rules 
include both self-restraint and self-determination. The ego 
is being relativized and has a close developmental relation­
ship to the play-con-integrate.
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JJ\ . Persona
Jung defines the persona as "... a function-complex 
which has come into existence for reasons of adaptation 
or necessary convenience, but by no means is it identical 
with the individuality. The function-complex of the 
persona is exclusively concerned with the relation -to the 
object..." (Jung CW 6 ). Throughout the stages of life 
one adapts one's persona constantly to pressures of the 
environment and of one's own evolving value system.
Persona is "a psycho-physical attitude that mediates between 
the inner and outer worlds, a kind of mask we develop to 
maintain a relatively constant or consistent front to the 
outside world, through which those we meet may relate to 
us fittingly" (Jacobi 1976).
Where in early childhood do we see signs of adaptation 
that are reflected in external behaviour? The infant's 
early persona is immediately involved with s miling. Ende 
and Harrison (1972) measured this to be at a rate of 11 
times in every 100 minutes. They related this to internal 
arousal state or a change of state and to recognizable EEG 
patterns. The social smile appears in the third week when 
a mechanical noise no longer elicits a smile as well as a 
human voice does and as eye-to-eye contact begins to further 
alter smiling patterns (Macfarlane 1975)* I would argue that 
the first almost embryonic appearance of a persona in the 
baby begins with his use of the social smile, at first 
unconsciously, and later very consciously and manipulatively. 
Shaffer (1971) argues that reciprocal behaviour, which would
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involve the baby's use of cognition and a conscious persona, 
begins at the very end of the first year of life. Reciprocal 
intentional signalling to the mother requires comprehension 
of the difference between self-behaviour and the behaviour 
of the other and some awareness of feedback from self­
produced behaviour. Feedback also requires the ability to 
anticipate the outcome of behaviour from past memory and to 
regulate responses in relation to this feedback.
The close connection with ego development is obvious if 
the persona helps the signalling processes and enables the 
child to begin to test details of his behaviour against the 
feedback he receives from his caretakers. Although the 
persona is very gradually socially developed during early 
childhood, it becomes such an important aspect of adult 
behaviour as to give it sufficient force to be a con-inte­
grate from the beginning of infancy. Behavioural studies 
have tended to quantify measures of smiling, crying, eye 
movements and the like without picking up the idiosyncratic 
differences within these modes in individual children as 
their person develops and acts to alter their manner of 
appearing and doing. Families mould persona so individually 
that by the time the child enters school he will need a 
major change of persona adaptation towards the group. The 
persona's adaptive function deals with incoming stimulation 
in a principal way from very early life and is, I believe, 
a con-integrate in its great influence upon the ego's role 
in behaviour and style of response throughout life.
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^ . . Defence of self
Self-defence as a con-integrate refers to the ways the 
infant can defend the self constellation psychologically.
This is particularly dependent on the early sources of 
security and competence and of ego-defence. A study of how 
personal relationships begin in childhood suggests that they 
are dependent on having elements of security and competence 
between child and caretaker. Whether the child is socially 
advantaged or disadvantaged does not give us a probability 
statement about what damage may occur to the self at psychia­
tric levels of disorder. Often children from stable homes 
do show disorders of the self and children from disadvantaged 
homes may come through unfortunate experiences and still 
develop competence and psychological security.
In children's earliest social development in the first 
months of life, infants respond in much the same way both to 
familiar adults and to strangers. At about seven months 
infants usually attach to a specific person although it can 
happen from 3^ months to 15 months (Ainsworth 1967). Neither 
feeding nor caretaking is the essential feature. The 
intensity of interaction seems to have the greatest effect 
in bonding (Stayton and Ainsworth 1973) . Increased anxiety 
and fear, expressing an ego needing defence, or illness 
when the self is attacked, increases the baby's attachment 
seeking (Bowlby 1969). There is a persisting hierarchy 
among attachments (Schaffer and Emerson 1964) .
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The reduction of anxiety if a familiar person is 
present, in a strange situation, proves how important 
bonding is (Cohen and Campos 1974). Bonding is differen­
tiated from attachment by the selectivity in relationships 
in which the infant persists over time and place. It is 
associated with older children at one or two years when the 
ego is being used by the child in this lasting selection 
of relationships more apparently than in infant attachment 
where ego competence is still not ripe.
New-born infants react in a specific and individual 
way to frustration since de-integrates do not yet re-inte­
grate easily. A similar reaction is present in surprise 
when the ego must try cognitive appraisal. Fraiberg (1968) 
points out that every baby defends or protects himself in 
very specific ways. Anxiety can become attached to ideas 
where previous experience produced pain, frustration, 
instinctive denial (hunger, cold, pain and general somatic 
distress), loneliness or the need to be autonomous. 
Macfarlane et al (1954) studied 100 infants of 21 months of 
age and found 30% had specific fears. At three years, 70% 
were affected by fears.
By the third week the normal baby is using smiles to 
insure that adults will interact with him. This is a 
primary defence of the self. The grasping reflex in the 
first two days enables a baby to hold onto a hand or finger 
and gain stability and contact at once. At six weeks 
amidst the gurgles and babbling and crying, some syllables 
can be heard. There is a rapid read-out of
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defences for the self as the ego de-integrates out to 
objects to assimilate them and re-integrate those which 
match his self-ego development. Self-defence is, like 
the other con-integrates, a very early vital reservoir 
of experience and capacity to cope with attacks to 
security, competence and survival. It would occupy a 
central position of control among the con-integrates 
filtering incoming stimuli from the ego to see if defence 
of the self were needed. Then the incoming stimulus 
would filter into other con-integrates or if more general 
in nature and further down the hierarchy of self, it 
might be designated to a multi-integrate level and find 
its way to the more general store of integrative aspects 
of the self.
4. Theory and empirical evidence
It is not the task of the theoretician to provide 
complete empirical evidence. Other workers in the field 
can continue to build that up. Postulation requires a 
strong conjecture to be put forward as scientific theory 
and defended within the present knowledge in psychology. 
When experimental psychology is ready to acknowledge the 
unconscious through its projection into conscious behaviour 
we will have the requisite foundation from which to explore 
what experiments can achieve for a self theory. In the 
past experimenters have rarely been sufficiently close to 
the work of depth psychologists to fully comprehend what 
is being claimed and to determine if it is testable by 
experiment.
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Basically depth psychologists cannot be blind to- human 
experience or convert it very easily into a laboratory 
setting. Individual experience and its detail is important 
to them. 'Individual' implies that a self involving a
total personality is what needs to be tested by experi­
menters in broadly-based open-ended psychometric approaches. 
If experimenters could work more effectively with deptW 
psychologists and analysts it might be possible to begin 
to quantify depth psychology with carefully designed research 
and strictly controlled experiments. The chief problem has 
been that the postulates of depth psychology are difficult 
to frame in an experimental design. To do so, experimenters 
have often so altered the meaning of the behaviour to be 
tested as to be testing something other than the postulate 
under question.
Using Jung's totality definition of the self, it can 
be argued that the self theory should be the principal 
framework for human psychology as a whole. For all psycho­
logical work is the psyche talking about and working with 
the psyche. That includes everything that can occur to the 
psyche all of which must occur within some self or selves.
To bring back the self theory to its inherent position of 
importance would be an important goal for the future of a 
total psychology - one that includes the richesse of the 
unconscious and its manifestations in conscious experience.
In a hierarchical self theory to which this book contributes, 
we have suitable boundaries for a unity among workers' 
approaches to the psychology of the self in all of its 
ramifications.
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Chapter VII. The con-integrates theory, its empirical . -
research and philosophy
1. The self/ego-integrates theory as a universal theory
Most of the group of 'self' psychologists who worked 
in the United States since 1900 neglected the childhood 
self as the working basis of their theories. Of W. James,
C.H. Cooley, G.H. Mead, R.B. Cattell, E.H. Erikson,
A,H. Maslow, P. Lecky, A. Angyal, H.S. Sullivan, K. Horney,
E. Fromm, C. Rogers, K. Goldstein, W. McDougall and 
G . Allport, only the theories of Sullivan and Allport and 
the work of H. Kohut (discussed in Chapter II, 3, b-5) 
closely relates to the body of work being extended here 
about childhood self.
Sullivan drew attention to the fact that subjects with 
differing available concepts focussed on different aspects 
of the 'same' stimulus. For self behaviour this is interesting 
because two similar behaviours may not have similar self­
conceptions behind them. The monitoring of self by appraisal 
and the differentiation of self/not-self is well introduced 
by Sullivan (1953) but like the other workers in America, he 
treated the self as merely persisting and conistent behaviour 
which was his measure of the self throughout personal develop­
ment. .The self/ego-integrates system, proposed in Chapter VI, 
sets up a process and dynamic for behaviour but it contains 
enough flexibility through its repression, memory and de­
integration systems to allow theoretically for all behaviours; 
it is psychologically well grounded in self theory (Jung, 
Fordham) and its extension in ego-integrate
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theory (Ryce). Sullivan argued for consistency of behaviour 
as the teleological goal of self. It is rather the early 
archetypal behaviour of infants that has some behavioural 
consistency in the early deintegration-reintegration of 
archetypal image-matches that secures the first threshold 
of ego-development and begins the ego-self differentiation. 
Later behaviour is much too varied and complex to be 
consistent as measured by external means over time. As 
the ego develops together with its integrates the range of 
self behaviour would deny any possible externally measured 
consistency of self across a large population as a measure 
of behaviour except in extremely general terms, such as 
introversion-extroversion as a typology.
Sullivan discussed the 'good-me' and 'bad-me' concept 
in babies and concentrated his interest on anxiety states 
picked up from the mother. He reduced all early experience 
at the breast to "nothing but" a reactivity based on the 
degree of ego security in the child as achieved at feeding.
In not dealing with archetypes Sullivan falls into the trap 
of supposing that the ego's only concern is defence. In 
relating the con-integrates to the ego I have tried to show 
the integral set of developing ego-areas that influence the 
developing self. All these may contain an element of defence, 
like an immune system in the body, but they contain many 
other dynamics as well.
G. Allport (1961) looked at self in young infants and 
believed in a functional autonomy. His Freudian orientation 
precluded his understanding of the collective unconscious 
and its important contribution to the self.
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Allport named all ego-functions the 'propriété' functions. 
During the first three years he thought the baby's self­
experience consisted of a 'self-body' sense, a 'self- 
identity' and a 'self-esteem'. He confused the role of 
the ego by stating that no self/ego acts as an entity 
distinct from the remainder of personality. In the arche­
typal sense, with which Allport never dealt, this is true, 
for unless the collective and personal unconscious can 
adapt to ego behaviour, and vice versa, the personality 
disintegrates. However the ego can function at a conscious 
level independently of its integrates in that it can use 
its repression system and control what enters the self for 
conscious dynamic use. My contention is that the ego is a 
process and the Flow-Diagram (Chapter VI) of the ego's 
dynamic process, showing its theoretical structural mechanism, 
is perhaps the solution to Allport's dilemma. It should be 
possible to include all of Allport's developmental self 
functions in my model. Allport names those developing after 
age three as self-extension, rational thinking, self-image, 
propriate striving and the function of knowing. It is 
endemic to the ego's deintegration-reintegration pattern 
that a great range of ego material is accepted by the self/ 
ego system for use and storage.
The con-integrate ego system makes clear how the ego- 
match to archetypal images and recognizable self-objects 
develops the personality from infancy. Such a system can 
theoretically operate to create the genius level of a 
Mozart or a Menuhin in infancy or the result of the other 
end of the same spectrum, the autistic infant.
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Definite expression of development becomes more dependent 
on the nature of the environmental stimulation in relation 
to the ego-integrates than to exact intelligence levels.
One could say intelligence levels may largely depend on 
the initial experiences of self, mediated by the ego, its 
con-integrates, the multi-integrates and the fortunes of 
health, genetic and maturational.
2. The research situation
As all activities, functions and structures of the 
psyche are subject to development, a theoretical requirement 
has been a clearer differentiation between ego and self and 
a more detailed developmental ego concept during the first 
years of life. The con-integrate theory modifies ego-self 
theory by suggesting that the ego-conglomerates are vital 
support systems for ego processes.
Development of this process depends on hereditary 
aspects, aspects pertaining to intrauterine and intraparture 
events and early postnatal experience. In reviewing empirical 
studies Schaffer (1971) proposes that the neonate has a 
structure that predetermines apprehension of the external 
world and a stimulus barrier affecting selection. Continuous 
adaptation transforms patterns of structure cognitively so 
that the baby changes his response patterns over time. By 
the tenth month Schaffer suggests an internal scan exists 
in children with which to match external image to internal 
image. Together with Fordham (1958b, 1969, 1976) I believe 
this match occurs during the first weeks of life and the 
deintegration-reintegration ego-process is present early on.
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The development of an enmeshing, entraining intensity of 
interaction between self and other is empirically supported 
by one hundred scientific papers quoted in but one review 
of child development by Schaffer and Dunn (1979).
A particular example of research is by Spitz, Ende and 
Metcalf (1970) who recorded a clearly defined change in the 
third month in babies. They discovered that at this time 
there occurred the emergence of quiet sleep, rapid eye 
movement states, changes in smiling patterns and the intro- 
dLLCtion of the adult form of the EEC sleep-spindle pattern. 
These changes would suggest that ego-differentiation 
correlates with the rapid development of the ego-integrates 
as they build up through the deintegration-reintegration 
process and that these changes found in laboratory testing 
by Spitz et al. are actually to do with ego-integrates' 
development in the self. For example, exogenous smiling 
independent of the infant's endogenous needs, begins to 
occur after six to twelve weeks. Actions of anticipation 
based on memory become present and directed action is seen 
by the third month. This third-month development suggests 
that some of the con-integrates are starting to function in 
ego-support. Whereas endogenous smiling is present in even 
a microcephalic infant with no functioning cerebral tissue 
(Harmon and Ende 1970) and is believed to be mediated by the 
brainstem, the change to exogenous smiling between six and 
twelve weeks marks the increased function of the ego and its 
integrates to the outside world.
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What kind of empirical approach is applicable to the 
study of the con-integrates? It could be said initially 
that wherever an organization of a behavioural element can 
be postulated as present in the child's psyche from three 
months forward (Spitz et al. 1970) that this is the developing 
ego and its integration system visibly functioning. After 
speech occurs, its patterns should reveal some of the con- 
integrates as they further develop in function, provided 
the observer can read the projection of archetypal images 
from the collective unconscious as it projects outward 
from the child's Shadow con-integrate and include this 
aspect in assessment. Depth psychologists are needed to 
help interpret play in the infant. Often activities are 
reported with little understanding of their symbolic signifi­
cance and hence of the Play con-integrate's true relation 
to ego-self. The Ego-Ideal con-integrate can be measured 
by finding differences in behaviour that parents' behaviour- 
style elicits from the child and studying the child's 
projections of archetypal material as he interacts with 
parents. Sand-plays, drawing and paintings made by children 
are useful projective tools among others in the field.
They can be correlated with longitudinal behaviour studies 
of family dynamics. The Aesthetic con-integrate cannot be 
measured quantitatively early on but careful observation of 
developmental signs of the earliest aesthetic awareness 
could lead one to its origins and its process which have 
never been clearly defined. The same may be said of the 
Person&con-integrate and its development (see Chapter VI, 3 
for full discussion).
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The great challenge to empirical study of the con- 
integrates is that it is essential to include experimental 
criteria of what only the subject knows about his own 
behaviour not just what another can measure. In the young 
child it is notoriously difficult to interpret experimenters' 
description and interpretation of early language but arche- 
typally projected images can be studied by photographing 
the child's art or sand-play creations while taping any 
spoken interaction and photographing the child's movements 
and manner of using toys. Where the function of the arche­
types is not included in the psychological study of early 
childhood, empirical work may remain full of unrelated 
detail in hundreds of thousands of experiments unrelated to 
any complete theory of the self/ego and hence become both 
parenthetical and perseverative. Babies cannot be reduced 
to organism or process alone. They are persons and however 
obscure the form of the personal has remained in psychology 
as a whole, the self/ego system is inevitably involved in 
behaviour. As the self is mediated by the ego's constructions 
and interpretations as agent, then experimentalists run a 
danger of incompleteness in that statements about personality 
should include deductions both from laboratory data itself 
and from the self-evaluation of those tested where age allows. 
The predictive capacity of experiments is qiestioned because 
the individual self cannot predict itself. The ego and the 
con-integrates have sufficient freedom of response within 
their archetypal framework to be simultaneous agents of the 
psyche. This precludes laboratory measurement of past
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behaviour as totally predictive of future behaviour. The 
influence of outside objects and their study neglects the 
fact that the self-ego system can adapt its interpretation 
and meaning concepts constantly, so that' over time the 
person's interactions change. The standpoint of the agent 
is in flux.
A parallel study to this idea concerning the indeter­
minism of self-prediction is found in K.R. Popper's work 
(see Popper and Eccles 1977), While the probability of events 
may be predicted from precise information, provided that 
similar conditions are present for their occurrence, events 
between the subject and object and their closed system of 
interaction leads to the unpredictability of events. Popper 
points out that it is impossible for a calculator to have 
up-to-date information about itself. I assert here it may 
also be impossible for the self, in each ego-decision process, 
to be up-to-date with the present and complex incoming demands 
Past states can be explained in detail. It is self-prediction 
while constantly interacting with an on-going self system 
that cannot be accurate. The interaction introduces a 
disturbance into the system whose magnitude is unpredictable.
If a standpoint within this total ongoing action of 
self is not the paradigm for psychology, i.e. the self/ego- 
integrates system proposed here, the alternative is a 
scattered, broken up set of aggregates of extreme psycho­
logical specializations lacking coherence or a n 'organizing 
principle. Disconnected data demands a self theory inclusive 
of childhood leading on through to old age. Hypotheses need
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a developmental procedure that is open to what persons of 
any age can do and become. The self and the ego-integrates
are the processing systems which can include a knowledge
of what the person knows about his own behaviour as well 
as what others observe that behaviour to be. The amalgam 
of inner and outer experience of self/ego, including the 
repeated experiencing of the archetypes is the totality 
within which psychology should be conducting its investi­
gations. Personality is not only what it seems to be for 
others, it is also what one knows it to be oneself. It is
both about what one can do and about what is experienced
in the doing. Action is experiential. This gives two sorts 
of propositions that lead on to higher-order theoretical 
propositions; one of the behavioural action and one of the 
experience of the actor.
3. The philosophical position
Throughout this reappraisal of the self concept I have 
assumed for theoretical purposes that Kant's 'Transcendental 
Deduction' in his Critique of Pure Reason (1788) is a 
philosophical basis for arguing the general approach I have 
used. A summary of those elements of Kant's arguments with 
which the self concepts deal would be that:
a) all experience includes a plurality of sensory elements 
and for these to be seen as subsumed by a single consciousness 
it must be possible to posit a self which is able to be 
conscious of itself;
b) judgments are required to bring elements together into 
a potentially self-conscious experience so experience is 
united by a prepositional form;
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c) an equivocation about self-consciousness would be that 
there are differing kinds: 1- a minimal self-consciousness,
2- a reflective awareness during experience that one is 
having experience and 3- a full consciousness of a persisting 
self requiring inbuilt judgments about the self's past for 
its conceptualizing;
d). there is a structural element in the conception of 
experience that we can make intelligible to ourselves which 
is pervasive, based on experience and related to self as a 
way of functioning and of knowing or experiencing. (This 
is the self-totality framing the self/ego as its 'centre' 
control of action-interpretation).
In the use of concepts to aid the interpretation which 
the self may use about itself, I refrain from citing Kant's 
belief in cause and effect as applicable to any and all 
experience: rather, I present the enlargement of the self/ 
ego theory as the self's structural/dynamic system without 
touching on the philosophical arguments of strict causal 
theories. They are outside our direct concern. What can be 
said is that the self is a required unity if the psyche is 
to make experience coherently conceivable in a single 
consciousness. Theoretically, the subject may or may not 
ascribe each item of psychological experience to himself; 
although he must be able to do so in theory, he may not be 
so self-conscious as actually to do so (see Autism, Chapter 
III). Mental recognition that contains concepts, requires 
a span of memory if experience is to become fully conscious 
and involve the elements together. The entity of such a 
consciousness involves a duality of apperception and of concept
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These representations of apperception and concept belong 
to "... a single consciousness in the sense that they are 
remembered, compared, and so on ..." (Mackie 1974) but they 
may not be seen as belonging to a single consciousness in 
the psychopathology of self as in the contrast between 
'mine' and 'not-mine' in object relations. P.F. Strawson 
(1968) sums up the position regarding the need for a self 
conception in The Bounds of Sense: "... any course of 
experience of which we can form a coherent conception must 
be, potentially, the experience of a self-conscious subject 
and, as such, must have such internal, concept-carried 
connectedness as to constitute it (at least in part) a 
course of experience of an objective world, conceived of as 
determining the course of that experience itself".
The con-integrates are proposed as the self's chief 
concept-carriers. They function under the direction of the 
ego and unify the self's objective input to its own subjective 
connectedness of experiencing. The influence of the arche­
types is seen as the a priori categories of universal human 
experience as they read-out in projection from the collective 
level of the unconscious. The archetypes contribute a degree 
of regularity within the self's innate propensity to inter­
pret sequences of impressions as unity within complexity, 
but their influence over time will be altered by the ego's 
propensities.
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4. Conclusions
In proposing a more extended theory of the ego, two 
ideas were fundamental to its inception: 1) that existing 
ego theory was not sufficiently related to contemporary 
empirical studies and that these areas needed to be 
brought together and 2) that the relationship of the ego 
process to the self concept as a paradigm for individual 
psychology needed further elucidation, defence and theoretical 
amplification. To the extent that this study achieves its 
purpose a further step will have been taken toward the full 
clarification of the self as it constellates its ego process.
Psychologists have been diffident in recent'times about 
extending ego theory. The disarray in the field concerning 
the postulates of ego function is marked. In proposing a 
model for the ego-process, carefully elucidated and growing 
out of the most substantial historical work in ego psychology 
that precedes it, the author has attempted to confront the 
psychological professions with systematic and thoroughly 
argued theory. There has been an attempt to define the terms 
'ego' and 'self' with clarity and to make formulations 
parsimonious throughout. The mode of presentation of the 
ego process in a flow diagram follows the precept that 
scientific explanation should explain the 'most with the 
least'. A theory should be a simplifying statement.
The con-integrates are postulated to show how a large 
number of apparently different inputs to the ego system 
have much in common in their processing into the psychic 
structure. The possibilities for predictability - studies
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should be much enhanced by the theory of the con-integrates 
and their related memory systems. Empirical work must 
contain the context that gave it its motivation for study: 
man's subjective experience of self and its ego-processes. 
The theory of the self objectivizes this subjective set 
of facts in a hierarchical construct, which is parsimonious, 
partially testable in that its postulates are open to 
falsification, and which provides an exciting heuristic 
orientation to ego psychology of great explanatory power.
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